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Many scholarly works address extensively the causes of revolution, but surprisingly 
little work has been done to develop a theory on counter-revolution. Generally, 
counter-revolution has been understood simply as the failure of revolution; counter-
revolution is rarely considered as a process in its own right. This thesis argues that 
counter-revolution is an important form of the transformation of state–societal 
relations that should be investigated in its own right, and not merely regarded as ‘failed 
revolution’ or as the restoration of the pre-revolutionary order.  
Between 2011 and 2013, Egypt experienced two uprisings. In 2011, the mass 
uprising led to the resignation of Mubarak and put his 30-year rule to an end, while in 
2013 a second mass uprising allowed the military to take full control of the country. 
Therefore, Egypt provides an excellent example, and the opportunity for a better 
understanding, of counter-revolution. Revolutionary studies have failed to explain why 
the Egyptian revolution was so fragile. What was a promising start to the 
democratisation process, with free parliamentary and presidential elections, came to 
an abrupt end and remained misunderstood as counter-revolution.  
To address an important question regarding the study of the Egyptian counter-
revolution, this thesis builds on the work of Antonio Gramsci, by reinterpreting its 
concept of subalternity – social groups who lack political power. This new 
interpretation of the concept of subalternity allows this thesis to argue that the 
Egyptian counter-revolution was not the result of a top-down restoration process due 
to the exclusion of civil society; rather, that it was the result of the shifting alliance 
between civil society groups and the military.  
This work aims to make a threefold contribution: (1) to establish a model that 
explains counter-revolution as the outcome of the open-ended revolutionary process 
depending on the interaction of the state transformation and the autonomy of civil 
society. I argue that the counter-revolution was the result of the power dynamics 
between the military, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the revolutionary movements. (2) 
To apply the concept of subalternity to the case of counter-revolutionary Egypt. This 
thesis identifies the main weaknesses that characterise the fragility of the 
revolutionary process. By comparing the strategies used by different social groups 
during the 2011 uprising, I seek to show that the strategy of cooperation used by the 
Muslim Brotherhood, while initially successful, failed to conquer political power 
 vi 
because it excluded the confrontational strategy of revolutionary movements. (3) To 
reconsider state–society relations in Egypt. The post-coup state is not based on form 
of corporatism as was the case pre-2011; rather, Sisi’s regime attempts to allow a 
meaningful participation of social forces in the formation of the counter-revolution 
state.  
By looking at the social drivers of the counter-revolution in Egypt through the lens 
of subalternity, this thesis offers a better understanding of the relationship between 
structure and agency during counter-revolutions that could be applied beyond the 
case of Egypt. 
 vii 
Lay summary 
Many scholarly works address extensively the causes of revolution, but surprisingly 
little work has been done to develop a theory on counter-revolution. Generally, 
counter-revolution has been understood simply as the failure of revolution; counter-
revolution is rarely considered as a process in its own right. This thesis argues that 
counter-revolution is an important form of the transformation of state–societal 
relations that should be investigated in its own right, and not merely regarded as ‘failed 
revolution’ or as the restoration of the pre-revolutionary order.  
Between 2011 and 2013, Egypt experienced two uprisings. In 2011, the mass 
uprising led to the resignation of Mubarak and put his 30-year rule to an end, while in 
2013 a second mass uprising allowed the military to take full control of the country. 
Therefore, Egypt provides an excellent example, and the opportunity for a better 
understanding, of counter-revolution. Revolutionary studies have failed to explain why 
the Egyptian revolution was so fragile. What was a promising start to the 
democratisation process, with free parliamentary and presidential elections, came to 
an abrupt end and remained misunderstood as counter-revolution.  
To address an important question regarding the study of the Egyptian counter-
revolution, this thesis builds on the work of Antonio Gramsci, by reinterpreting its 
concept of subalternity – social groups who lack political power. This new 
interpretation of the concept of subalternity allows this thesis to argue that the 
Egyptian counter-revolution was not the result of a top-down restoration process due 
to the exclusion of civil society; rather, that it was the result of the shifting alliance 
between civil society groups and the military.  
This work aims to make a threefold contribution: (1) to establish a model that 
explains counter-revolution as the outcome of the open-ended revolutionary process 
depending on the interaction of the state transformation and the autonomy of civil 
society. I argue that the counter-revolution was the result of the power dynamics 
between the military, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the revolutionary movements. (2) 
To apply the concept of subalternity to the case of counter-revolutionary Egypt. This 
thesis identifies the main weaknesses that characterise the fragility of the 
revolutionary process. By comparing the strategies used by different social groups 
during the 2011 uprising, I seek to show that the strategy of cooperation used by the 
Muslim Brotherhood, while initially successful, failed to conquer political power 
 viii 
because it excluded the confrontational strategy of revolutionary movements. (3) To 
reconsider state–society relations in Egypt. The post-coup state is not based on a 
form of corporatism as was the case pre-2011; rather, Sisi’s regime attempts to allow 
a meaningful participation of social forces in the formation of the counter-revolution 
state.  
By looking at the social drivers of the counter-revolution in Egypt through the lens 
of subalternity, this thesis offers a better understanding of the relationship between 
structure and agency during counter-revolutions that could be applied beyond the 
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This thesis reconsiders the role of social forces during the counter-revolution. 
There is much scholarly interest in revolution but surprisingly little in 
developing a theory on counter-revolution. Revolutionary theory focuses on 
the causes that trigger the revolutionary episode, while there is little 
investigation of the reasons behind forms of counter-revolution which are 
generally understood as the failure of revolutions. In contrast, this thesis 
argues that counter-revolution is still a form of transformation of state–societal 
relations, and it needs to be investigated not merely as ‘failed revolution’ or the 
restoration of the pre-revolutionary context, but as one of several outcomes 
underpinning the open-ended revolutionary process. In order to provide a 
better understanding of the revolution as relational and procedural, this thesis 
takes the Egyptian counter-revolution as the starting point to address important 
questions regarding the study of revolution. 
This thesis aims to fill the theoretical gap in the understanding of revolution 
addressed by the Arab Uprisings of 2011. In fact, the Arab Uprisings marked 
not only the need for a revision of the understanding of Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) politics in terms of relations between regime and society but 
also the necessity to advance revolutionary theory which failed to address why 
the Arab Uprising generated a wave of fragile revolutions prone to turn counter-
revolutionary (Abrams, 2019, p. 2; Allinson, 2019a, p. 148, 2019b, p. 321). By 
revising the study that Gramsci conducted on subalterns and their quest for 
political power, the theory presented in this thesis addresses how the concept 
of subalternity helps to explain the relational feature of revolution – intended 
as a hegemonic crisis – and its open-ended resolution.  
Subalternity and Counter-Revolution 
2   
Therefore, this thesis aims to make a threefold contribution by bringing 
together three different pieces of literature, ranging from the broader study of 
revolution to the narrow understanding of state–society relations in MENA. Its 
first contribution to the study of revolution is the development of a model to 
understand the counter-revolution as one potential outcome – of many – of the 
open-ended revolutionary process. The model proposed in this thesis sheds 
light on how the interaction between state transformation and autonomy of civil 
society can shape the outcome of the revolutionary process.  
The second contribution is a re-engagement with the concept of subalternity 
in Gramsci. Subalternity is not equated to a ‘state of victimhood’ or 
marginalisation, nor is it the equivalent of proletariat due to censorship (Green, 
2002; Smith, 2010, p. 45). Rather, subalterns are social groups which suffer 
under the hegemonic power of a ruling elite (Louai, 2012, p. 5). The interaction 
of various social forces – which use different strategies in their quest to 
conquer political power – is key to understanding where the fragility of the 
revolutionary process lies. By applying the concept of subalternity to the 
empirical case of revolutionary Egypt, this thesis stresses how the 2011 
uprising generated a three-player power dynamic – between the military, the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the revolutionary movements. To take control of the 
state, two of these actors had to become allies; the shifting alliances among 
these three actors determined the counter-revolution.  
Finally, the third contribution is narrowed down to the understanding of 
state–society relations in Egypt. The Egyptian Uprising revealed that the 
Egyptian state was not resilient due to its corporative nature, and similarly the 
Muslim Brotherhood as the major opposition force – considered a state in 
waiting – was unable to take control of the state. The pre-2011 context was 
reshaped primarily by the neoliberal policies introduced in the 1970s. This 
affected both relationships within the elite and the relationship between state 
and society. Such transformation ultimately made fertile ground for the 2011 
uprising. Considering the post-2013 situation as the restoration of the relations 
existing before 2011 limits the understanding of counter-revolution as a form 
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of state transformation. In fact the relations within the elite and the state–
society relations are the direct results of the transformation that occurred 
during the transition period, which could not have otherwise been understood.  
In conclusion, this thesis focuses on how, despite the promising start, the 
Egyptian Uprising turned into a counter-revolution. This serves the broader 
scope by proposing a categorisation of how the interaction between the state 
and the actors can shape the outcome of a revolution. By looking at the social 
drivers of the counter-revolution in Egypt through the lens of subalternity, this 
thesis offers a better understanding of the relationship between structure and 
agency during counter-revolutions that could be applied beyond the case of 
Egypt. 
 
1.1 Research puzzle and research question(s) 
Between 2011 and 2013, Egypt experienced two uprisings. In 2011, the 
mass uprising led to the resignation of Mubarak and drew his 30-year rule to 
an end. This seemed to be the start of the democratisation process, skipped 
during the third wave of democratisation (Sarihan, 2012; Arafat, 2018). After 
Mubarak’s resignation, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) 
suspended the constitution of 1971. To facilitate the transition of power, the 
SCAF amended only nine articles of the 1971 constitution. This was 
considered as a provisional draft, in force only to facilitate the transition of 
power and organise both presidential and parliamentary elections. It imposed 
upon the newly elected parliament the requirement to form a new Constituent 
Assembly able to write a new permanent constitution. The first Constituent 
Assembly was dissolved because it was deemed to be ‘unrepresentative’, due 
to the majority of Islamist members. Thus, a second Constituent Assembly was 
formed. Although it was more representative, it was boycotted by members of 
the opposition who accused the Islamists of not respecting the agreements 
that formed the foundation of the second Constituent Assembly. In December 
2012, the constitutional draft opened up new waves of protests. A new social 
Subalternity and Counter-Revolution 
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movement – Tamarrod (Rebel) – capitalised on this. The movement managed 
to organise what it claimed to be the largest protest in Egyptian history (BBC, 
2013). Tamarrod was founded in April 2013. It collected 22,000 signatures to 
demand Morsi’s resignation; it also organised the protest that lead to the 2013 
uprising. On that occasion, the military removed Mohamed Morsi, who was the 
first freely elected president, and took control of the country. Soon after the 
military coup, Tamarrod supported General el-Sisi. 
The popular supported military coup poses questions about the 
understanding of agency and structure in the region. Firstly, until 2011 secular 
and Islamist groups put aside their incompatible ideologies to fight against the 
common enemy: the authoritarian regime. Often seculars declared clearly, 
‘With the Islamists? Sometimes. With the state? Never!’ (Abdelrahman, 2009). 
However, in 2013 the secular bloc split on their position regarding military 
intervention. Some openly supported the military, while others simply wanted 
Morsi to resign. This outcome reinforced the assumption that the counter-
revolution was a default outcome because the revolutionary movements were 
not revolutionary enough to establish a new order (Bayat, 2013, 2017). In 
addition, the unfolding of the counter-revolution exposes the inability of the 
fourth generation of revolutionary study to understand why the Egyptian 
revolution was so fragile. 
Secondly, the inability of the Muslim Brotherhood – the main opposition 
group – to remain in power despite significant parliamentary and presidential 
victories shows two main flaws in the understanding of the Egyptian state and 
its opposition; in fact, the Muslim Brotherhood was revealed to be not the state 
in waiting, ready to capitalise on its counter-hegemonic leverage to control the 
Egyptian state (Bayat, 2007; Perry and Blair, 2012; Al-Anani, 2015, p. 533; 
Ranko, 2015; Kennedy, 2017). On the other hand, the counter-revolution 
showed that the corporative system was not adaptable enough to prevent the 
uprising (Ayubi, 1995; Stacher, 2012a). Both these considerations highlight 
how the counter-revolution is the result of the interactions between agency and 
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structure, and not necessarily based on specific characteristics of the agent 
(Lauer, 1972; Abou-El-Fadl, 2015; Bennani-Chraïbi, 2017; Volpi, 2017).  
What was a promising start to the democratisation process, with free 
parliamentary and presidential elections, came to an abrupt end and remained 
misunderstood. Therefore, to explain the Egyptian counter-revolution, I identify 
the following dynamic of power (Figure 1): to rule, two actors must join against 
a third one. The three main actors in this dynamic of power shifted their 
alliances in each uprising. Until the first uprising in 2011, seculars and Islamist 
groups cooperated against the regime. In 2012 Islamists won the elections and 
allied with the SCAF while excluding the seculars from any institutional 
positions. Finally in 2013, during the second uprising, secular forces 
challenged the Islamists’ regime, supporting instead the military intervention 
and the restoration of the military regime.  
Figure 1: Dynamic of power in Egypt between 2011 and 2013 uprisings 
 
This dynamic stresses how the interaction among actors is key to 
understanding the counter-revolution; therefore the counter-revolution was not 
merely the failure of revolution, rather an active process in its own right. To 
recap, this thesis aims to answer the following question: what explains the 
Egyptian counter-revolution? In order to address this question, this thesis 
analyses it from four different angles, with specific sub-questions. (1) ‘How did 
the Egyptian state transform?’ looks at the transformation of the Egyptian state 
and the relations between the elite and society that ultimately led to the 2011 
uprising. (2) ‘How did the alliance between the military and the Muslim 
Brotherhood shape the Egyptian state in 2011–2012?’ investigates the 
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immediate aftermath of the 2011 protests and reflects on the basis that brought 
the military and the Muslim Brotherhood to exclude the secular forces, and 
how this dynamic affected the state. (3) ‘How did the Muslim Brotherhood fail 
in controlling the state?’; by asking this, this thesis addresses the paradox of 
how the major opposition group which was waiting to take control of the state 
failed in its task. (4) ‘How did Sisi’s counter-revolutionary regime consolidate 
after the coup?’; to answer this question, this thesis explores the basis of the 
counter-revolutionary post-coup state, the results of the state and society 
transformation started in 2011.  
These questions have been addressed by the existing literature at different 
levels of analysis: regime and societal level. The Arab Uprisings challenged 
established paradigms in the literature such as the resilience of 
authoritarianism, which is the ability of the authoritarian regime to neutralise 
any challenge to its stability with methods like co-optation and repression 
(Albrecht and Schlumberger, 2004; Bellin, 2004; Albrecht, 2005; Heydemann, 
2007). In 2013, the second mass uprising led to the military coup which put an 
end to the so-called ‘democratic transition’ (Brown, 2013a), reviving the 
assumption that authoritarian regimes persist because they learn from each 
other how to adapt to new challenges (Heydemann and Leenders, 2011; 
Stacher, 2012a). The Arab Uprisings revived the debate between contrasting 
paradigms like ‘democratic spotting’ and ‘authoritarian resilience’ (Cavatorta, 
2015; Rivetti, 2015).  
The literature on social movements as protagonists of the uprising soon 
identified such movements as cross-ideological, spontaneous and episodic in 
destabilising the regime, but leaderless and unorganised, thus prone to failure 
(Bayat, 2011; Cole, 2012; Bayat, 2013; Beinin and Vairel, 2013; Abdelrahman, 
2015; Durac, 2015). Due to the lack of organisation and leadership of social 
movements, the elite was able to control the transition (Springborg, 2011b, 
2014; Brown, 2013a; De Smet, 2014b). Again the literature reproduces the 
dichotomy between the elite and society rather than aiming to address more 
organic relations. Among all the countries that experienced the uprisings, only 
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Egypt had the trajectory of a counter-revolution, whereas Tunisia managed to 
transit to a new democratic regime, Syria and Libya plummeted into civil war, 
and Yemen’s transition turned into civil war and escalated to major regional 
conflict and humanitarian crisis. This reopened the debate around competing 
paradigms and framed the return of an authoritarian regime as the failure of 
the democratisation process. This project aims to go beyond the deterministic 
approach of both paradigms and will provide a new understanding of the social 
drivers of the counter-revolution. In this regard, Gramsci’s theory of revolution 
allows the understanding of the transformation as due to the revolutionary 
process, without a predetermined outcome.  
Therefore, a way to move beyond this dichotomy is to address these two 
uprisings as the manifestation of a revolution and its counter-revolution. This 
is not an easy task, either, because the theory of revolution falls short in (1) 
conceptualising the uprising as a form of revolution due to its deemed failure;1 
and (2) explaining state–society relations in Egypt. I will address the latter point 
first, and from the particular case of Egypt, I show the limitation of the existing 
theory of revolution. First of all, the Egyptian case highlights how the 
understating of the strength of the agency and state was not accurate. This 
can be analysed from two different angles. At the state level, Ayubi has argued 
how the lack of hegemony in the Arab countries has created a corporative 
system that could be easily disrupted by the activism of civil society:  
The ‘radical’ (thawri) systems […] could mobilise the populace (via 
education, the media and social welfare programmes), but they 
could not as effectively integrate the newly mobilised social forces 
(partly because their economic and industrial plans had not yielded 
the required accelerated development). They suffer from a 
‘hegemony crisis’: a mildly prolonged fiscal crisis (often resulting 
from the very contradictory nature of their economic policies) is 
sufficient to tear away the thin veneer of their populist ideology and 
to reveal that it is more of an eclectic blueprint than it is of a genuine 
self-sustaining ‘world-view’. Once their powers of (coercive) 
expropriation are exhausted, it becomes clear that their powers of 
                                            
1 Cf. the debate between Beinin and De Smet mostly on Jadaliyya (Beinin, 2013b, 2014a, 
2014b; De Smet, 2014b, 2014c, 2014a).  
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(politico-economic) extraction, via direct taxation, are seriously 
impaired. (Ayubi, 1995, p. 448, emphasis in original).  
This interpretation helps to explain how the wave of protests in 2011 put an 
end to Mubarak’s regime; however, it falls short in accounting for the formation 
of the counter-revolutionary regime in 2013. In addition, the assumption that 
opposition groups like the Muslim Brotherhood were able to capitalise on the 
state and transform the regime was revealed to be a second shortfall in light 
of the 2013 coup. In other words, this thesis investigates how the counter-
revolution occurred by looking at the intersection between the state structure 
and civil society forces that were ready to take control of the state. The 
understanding of how the Muslim Brotherhood failed to take control of the state 
sets a foundation for explaining where the counter-revolution stands.  
 
1.2 Contributions 
The innovative approach that this thesis offers makes three contributions, 
since it brings together three different but interconnected fields of knowledge. 
Firstly, the primary contribution is to the study of revolution and counter-
revolution, because this thesis develops a theoretical framework that 
encompasses a multitude of actions depending on two main criteria: (1) the 
integration of civil society within the state, and (2) the autonomy and leadership 
of specific segments of civil society. The combination of these two criteria 
shapes the revolutionary process.  
Secondly, within the study of Gramsci’s political thought, this thesis 
contributes to redefine and to operationalise the concept of subalternity. The 
concept of subalternity has been interpreted differently by different schools of 
thought – like the British Marxist Historians and the Subaltern Studies Group 
– due to the objective challenge of studying incomplete manuscripts written in 
captivity, such as prison notebooks, and the subjective research aim of these 
schools of thought. Within the scope of readdressing the concept of 
subalternity to explain the counter-revolution, this thesis redefines the role of 
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‘intermediary forces’ – which are groups that connect civil society with the elite 
– as pivotal in explaining the counter-revolution. Thirdly, by narrowing down 
the scope of this research based on the Egyptian case study, this thesis revisits 
the transformation of the state, and civil society transformations and 
interactions in the MENA. In the field, there has been a tendency to study either 
the persistence of authoritarianism or the lack of democracy in the region. As 
discussed earlier, the Arab Uprising shook the understanding of both; 
nevertheless, despite the return of authoritarianism in the region after the 
uprising, we can still learn how the interaction between the state and civil 
society has changed.  
In sum, this thesis moves the debate towards a fifth generation of 
revolutionary study. Therefore, it seeks a better understanding of the Egyptian 
Uprising because this event marked an impasse for revolutionary studies, 
which was not able to explain fragile revolutions prone to failure. It offers a new 
theoretical framework which enables a pinpointing of the relations between 
structure and agency that allows a better understanding of the open-ended 
revolutionary process. This new theorisation can be extended to other cases 
– beyond the case analysed in this thesis – and such applications will help to 
refine the theory. Thus, this thesis contributes to the fifth generation of 
revolutionary study by stressing the interaction between agency and structure 
that marked the fragility of these new waves of revolutions. In this way, this 
thesis reassesses the concept of revolution by stressing its open-ended 
outcome. By looking at the various possible ways in which the revolution can 
develop it should be possible to pinpoint where the main weaknesses of the 
revolutionary process are in order to identify the source of the fragility of 
revolution and the turning point of counter-revolution.  
The core argument of this thesis rests on the variation of the integration of 
civil society within the state. In fact, in the case under analysis, the Egyptian 
state is semi-integral; this means that civil society forces are not fully integrated 
into the state system, leaving more autonomy to civil society actors to shape 
their counter-hegemony. Within the context of a semi-integral state – where 
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the elite does not have full control of civil society – the intermediary force acted 
as a connecting element between civil and political society. I argue that the 
Egyptian Uprising turned counter-revolutionary due to the oscillating behaviour 
of the intermediary forces; in fact, because the intermediary forces attempted 
to support the dominant force and at the same time counteract it by attempting 
to lead the subaltern bloc. Next I clarify these terms and introduce the 
necessary concepts that need to be unpacked to understand the dynamic of 
counter-revolution – addressed in Chapter Three. In other words, how does 
the concept of subalternity explain the Egyptian counter-revolution? Next, this 
thesis discusses how the concept of subalternity explains the open-ended 
outcome of the revolution, and specifically the counter-revolution. In fact, it 
addresses how the counter-revolution was the result of the interaction between 
political and civil society, instead of a top-down process.  
Subalternity puts in relationship the agency and the structure, in the way 
that the counter-revolution does not interpret the Egyptian Uprising as the start 
and the failure of a democratisation process based on the assumption that 
there is only one direction that a regime change should take – from non-
democratic to democratic regime. In other words, by using subalternity, we can 
move beyond the impasse that this dichotomy presents. Thus, this thesis 
shows how the Egyptian regime has changed thanks to the counter-revolution; 
nevertheless, this change is not democratic, not the complete restoration of 
the pre-2011 order. The concept of subalternity formulated by Gramsci is here 
interpreted as a lens that can explain the counter-revolution by looking at the 
agency of different actors in a specific context. In other words, in order to 
understand the dynamics of the counter-revolution, we should reconsider the 
state to address how different actors attempt to control it and how those 
dynamics have shaped the counter-revolution. The interaction between the 
state and subalternity offers a new understanding of how social drivers lead to 
the counter-revolution.  
Therefore the analysis of subalternity in order to understand the counter-
revolution relates to a different conceptualisation of the revolution as an open-
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ended process, and the rethinking of the relations between state and 
subalternity during revolutionary situations. In this regard, Gramsci’s theory 
offers a comprehensive tool of analysis to reconceptualise the revolution as a 
crisis and the different outcomes as different resolutions. This project offers a 
model of revolutionary process and outcomes based on the transformation of 
the state, and the ability of civil society to exploit pockets of autonomy – due 
to the state transformation – to develop political strategy to conquer the state.  
 
1.2.1 Rethinking revolution in terms of hegemonic crisis  
It is impossible to study the phenomenon of counter-revolution without 
taking into account the concept of revolution. However, before doing so it is 
necessary to clarify the differences between passive revolution and counter-
revolution. In Gramsci, passive revolution has two distinct meanings. On the 
one hand, passive revolution is a form of state formation; on the other hand it 
is a form of crisis resolution. In both cases, passive revolution is driven by 
dominant forces with the exclusion of the remaining subaltern forces. Contrary 
to the case of passive revolution – which is a form of state formation that does 
not need a revolution as a prerequisite – counter-revolution is unthinkable 
without the reference of a revolution preceding it.  
This thesis goes beyond the understanding of revolution as a process or 
outcome. Revolutions – as a form of crisis of hegemony defined by Gramsci 
(see section 3.3) – allow investigation of the process of a revolutionary 
situation without assuming a predetermined outcome like the consolidation of 
a democratic regime, or that the fact that the control of the process by the old 
elite will necessarily determine counter-revolution.  
Depending on the actors involved, a revolution can be top-down – the elite 
control the revolutionary process, excluding the social forces – or bottom-up – 
social mobilisation leads the revolution. In terms of change, revolutions can be 
either political or social, or both, depending on the type of transformations that 
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occur. These categorisations attempt to crystallise the complex phenomenon 
of revolution, reducing it to a set of attributes that develop accordingly fixed 
patterns (Lawson, 2019, pp. 48–61). This strict classification allowed some 
scholars to place revolution and counter-revolution as opposite poles, where 
revolution is led by popular forces and counter-revolution is led by elite forces 
(De Smet, 2016, pp. 69–71). Therefore, this thesis argues that the 
phenomenon of revolution could be better understood using the concept of 
hegemonic crisis developed by Gramsci, since hegemony determines the 
relations between structure and agency. This allows the crisis to be resolved 
in different ways: either as revolution, passive revolution or forms of morbid 
symptom. Morbid symptoms are when a previous social order has been 
disrupted by a hegemonic crisis, but the outcome of the crisis – either as 
revolution or passive revolution – does not resolve the root cause of the 
hegemonic crisis. In other words, both revolution and passive revolution 
generate a new order that resolves the cause that triggered the hegemonic 
crisis, whereas morbid symptoms establish a system that is the direct result of 
the combination of a new and old system that does not resolve the causes of 
the hegemonic crisis.  
Therefore, this thesis argues that revolution and counter-revolution are not 
two determinist accounts. Rather they become the extreme of a spectrum that 
offers nuanced concepts that have the potential to explain a larger variety of 
cases, depending on the interaction between the subaltern bloc and the state. 
Looking at it from this perspective, the concept of subalternity developed by 
Gramsci helps to understand how the relations between structure and agency 
and within social forces can explain the counter-revolution. By doing so, this 
thesis expands the panorama of theories on the revolution, advancing the 
relational approach overlooked by the fourth generation.  
In fact, this thesis argues that revolutionary episodes should be better 
understood as a form of hegemonic crisis. In this way, the stability of the 
system is not due to specific attributes or conditions that need to be met as is 
assumed by the fourth generation. On the contrary, this thesis reverses the 
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logic of the study of hegemonic control. In order to understand how hegemonic 
crisis emerges in a context that does not share similar attributes or conditions, 
we should look at how hegemony is exercised within civil society. Instead, the 
balance between the integration of the state and the autonomy of civil society 
allows us to study the entire revolutionary process and stress the open-ended 
nature of the revolution. In this way, actors who control the hegemonic 
functions are pivotal in understanding the development of the revolution. 
 
1.2.2 Rethinking subalternity and state 
At first glance, the attempt to explain a counter-revolution by using the 
concept of subalternity might sound odd because schools of thought like the 
British Marxist Historians and the Subaltern Studies Group had investigated 
the social forces to unpack their relations with the colonial power and rewrite 
a ‘history from below’. Although these studies on subalternity helped to 
popularise the concept – and also the overall theory of Gramsci – the analysis 
of subalternity has slowly been disassociated with relations with the system. 
Subalternity during counter-revolution remains under-studied because 
counter-revolution is often equated to a passive revolution which implies the 
exclusion of civil society from the revolutionary process. On the contrary, this 
thesis offers an account of how the internal division within the subaltern bloc – 
and its attempt to control the state – offers a better explanation of the role of 
social drivers in the counter-revolution.  
Via the lens of subalternity, this thesis argues that the counter-revolution is 
not solely a top-down process – as is the case in passive revolution. Counter-
revolution can be better understood by looking at the internal dynamics within 
civil society and the attempt of social groups to conquer the state power. For 
this reason, the concept of intermediary force between political and civil society 
allows us to move forward the dichotomous predetermined outcome of a 
successful revolution led by civil society forces, vs counter-revolution led by 
the elite. The majority of studies on the Egyptian counter-revolution either look 
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at how the military attempted to maintain the neoliberal structure (Abul-Magd, 
2016), or how Islamist and secular forces failed in gathering the support of the 
masses (Bayat, 2013; Brown, 2013a) or at the weaknesses of the working 
movements (Alexander and Bassiouny, 2014; Allinson, 2015). The existing 
literature looks at the state transformation in economic terms to explain the 
uprising in 2011 (Joya, 2011; Roccu, 2013), but it does not account for the 
implications of the state transformation in explaining the counter-revolution.  
Subalternity – along with hegemony – is the concept that puts political and 
civil society in relationship. Gramsci is well known to be the theorist of 
hegemony and civil society. Hegemony represents both ideological and 
coercive control of civil society. For Gramsci ideology is not only a political 
system of ideas, it is a much broader understanding of the world. For this 
reason, ideology is close to other concepts like religion, folklore and common 
sense (Liguori, 2004a, pp. 140–142) .  
The missing piece between the hegemony of the dominant force and its 
implementation within civil society is the concept of intermediary forces, a 
peculiar form of subalternity. Understanding the dynamic within the subaltern 
bloc explains how hegemony is implemented within civil society. In this regard, 
the intermediary forces are the key driver that exercises the hegemonic 
function within civil society. A function is an activity that a subject has. I 
distinguish direct and indirect uses of such a function. The direct use is related 
to the dominant force, which directly exercises the hegemonic function to keep 
its power. Indirect use of the hegemonic function is when the subject performs 
an activity not for its own interest, but for the interest of a third party. For 
example, hegemony is exercised in political and civil society, and as Chapter 
Three discusses in detail, hegemony as domination is directly performed within 
political society, while hegemony within civil society is mediated by the ‘private 
organisation’. For example, the intermediary teacher who works within an 
educational institution exercises the hegemonic function of dominant force 
within the civil society; in other words, the teacher exercises the hegemonic 
function not for their own interest but for the interest of the dominant force.  
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The control over civil society and cooperation of the intermediary forces is 
a criterion to define the state. Therefore the integral state of Gramsci is not 
simply the unity between political and civil society. It implies a specific 
regulation of civil society, which deprives civil society of any form of self-
regulation and autonomy. As the revolutionary outcome is not a dichotomy of 
two opposite poles, neither is the concept of state either integral or gendarme 
– a gendarme state is a state that does not attempt to regulate social and 
economic relations within civil society, as its priority is to maintain a police state 
(Ayubi, 1995, p. 7). The state should be placed on a continuum, and that 
should overlap with the definition of revolution (see section 1.2.4). This thesis 
argues that during the moment of hegemonic crisis, the intermediary forces 
are the key factor that can shape the outcome of the crisis resolution. Such an 
outcome is dependent on the type of state because this establishes the 
permeability of the state structure to subaltern counter-revolutionary forces. 
Finally, by applying the idea of intermediary forces as a special case within the 
variety of subalternities in the case of the Egyptian counter-revolution, this 
thesis advances the understanding of how hegemony is organised within 
society via the support of specific social actors within civil society.  
 
1.2.3 Rethinking the role of intermediary forces as social 
drivers of counter-revolution  
The Egyptian Uprising was the manifestation of a crisis of hegemony. The 
crisis manifested because on the one hand the dominant bloc weakened due 
to internal power struggles which translated into reduction of hegemonic 
control over civil society, and on the other hand the subaltern forces unified 
and strengthened their counter-hegemonic strategies like the war of position 
and war of manoeuvre. Gramsci’s conceptualisation of society can be 
summarised in two distinct blocs. A dominant bloc controls the economic 
structure’s political and coercive institutions, while a subaltern bloc is a social 
alliance among different social groups. This difference might resemble the 
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dichotomy between elite and civil society; however, the interactions between 
the dominant and subaltern forces are mediated by the intermediary force, 
which is a special case of subalternity. Intermediary forces are the ones that 
exercise the hegemonic function within civil society, to control the different 
social forces. This thesis reinterprets the concept of subalternity by 
establishing clear relations between subalternity, state and hegemonic crisis; 
conceptualising the subaltern intermediary force, which within the case of a 
semi-integral state can shape the outcome of the revolution; and introducing 
this new concept of subalternity within the field of Middle Eastern studies, 
which has mostly used the concept based on the work of the British Marxist 
Historians and the Subaltern Studies Group. Finally, Egypt offers an empirical 
case to explain such new conceptualisation, especially since the empirical 
application of the revised concept of subalternity had remained limited to the 
empirical case of India (Zene, 2011; Nilsen and Roy, 2015).  
In this way, the revised concept of subalternity as social alliance developed 
by Gramsci helps us to understand the dynamics within a specific bloc. 
Subalternity has been studied so far by reducing the concept to already 
existing conceptual categories. Subalternity should be rethought as a form of 
social groups’ alliance, rather than the identification of a single category 
(Green, 2002, p. 21). In other words, the dynamics among the various 
components of this social alliance determine the revolutionary outcome. In 
order to understand how the social interactions of groups within the subaltern 
bloc can explain the counter-revolution, we need to go back to the relations 
that the structure has with the agency. From this point of view, Gramsci once 
again offers a comprehensive interpretation of the relations between structure 
and agency. As a result, this thesis expands the understanding of fragile 
revolution by looking at the agency of intermediary forces within the context of 
a semi-integral state.  
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1.2.4  Gramsci’s theory in a nutshell – a model of 
revolutionary process  
An efficient way to understand and interpret the concept of state and 
subalternity is to put the conceptualisation of the state along a continuum. At 
one extreme, there is the integral state (regardless whether it is democratic or 
not); this integral state encompasses strong relations with civil society – in a 
way, civil society is indeed integrated within the state. Such integration occurs 
at structural (economic) and superstructural (political and cultural) levels. The 
difference between democratic and authoritarian regimes does not lie in 
integration, since the primary form of integration is economic. An integral state 
is not democratic or authoritarian; this can be explained with Fordism as the 
democratic state, as well as the planned economy of the Soviet Union as a 
non-democratic regime. The difference between the types of regime is 
superstructural: the democratic hegemony is skewed towards persuasion; on 
the other hand, the authoritarian hegemony is shifted towards coercion. In this 
context, the autonomy of subaltern groups within civil society is limited. And in 
the rare case of a crisis of hegemony, the dominant force can actuate a passive 
revolution to maintain its supremacy over society.  
At the opposite extreme, there is the non-integral state. By non-integral 
state, I refer to what Gramsci defines as ‘the state as a confederation of 
classes’ (Frosini, 2016, pp. 136–137). In this context, civil society is the space 
where the classes interact with less imposition from a dominant class that 
places itself within the state structure. Such state formation is theorised by 
Gramsci (see Figure 2) as passive revolution (I), where a dominant force 
emerges and forms the integral state, restricting civil society autonomy via its 
hegemonic function. For example, the Free Officers’ revolution in 1952 was a 
form of state formation, when Egypt’s state and society changed radically via 
the ability of the Nasserite state to integrate different social forces within the 
state (Achcar, 2016, p. 66; Salem, 2019, pp. 270–271).  
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 The crisis of a democratic or authoritarian system should be addressed as 
a crisis of hegemony regardless of the form of governance. This leads to the 
definition of crisis in Gramsci as the situation where the ‘old is dying and the 
new cannot be born’ (Gramsci, 1975, p. 311 [Q3§34]). Such a crisis of authority 
is ever-present; it emerges when the hegemony of the dominant force 
weakens and the autonomy of the civil society allows the subaltern forces to 
organise their form of alternative hegemony. At this point, the crisis of 
hegemony can be resolved with a variety of potential outcomes, within the 
spectrum of the opposite poles of revolution and passive revolution. The 
revolution occurs when a social force within the subaltern bloc develops a 
counter-hegemony to take the lead in controlling the state. In contrast, passive 
revolution (II) consists of the exclusion of the subaltern forces and the use of 
hegemony by the dominant force to reinstate the integrity of the state. The core 
difference between revolution and passive revolution is not only the main actor 
that leads the resolution of the crisis, but in fact the type of state is also a 
prerequisite to determining a specific outcome. In order for the dominant force 
to exclude the subaltern forces, they need to exercise their hegemony within 
the framework of the integral state, whereas subalterns can only achieve their 
complete autonomy within the context of a non-integral state.  
The semi-integral state exists with mixed characteristics in between these 
two extreme ideal types of state. If a hegemonic crisis occurs in the context of 
a semi-integral state, the crisis is more likely to be resolved as a form of morbid 
symptoms. In fact, the role of the intermediary forces – between civil and 
political society – can make a difference in resolving the crisis towards the end 
of revolution or passive revolution. From the specific case of the Egyptian 
counter-revolution this theoretical framework can be generalised to be applied 
in other cases.  
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Figure 2: Type of state–civil society relation and implication for the hegemonic crisis 
 
Type of state 
Integral Non-integral 
High hegemonic control    Low hegemonic control 
Less civil society autonomy  More civil society autonomy  
Passive revolution (I)  
Hegemonic crisis 
Passive revolution (II)* Morbid symptoms Revolution 
               Caesarism       Spontaneous insurrection  
* In this case, passive revolution is a form of transformation of the state to pre-empt or 
resolve a crisis of authority. 
 
1.3 Research design  
The research objective of this thesis is to develop the study of subalternity 
and counter-revolution, specifically the role that intermediate forces have in 
shaping the counter-revolution. This thesis is based on the epistemological 
assumption that the social world is formed by stratified structures that are 
reproduced by the agency via complex inter-relations (Joseph, 1998, pp. 83–
84). In this view, hegemony is key to reproducing the structure within social 
relations, and the stratification of reality reflects the dialectic relations between 
politics and economics (Joseph, 1998, pp. 99–100).  
The central question of this thesis is: what explains the Egyptian counter-
revolution? This question is further analysed from four different angles that 
together concur to provide a comprehensive answer: (1) How did the Egyptian 
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state transform? (2) How did the alliance between the military and the Muslim 
Brotherhood shape the Egyptian state in 2011–2012? (3) How did the Muslim 
Brotherhood fail in controlling the state? (4) How did Sisi’s counter-
revolutionary regime consolidate after the coup? These four sub-questions 
address four different aspects of the counter-revolution. Let’s turn to how this 
thesis develops models to understand the relations between agency and 
structure.  
As already stated earlier in the chapter, the counter-revolution is the by-
product of the hegemonic crisis. Therefore in order to explain what leads to the 
counter-revolution, it is essential to investigate the manifestation of the 
hegemonic crisis during the 2011 uprising. In order to answer this first sub-
question, this thesis elaborates a model of state integration. The second sub-
question – which investigates the transformation of the Egyptian state during 
2011–2012, as a result of the interaction between the new dominant force and 
the most advanced subaltern force – and the third sub-question – which shifts 
the analysis onto the ambivalent agency of the Muslim Brotherhood as an 
intermediary force which alternates support and challenge to the dominant 
forces – both set the scene for understanding how, during the hegemonic 
crisis, the relations between key actors can shape the structure of the state. 
Finally, the last sub-question aims to square the circle. In other words, it 
addresses how the post-coup regime is the result of the counter-revolution due 
to the crisis started in 2011.  
To answer the research question I use the retroductive research strategy. 
The retroductive strategy is composed of two stages: empirical study and 
theoretical study. During the empirical study, researchers observe the 
phenomena and identify patterns. They identify potential models of 
explanation. In the theoretical study, the researchers elaborate the details of 
the models. Finally, the researchers have to establish if the proposed models 
fit the reality. Because the research strategy chosen is retroductive, theory is 
generated ‘by establishing which one of a number of possible known structures 
or mechanisms is responsible, and the condition under which it operates’ 
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(Blaikie, 2009, p. 155; see also Ragin, 1994, pp. 55–59; Hartig, 2011, pp. 161–
163). 
The Egyptian case offers the opportunity to clarify concepts and categories 
used in dominant theories. It identifies which type of models can better explain 
the causal mechanism hidden behind the uprising and coup, and these models 
can still be tested in other contexts (George and Bennett, 2005, pp. 111–112).  
 
1.3.1  Approach and case selection  
This study is qualitative. The qualitative method offers the possibility of a 
detailed description of an entire process and allows the development of 
concepts and theory while collecting data (Blaikie, 2000, pp. 252–253). 
Therefore the qualitative data is analysed to ensure the establishment of 
models and relations. Egypt as a fragile revolution can shed light on the 
interaction between structure and agency that led to the counter-revolution. 
The finding derived by the Egyptian case can be generalised and tested in 
other cases which have experienced the same fragility. The Egyptian Uprising 
is an extended retrospective case study. It is extended because the events 
under analysis span over an extended period, and the actors are involved in 
different interlinked events. This allows us to identify patterns and models 
(Blaikie, 2000, p. 219). In this way, the Egyptian hegemonic crisis between 
2011 and 2013 outlines an explanatory model of how the interactions between 
the state structure and the agency can affect the outcome of the counter-
revolution. The different models of crisis resolution are based on Gramsci’s 
theory, and Egypt is the explicative case that addresses the failure of the 
revolution as a form of counter-revolution rather than passive revolution.  
It is retrospective because the phenomenon under analysis occurred in the 
past and the data collection was undertaken when the final outcome was 
already known. Therefore even if the researcher cannot observe or actively 
participate in the development of the phenomenon under study, she can 
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access documents or witnesses (Street and Ward, 2010, p. 825). A case study 
is beneficial to answer a ‘how’ question – that addresses the development of 
a specific event – when the event under analysis is not in the researcher’s 
control. The case study is able to address contemporary phenomena in a real-
life context when context and event is inextricable (Yin, 1994, p. 13). The 
obvious choice of selecting Egypt during 2011–2013 to explain the counter-
revolution is dictated by the research question and contribution already 
discussed in this chapter. Egypt challenges empirically the assumption that 
2011–2013 is a form of passive revolution, especially if we compare it with the 
1952 Free Officers’ coup. This is the case of the Egyptian Uprising when the 
context of the semi-integral state is taken into account to explain the agency 
of actors and the outcome of the uprising. Egypt has been chosen because, 
among the countries that experienced the so-called Arab Spring, only Tunisia 
and Egypt had a relatively peaceful transition. However, while Tunisia has 
been more successful in its transition process, the Egyptian transition was 
stopped by a military coup. For this reason, Egypt is also an instrumental case 
study; in fact, it provides specific insights and understanding of the 
phenomenon under consideration. It is therefore beneficial to develop a new 
theory – as this thesis does in taking into account subalternity to explain 
counter-revolution as well as testing the existing theory – the interpretation that 
the failed revolution is a form of passive revolution (Grandy, 2010, pp. 474–
475). In this regard, the Egyptian Uprising is an instrumental case study 
because it allows the explanation and clarification of Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemony, and related concepts like hegemonic crisis and subalternity within 
the specific context of the semi-integral state.  
In terms of time frame, the thesis takes into account the development of the 
state from Nasser to the eve of the uprising, in order to investigate how the 
shrinking of the integral state allowed more autonomy for the subalterns’ 
agency. Between 2011 and 2013 I focus my attention on the agency by looking 
at the interaction between dominant and subaltern forces in the context of the 
semi-integral state. Finally, after the military coup, I return to analyse the 
potential for the integration of the subaltern within the state. 
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1.3.2  Data collection  
Before addressing in detail the data collection via the use of secondary data, 
I address the conditions of production of this research and how the changing 
situation in the field required an abrupt steer in the direction of this project. 
Factors like the internal organisation of social movements involved in the 
uprising and counter-revolution, the impact of ideology in decision making, and 
pragmatism in perusing political opportunities are all variables that capture the 
limits of actors’ actions and how these affect the interactions between agency 
and structure.  
These factors are best captured via tailored interviews of actors involved in 
the phenomenon under analysis. Therefore I planned fieldwork in Cairo 
starting from April 2016. However, I never went to Cairo to conduct my 
fieldwork and collect primary data via interviews. My fieldwork was cancelled 
because of the tragic death of Giulio Regeni, a fellow PhD student. Giulio was 
in Cairo to conduct fieldwork on pedlars and independent trade unions in 
Egypt. He went missing on 25th January 2016 – not surprisingly the fifth 
anniversary of the start of the uprising – and his body was subsequently found 
in a ditch on the side road of the Cairo–Alexandria highway (Kirchgaessner 
and Michaelson, 2016). Giulio’s murder brought significant changes not just in 
the country but also the way scholars can study it. The death of Giulio showed 
the necessity for the academic community to rethink how to conduct the 
research of sensitive topics highly scrutinised by authoritarian regimes, not just 
in the Middle East but elsewhere (Clark and Cavatorta, 2018, p. 3).  
First of all, Giulio’s murder highlighted the escalation of harassment 
experienced by other academics like Michelle Dune, who was denied access 
to the country, and ‘Fanny’ Othier, who was arrested in Damietta for meeting 
with April 6 activists (Kirkpatrick, 2014; Al Karama, 2015). Holding a foreign 
passport was no longer sufficient to protect researchers in Egypt. Secondly, it 
unveiled the paranoid climate that pervaded society where the rhetoric of 
honourable citizens deepened divisions within society and xenophobia fed the 
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spread of conspiracy theory, increasing the hostile environment for 
researchers. Beside concerns for my personal safety I was not willing to put 
any of my participants at risk, especially knowing that many activists were 
already jailed or missing. In addition, I lived in Egypt between April 2012 and 
October 2014, getting to know many people, and with some of them I 
developed a deep friendship. Regardless of the lack of political activism of my 
friends in Egypt, I did not want them to be put at any risk because of their 
relations with me and the sensitivity of my research.  
In sum, the ethical burden of risk for my participants and friends did not allow 
me to return to Egyptian for my fieldwork. This left me with other data collection 
methods to explore and evaluate to conduct my research. Obviously I was not 
the sole researcher interested in the Egyptian counter-revolution to face such 
a hostile environment. Said reflects on a series of creative methods for 
collecting data from various participants without accessing the field (Said, 
2018, pp. 90–92).  
The first method is cooperation with local researchers. Such an interesting 
form of academic cooperation is not exempted from the ethical burden for the 
safety of local researchers who live and work in Egypt along with their families 
(Clark and Cavatorta, 2018, p. 3; Said, 2018, pp. 91–92). Beside the ethical, 
obviously, this method is not an option for a sole-authored work like a PhD 
thesis; nevertheless, it could be considered for further research. 
The second method proposed by Said is interviews through emails. This 
method consists of emailing out a series of questions to participants and 
awaiting their answers. The advantage of this method is that it avoids the risk 
of participants encountering the security apparatus. At the same time, written 
answers ensure more accuracy and avoid time-consuming transcriptions. 
Nevertheless, Said himself admitted that this method is beneficial when asking 
short questions but that the follow-up round of questions was not successful 
(Said, 2018, p. 92). The difficulty that I envisaged with this method was related 
to a lack of access to participants from abroad.  
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Finally, the third method involves conducting interviews with Egyptian 
activists in exile. This method ensures a relatively easier access to participants 
and the opportunity of snowballing for other participants. However, the primary 
limitation of this method involves the risk of relying only on a limited number of 
activists and the potential of skewing the finding over a limited group. This is 
problematic when we look at two overlapping issues: on the one hand, the 
variety of destinations chosen by exiled activists like the MB who left the 
country for destinations like Qatar, Turkey, Sudan, North America, Asia and 
Europe, mostly depending on socioeconomic and ideological factors, whereas 
the destination country of young secular activists were European capitals and 
North America (Dunne and Hamzawy, 2019, pp. 3–4); on the other hand, 
travelling to multiple locations in order to ensure the validity of the data was 
not financially affordable as a self-funded student. Nevertheless, the lack of 
fieldwork did not prevent me from investigating actors’ agency to assess the 
effect of their political actions, beyond the impact of ideology in their decision 
making. 
In terms of data collection, I rely on a range of documents. Documents under 
consideration are all sorts of written, audio and visual artefacts that testify to 
human activities. The variety of documents is very comprehensive, from public 
records or open documentation – like the media, books, reports, government 
policy, laws, court documents etc. (Olson, 2010, pp. 319–320; Raptis, 2010, 
pp. 321–322). Documents provide a wide variety of contextual materials that 
are alternative – or complementary – to direct observation and interviews 
(Raptis, 2010, p. 323). The documents analysed in this thesis are secondary 
sources, like newspaper articles and reports and data from peer-reviewed 
academic research, broadcast media, and recorded interviews; as well as 
official documents like constitutions and laws. By analysing the economic and 
security policies that have been put in place by the SCAF and the Muslim 
Brotherhood it is possible to establish in what forms the Muslim Brotherhood 
challenged the military’s dominance, and how the military attempted to appeal 
to other sectors of society. The assessment of authenticity and credibility of 
the document being examined is crucial for accurate analysis (Raptis, 2010, p. 
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323). For this reason, this thesis relies on established news providers and 
academic peer-reviewed research to ensure the credibility of the data 
analysed.  
The qualitative secondary analysis revisits the data of existing research 
projects to develop theories (Curtis and Curtis, 2011, pp. 216–218, 224). It 
offers a valid alternative to fieldwork for conducting research on sensitive 
topics, unsafe countries and elusive populations (Long-Sutehall, Sque and 
Addington-Hall, 2011, p. 335). The qualitative secondary analysis consists of 
the use of existing data to answer a different research question than the 
original questions driving the primary data collection (Hinds, Vogel and Clarke-
Steffen, 1997, p. 408). In this research existing qualitative secondary data is 
used to reinterpret and re-analyse existing data on the Egyptian Uprising 
through the conceptual lens of subalternity, and its relations with other 
Gramscian concepts like hegemonic crisis and its resolution and the integral 
state. Nevertheless, the collection of secondary data displays minor gaps due 
to the lack of primary research. However, the Egyptian Uprising was one of the 
most documented events in recent years, and the overwhelming data existing 
on the topic is sufficient to minimise the gaps caused by the lack of fieldwork. 
Therefore, the intention of the project is to evaluate the existing data on the 
Egyptian Uprising in line with the concept of subalternity in general, and 
intermediary forces in particular. The secondary data used has similar 
research questions to those in this study; however, this research aims to link 
the existing data on the Egyptian Uprising with the explanatory concept of 
subalternity and intermediary forces, as the scope of the primary research 
needs to be taken into account during the re-analysis of secondary data 
(Hinds, Vogel and Clarke-Steffen, 1997, p. 412; Long-Sutehall, Sque and 
Addington-Hall, 2011, p. 337). 
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1.4 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter Two starts by addressing the broader literature the theory is built 
on. The chapter addresses the gaps in existing Middle Eastern studies which 
view 2011 or 2013 as examples of forms of democratisation or authoritarian 
resilience respectively. Studies on revolution have attempted to move beyond 
the deadlock of viewing these two phenomena separately. However, theories 
on revolution sufficiently address the causes of revolution but fall short in 
addressing the roots of counter-revolution. Finally, the chapter analyses the 
interpretation of the concepts of subalternity by the British Marxist Historians 
and the Subaltern Studies Group, who were credited with popularising the 
concept of Gramsci’s subalternity but failed to link it to the counter-
revolutionary process. Chapter Three then turns to discussing the concept of 
subalternity in Gramsci and its relations with hegemonic crisis, crisis resolution 
and types of state. It highlights why the Egyptian counter-revolution is a form 
of morbid symptom, and in order to do this the chapter discusses the active 
role of the intermediary force in shaping the counter-revolution. Chapter Four 
analyses the hegemonic crisis in Gramsci’s terms, highlighting not only the 
economic roots of the uprising but also defining how autonomy is a prerequisite 
of subalternity organisation. This chapter addresses the transformation of the 
Egyptian state and the manifestation of hegemonic crisis at the political and 
civil society level, since the manifestation of the hegemonic crisis cannot be 
fully understood without taking into account the Egyptian state. Chapter Five 
explains the first phase of the power dynamic between the three main actors, 
within the time frame from 25th January 2011 to the presidential victory of the 
Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsi in June 2012. In Chapter Six, the 
thesis looks at the failed attempt of the Muslim Brotherhood as the intermediary 
forces that allied with the military to control political society. It investigates how 
the intermediary forces oscillated between attempting to lead civil society and 
maintaining the dominance of the military. Chapter Seven looks at the post-
coup scenario to analyse how the military has learned from the experience of 
the Muslim Brotherhood as intermediary force and unstable ally. This chapter 
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stresses the transformation of the post-coup Egyptian state as the result of the 
counter-revolution. The chapter argues that the new basis of the hegemony of 
the new regime is linked with the attempt of the military to create an integral 
state, where the political society can penetrate the socioeconomic relations of 
the civil society. Whether or not Sisi’s regime will manage to turn Egypt into an 
integral state via a passive revolution to neuter the subaltern forces remains 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Finally, the concluding chapter self-reflects on 
the theoretical framework and argument offered in this thesis and expands on 
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Chapter 2 Beyond the paradogma: revolution, 




Chapter One has set the rationale of counter-revolution study in its own 
right. In fact, the empirical puzzle that Egypt poses – not only to scholars 
interested in Middle Eastern politics, but also scholars interested in the 
phenomenon of revolution – has offered the opportunity to bridge different 
fields that otherwise might not have been in put into relationship: Middle 
Eastern politics, revolution studies and subaltern studies. Hence, the threefold 
contribution discussed in Chapter One reflects these three different areas of 
literature, and thanks to the Egyptian counter-revolution helps to build a theory 
of counter-revolution.  
To investigate the counter-revolution, we need first to address how 
revolutions occur. The so-called Arab Spring questions the two paradigms – 
democratisation and authoritarian resilience – in existing MENA studies. Both 
of these contrasting paradigms need to be revised to explain the reasons 
behind the uprisings. Additionally, the literature on Arab civil society deserves 
attention, because under-studied actors like seculars and workers’ movements 
had a key role in the 2011 and 2013 uprisings. Finally, the literature on 
revolution and counter-revolution in Egypt has failed to relate the agency of 
social forces during the counter-revolution, and exposes a misunderstanding 
of Gramsci’s theory.  
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2.1 Democratisation and authoritarian resilience – 
two separate levels of analysis  
2.1.1 On democratisation and authoritarian resilience – 
regime level  
Before the Arab Uprisings, the academic debate on MENA politics was 
characterised by two dominant paradigms: democratisation (transitology 
paradigm) and post-democratisation (authoritarian resilience). The use of the 
democratisation paradigm was inspired by the third wave of democratisation 
in the 1990s, which included regime reforms like repetitive elections, the 
introduction of a multi-party system, economic liberalisation, and social 
activism which signalled the emergence of a vibrant civil society (Huntington, 
1991; Salamé, 1994; Yom, 2005; Pratt, 2007). These changes, however, did 
not allow democracy to flourish. Instead, it seemed that the Arab world skipped 
the third wave of democratisation, and the debate moved around the 
exceptionalism of the region. Lisa Anderson (2006) highlights that searching 
for democratisation in MENA states is misleading because we are searching 
for something that is not there. Scholars would have to adjust democratisation 
theory in a context that was not democratising. Consequently, rather than 
studying ‘the failure of democratization, one should seek a better 
understanding of the success of authoritarianism’ (Valbjørn, 2015, p. 221).  
The democratisation paradigm was replaced with the authoritarian 
resilience paradigm for the MENA region (Carothers, 2002). Regime reforms 
and social activism were interpreted as forms of regime upgrading in line with 
Tomasi di Lampedusa’s doctrine2 (Valbjørn and Bank, 2010; Valbjørn, 2015). 
Albrecht and Schlumberger (2004) argue that democracy in the Arab world is 
like Beckett’s Godot because we are waiting for something that might not 
arrive; the regime reforms did not make democracy any closer for MENA 
states. The authoritarian resilience paradigm focused its attention on regime 
structure and the ruling elite, and less on civil society. Arab regimes undertook 
                                            
2 In his novel The Leopard, Sicilian nobility is caught by popular revolution, and in order to 
maintain its privileges, the nobility understands it has to adjust and manipulate the changing 
events.  
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changes only to grant them stability and longevity, which resulted in a kind of 
hybrid regime, not fully autocratic or progressing towards democratic forms 
(Brumberg, 2002; Zakaria, 2003; Volpi, 2004; Cavatorta, 2010). However, the 
post-democratisation paradigm became a paradogma – stressing the fact that 
certain paradigms in academia become like dogma because their core 
assumptions are unchallenged (Valbjørn, 2015).  
Both paradigms failed in different ways. Authoritarian resilience did not take 
into account the unintended consequences of liberalism and cosmetic reforms, 
while democratisation did not look at other actors like social movements that 
challenged the regime (Pace and Cavatorta, 2012). Nevertheless, regimes still 
operate successfully in their upgrading, demonstrating the validity of the 
upgrading and resilience capacity of regime adaptation (Pace and Cavatorta, 
2012). Other scholars looked at factors like oil renters and hereditary regimes 
to explain the causes of the uprisings and regime change. Brownlee et al. 
(2013) argued that non-hereditary regimes without oil experienced elite 
defection that determined regime change, whereas hereditary regimes with 
rich oil-maintained elite cohesion guaranteed regime continuity. In the case of 
Egypt, Brown (2013a) identifies ‘bad behavior’ and ‘bad choices’ as the causes 
of the failed transition. Bad behaviour is constituted by shallow democratic 
practice, mistrust of ballots, corruption and authoritarian procedure. The 
Muslim Brotherhood excluded the rest of the opposition while in power, while 
the opposition sought to overthrow the electoral results by street protests 
rather than seeking negotiation and mediations. In terms of bad choices, the 
political forces lacked consensus and oppositions split (Brown, 2013a). To the 
eyes of the vast majority of the population, Mubarak, his son Gamal, and the 
National Democratic Party (NDP) were responsible for Egypt’s declining 
conditions, whereas the positive image of the military was reinforced. Looking 
only at regime level, Cook points out that ‘Arab leaders have little reason to 
undertake reforms’ (Cook, 2006, p. 66). The robustness of the security 
apparatus and the co-opted opposition enjoyed benefits of the corporate 
system and had few intentions of pushing towards an overthrow (Albrecht and 
Schlumberger, 2004; Bellin, 2004, 2012; Albrecht, 2005). 
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None of these explanations takes into account the importance of popular 
support during regime change. The focus of the majority of existing literature 
conducts its analysis at the regime level (elite and institutionalised opposition) 
while considering social movements and masses as secondary actors. Both 
paradigms underestimated the role that civil society had in the region. In the 
case of Egypt, civil society challenged the regime in 2011 and supported the 
upgrading of authoritarians in 2013. On the contrary, the theory of counter-
revolution – proposed in Chapter Three – addresses how the return of the 
authoritarian regime does not recreate a pre-2011 order; the post-2013 order 
is the result of the interactions between civil society and the elite.  
 
2.1.2  On democratisation and authoritarian resilience – 
society level 
Many scholars, like Augustus Richard Norton (1995), Saad Eddin Ibrahim 
(1997) and Ghassan Salamé (1994), have investigated the role of civil society 
in the Arab world. The existing literature regarding civil society in MENA offers 
several perspectives on how civil society can affect democratisation in the 
region. Despite different interpretations, these approaches stand on the same 
definition of civil society as the sphere of voluntary associations autonomous 
from the state and the market.  
In the liberal approach, civil society was understood as a necessary force 
able to undermine a non-democratic regime. This approach is derived from the 
successful democratisation in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe, 
as well as from its liberal heritage. This approach argues that the involvement 
of citizens in civil life occurs when the state (no matter what form of 
government) retreats from both social and economic life, leaving society 
enough space to regulate itself. This empty space is considered free and 
autonomous, and therefore individuals freely and voluntarily decide to organise 
themselves to fulfil the common aim that brought them together (Kubba, 2000; 
Hawthorne, 2004; Yom, 2005; Pratt, 2007). From this perspective, it is 
understandable why there was great enthusiasm regarding civil society in 
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MENA among scholars, who hoped for the development of this new actor as 
the key element in triggering democratisation in the region (Kubba, 2000). 
However, the limitations of this approach came from the fact that civil society 
in MENA does exist but is not considered a pro-democratic actor. Those who 
were not convinced by the idea of a weak civil society in MENA preferred to 
explain the lack of democratisation by looking at the Islamist groups. For them 
‘uncivil society’ was the answer (Abdelrahman, 2002; Berman, 2003; 
Hawthorne, 2004).  
The formation of an Islamic state with characteristics that did not seem to 
reflect a democratic state made these scholars assume that Islamists are 
illiberal and anti-democratic forces by definition (Berman, 2003). This is the 
reason why Arab countries are trapped in the dilemma of the ‘Weimar’ 
syndrome of how to implement the democratic procedure without having 
spread democratic values, as well as reflecting on how democracy could 
exclude certain groups from the political competition (Brumberg, 2002; 
Zakaria, 2003). This approach is limited since it considers Islamist groups 
undemocratic by definition; they are seen as a monolithic bloc that is incapable 
of having different views, thus highlighting the fact that civil and ‘uncivil’ society 
are unable to cooperate.  
There is a third approach that aims to be ‘value-free’, distancing itself from 
this debate around civil vs uncivil society (Cavatorta and Durac, 2011). 
Cavatorta and Durac claim that assuming that civil society can have a positive 
or a negative character leads to the predetermination of what we could expect 
from it in terms of goals and behaviours. They point out that Islamist and non-
Islamist groups can cooperate together because they are both actors operating 
within the same system. They remark that civil society behaves differently in a 
democracy vs a non-democracy. Thus, to understand a civil society we need 
to take into account the environment within which it works (Abdelrahman, 
2002, pp. 33–34; Shehata, 2010, p. 83; Cavatorta and Durac, 2011, pp. 18–
19).  
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Both levels of analysis – elite and societal – reproduce the same 
deterministic outcome of democratisation. The Islamist bloc can be considered 
either civil or uncivil; likewise, it is possible to make the same assumption 
regarding the non-Islamist bloc, since not all non-Islamist groups aim to 
undermine the regime in order to trigger a democratisation process. Although 
this perspective offers a better understanding of the variety of Islamist forces, 
it still bases its analysis on the expectation that the transformation of the 
regime and the actions of actors are guided by democratic goals. On the 
contrary, this thesis applies Gramsci’s concept of civil society. Instead of 
considering civil society ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in itself, Gramsci describes civil society 
as an expression of dialectic between hegemony and counter-hegemony. Civil 
society is divided into different (subaltern) groups. What limits the previous 
approaches is the imposition of labels to specific groups (like Islamists, 
seculars, pro-democratic etc.) which brings more focus onto the characteristics 
of the groups themselves rather than their interactions. The fact that Arab 
society does not have pro-democratic actors as defined according to the 
dominant Western concept does not mean that different civil society forces do 
not interact with each other to reshape the existing order. Gramsci’s approach 
overcomes these limits because it highlights the moment of interaction of 
different groups within civil society, and between civil and political society; such 
interaction determines the revolutionary outcome.  
Gramsci offers a better understanding of the interaction between political 
and civil society. Gramsci’s approach overcomes the analysis of a single level, 
either of elite interactions or of the dynamics within civil society. These 
separated analyses of elite and civil society have two main limitations: first, the 
separation between the agency of the elite and the agency of civil society 
remains confined in two separate levels of analysis that compromise the 
understanding of social drivers of counter-revolution. This division does not 
offer an accurate account of the power dynamics during the Egyptian counter-
revolution. Second, the analysis of elite and civil society overstates the agency 
of these actors and limits the analysis of how the structure limits actors’ 
                                                          Subalternity and Counter-Revolution 
  35 
agency. Therefore the agency of social forces during the counter-revolution 
needs to be analysed by taking into account the limits that the state imposes.  
 
2.2  Revolution  
A way to overcome the determinist dichotomy reproduced by the 
democratisation vs authoritarian persistence is to analyse the uprising through 
the lenses of revolution. Revolution is by definition a form of transition. Initially, 
this helps to move beyond the expected democratic outcome embedded in the 
democratisation theory. Nevertheless, the literature on revolutions tackles this 
complex phenomenon from different angles. Revolutionary theories have 
developed in generations, which allows a building upon reflections of previous 
theories and is driven by a heuristic scope (Lawson, 2016, pp. 106–107). The 
first generation – ‘the natural history of revolution’ theories – was led by 
historians who used a descriptive approach to explain revolutions as a 
deviation from the norm. This implies the exceptionalism of the revolutionary 
phenomenon derived from normative assumptions, because the explanations 
for revolution were often various and ad hoc. For these reasons the main 
weakness of the first generation of study of revolution was the lack of a robust 
theoretical framework (Goldstone, 1980, pp. 428–429; Foran, 1993, pp. 1–2; 
Lawson, 2019, pp. 48–49).  
Second generation – general theory – developed from three distinct 
approaches – psychology, sociology and political science (Goldstone, 1980, p. 
425; Foran, 1993, p. 1). The psychological approach looks at cognitive 
psychology and the frustration-aggression theory. Inspired by modernisation 
and urbanisation theory, this approach considers revolutions as the result of 
‘relative deprivation’. In other words, masses rebel because they become 
‘frustrated’ by the discrepancy between the expectation generated by rapid 
economic growth and the unrealised expectation that has caused through an 
economic downturn. Ultimately the divergence between the reality and the 
unfulfilled expectations turns frustration into violence. In this perspective, the 
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aim of this school of thought was to identify the factors that affect these 
cognitive attitudes (Gurr, 1970; Goldstone, 1980, pp. 427–428; Tiruneh, 2014, 
p. 2; Lawson, 2019, p. 50). Although this approach explains the people’s 
motivation to revolt, it does not explain the modality of revolution. These 
interpretations overstate the ability of the agency in triggering a revolution, 
depending on the interpretation of deprivation by the subject. They also fail to 
explain cases that have widespread relative deprivation but where revolution 
did not happen (Lawson, 2019, p. 50).  
The sociological approach refers to structural-functionalist theory which 
considers revolution as the result of ‘disequilibrium’ among the various 
subsystems (polity, economy, culture, status, values) that make society – the 
social system. The aim of the analysis is to identify the causes that disrupt the 
equilibrium of the system (Goldstone, 1980, p. 428). The political science 
approach reflects on the pluralist theory of interest-group competition. The 
political science pluralist theory addresses the revolution as the results of the 
conflict between competing interest groups. In this regard, revolution is the 
escalation of conflicts among these groups that could not be solved via 
negotiations, and therefore revolution was the violent bursting of the political 
system (Goldstone, 1980, pp. 428–429). These theoretical approaches also 
share common weaknesses, for example their variables – frustration, 
disequilibrium and conflict – remain difficult to observe and measure. These 
theories also focus on the causes of revolution, giving a little attention to what 
accounts for revolutions that produce a democratic or an authoritarian regime 
(Goldstone, 1980, pp. 433–434; Foran, 1993, pp. 1–2).  
The third generation – structural model – steered the investigation of revolution 
towards the structure, reconsidering the state structure, domestic and 
international constraints that led to revolution. The debate was no longer why 
people rebel but under what circumstances revolutions happen (Foran, 1993, 
p. 1; Lawson, 2019, p. 51). The third generation started to pay attention to the 
different kind of state – based on governance institutions and coercion – and 
its goals. In fact, revolution is the result of the mismatch of the goals of the 
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state and the political and economic structure (Trimberger, 1977, Eisenstadt, 
1978, Skocpol, 1979 cit. in Goldstone, 1980, p. 435). The third generation of 
revolution study also takes into account international political and economic 
interferences as well as accounting for armed forces coherence, agrarian 
structure and elite concessions (Skocpol, 1979; Goldstone, 1980, pp. 436–
437). Nevertheless, the third generation overemphasised the structure, 
disregarding other factors like agency and culture, and it failed to recognise 
the role of urban forces and social coalition generally (Foran, 1993, p. 4). 
Overstating the structural features of revolution resulted in the impossibility of 
explaining cases that structurally met the criteria for revolution but where the 
revolution did not occur, and vice versa; it was unable to explain why revolution 
occurred in unfavourable circumstances (Lawson, 2019, p. 51).  
Finally, the fourth generation attempted to balance the relationship between 
structure and agency, by looking at culture, ideas, values and ideology that 
can motivate actors. The fourth generation foregrounded the variety of factors 
that allowed the revolution to burst forth (Foran, 1993, pp. 6–7; Goldstone, 
2001; Lawson, 2019, pp. 51–52). In this regard, the actors behind the 
revolution were not a single category – like peasants for the third generation. 
Instead the fourth generation addresses the involvement of a broad social 
coalition not characterised solely by social class dimension; rather, it 
emphasises other social cleavages like gender, ethnicity and religion (Foran, 
1993, p. 8). Despite the improvements in the fourth generation of study of 
revolution, it has not remained immune from criticism. Firstly, the research of 
multiple factors and the renewed attention on agency highlight how the 
contingency aspect makes the phenomenon of revolution difficult to study and 
impossible to predict. This is because the revolution breaks down everyday life 
and ultimately creates a state of confusion where people are not aware of their 
own actions and likewise they might not understand the actions of others 
around them. Therefore attempting to explain the pre-existing conditions of 
revolution remains impossible (Kurzman, 2004a, p. 347, 2004b, pp. 166–167, 
2008, pp. 22–23; Clarke, 2014, pp. 381–382). Secondly, despite the aim of the 
fourth generation to overcome the limitations of the third generation by looking 
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at multiple factors, it remained anchored to ‘substantialist commitments’ like 
‘context-less attributes, abstract regularities, ahistorical variables, and 
timeless properties’ (Lawson, 2016, p. 122).  
The Arab Uprisings flagged the need for a new theoretical tool make sense of 
such phenomena. This shaped the debate within Middle Eastern studies to 
understand, in the first instance, if the Arab Uprisings were a revolution or not. 
The debate is shaped around two relevant definitions of revolutions – from the 
third and fourth generation – that were used to conceptualise the Arab 
Uprisings.  
The first definition is perhaps the most well-known definition of revolution. 
Skocpol (1979, p. 4) looks at social revolutions as ‘rapid, basic transformations 
of a society’s state and class structure; and they are accompanied and in part 
carried through by class-based revolts from below’. This definition takes into 
account (1) the causes (class-based revolts) and (2) the outcome 
(transformation of state and class structure) of the revolution, and (3) the 
modality (rapid and basic transformation). The Egyptian case hardly fits this 
definition of revolution, because the causes were not only class-based revolts 
– for example, police brutality – and the outcome did not materialise into a 
transformation of a class structure, because the neoliberal economic system 
that generated the grievances at the core of the uprising remained in place 
after the counter-revolution. Starting from the same economic approach, 
Beinin stresses how an essential element of revolution is its ‘long-term 
process’ which will form a new social order, and in the case of Egypt the 
spontaneous popular movement that managed to bring down Mubarak did not 
build a new political order (Beinin, 2013b). In this regard, rather than attempt 
to theorise counter-revolution the focus should be on addressing ‘the 
distinction between a successful revolution and a defeated social movement 
with revolutionary aspirations’ (Beinin, 2014b). In this way, looking at the 
revolution only through its success reduces the analysis of revolution only to 
successful cases and makes the study of failed revolutions impossible (De 
Smet, 2016, pp. 72–74; Allinson, 2019b, p. 324).  
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This opens the debate on how to conceptualise a revolution that fails, often 
considered a successful counter-revolution (Goldstone, 2001, p. 143; De 
Smet, 2014c; Slater and Smith, 2016, pp. 1473–1474; Allinson, 2019a, pp. 
143–144). In the critiques of Skocpol’s definition of revolution, Goldstone takes 
away the ‘success’ of a revolution as a necessary outcome to define the 
concept and defines revolutions as:  
(a) efforts to change the political regime that draw on a competitive 
vision (or visions) of a just order, (b) a notable degree of informal or 
formal mass mobilization, and (c) efforts to force change through 
noninstitutionalized actions such as mass demonstrations, protests, 
strikes, or violence. (Goldstone, 2001, p. 142).  
 
This definition includes the Egyptian case; in this way the focus of 
investigations moves from the outcome to the process. This definition allowed 
a shift of analysis from a class-based analysis to an ideological component 
(the vision of just order). However, it poses methodological issues regarding 
the measurement of ‘efforts’ or ‘notable degree’. Goldstone attempts to 
operationalise these variables using social movement theory, and therefore 
including elements like organisations and networks and the relevance of 
identity to account for the agency (Goldstone, 2001, pp. 152–154). To apply 
this definition to the case of Egypt, the revolution materialised due to the 
presence of various social movements; however, arguably the failure of the 
Egyptian revolution was due to the lack of ideology and leadership. Such 
interpretation is primarily agency-driven and does not take into account the 
constraints that the system imposes on the range of actions of the agents. In 
addition, conceptualising the failed revolution as a process that lacks specific 
attributes ultimately reduces ‘counter-revolution [to] an inevitably secondary, 
reactive phenomenon’ (Allinson, 2019b, p. 323). As non-democratic regimes 
are not merely the residual category of what does not constitute a democracy, 
within the pool of non-democratic regimes there is growing investigation into 
how to understand and conceptualise these regimes on their own merits 
(Brooker, 2014, pp. 1–4). The same logic is applied here to understand ‘failed 
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revolution’, which is not a residual category of what does not constitute a 
revolution. In this regard, the Arab Uprising stressed the need to revise the 
theory of revolution. Firstly it highlights the need to understand what makes 
these revolutions so fragile (Abrams, 2019, p. 2; Allinson, 2019a, p. 148, 
2019b, p. 321), therefore we should no longer seek ‘to understand failed 
revolutions but rather successful counter‐revolutions’ (Allinson, 2019a, p. 144, 
emphasis in original); and secondly it stresses how the complexity of studying 
revolutions and counter-revolutions derives from the fact that revolutions often 
occur along with other social phenomena like civil war, rebellions, coups d’état, 
and transitions (Lawson, 2019, p. 3).  
A way to move forward our understanding of revolution and counter-revolution 
refers to the conceptualisation of revolution as a process based on ‘context-
specific interactions’ (Lawson, 2016, p. 114). The use of the interactionist 
approach moves beyond the dichotomy between agency and structure, by 
balancing ‘law-like historical processes and thick narratives of particular events 
without trying to subsume the one into the other’ (Bennani-Chraïbi and 
Fillieule, 2012 cit. in Volpi, 2017, pp. 3–4). In fact, based on the interactionist 
approach, social conflicts are underpinned by an economic structure that 
nevertheless leaves the agency room to manoeuvre to generate unpredictable 
development (Clarke, 2017, p. 573). From this perspective, class interests are 
context-driven and not fixed, and this allows the formation of coalitions beyond 




2.3 Reconsidering the application of Gramsci in 
Egypt 
2.3.1 Gramsci before the uprising  
In order to move beyond the impasse of the fourth generation, this thesis 
will use Gramsci’s theory of revolution and the concept of subalternity in the 
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revolutionary process. However, Gramsci was not only the theorist of 
revolution; the application of his theory has been prolific and varied because 
Gramsci offered a multi-level analysis of elements like the state, civil society, 
and revolution. All these concepts have been applied in Egypt with great merit; 
nonetheless the Egyptian uprising highlights some limitations. The first 
analysis on the Arab state based on Gramsci offers an alternative 
understanding of the state in liberal terms (either strong or weak). In fact, Ayubi 
argues that most Arab states are ‘hard state’, some are ‘fierce’, while very few 
are ‘strong state’. Arab states are ‘hard’ states in the sense that they have a 
large bureaucracy; ‘fierce’ states as they have sharp and efficient repressive 
apparatus; but not ‘strong’ states because they fail to penetrate into society in 
terms of taxation and law enforcement (Ayubi, 1995, p. xi). More importantly, 
the states lack ideological hegemony. Therefore, social relations were shaped 
by individual ties developed across limited groups; this cooperation ultimately 
developed into form of corporatism (Ayubi, 1995, pp. 3, 33–35, 196–221). This 
understanding of Gramscian states and their relations with civil society does 
explain the stability of the authoritarian regime in the region. However, it falls 
short of explaining how these relations change. In fact, the stability of the 
corporatist system did not prevent the uprising in 2011.  
The other side of the analysis of the state is based on its relations with civil 
society. Pratt (2007, pp. 6–9) observes that despite the fact that welfare is 
declining it does not seem that the authoritarian regime is becoming more 
fragile. She explains the failure of democratisation or the persistence of 
authoritarianism through ‘bringing culture back in’, while acknowledging the 
contributions of other theories based on economic variables, such as the 
rentier state theory, economic development of state formation, and lack of 
independent civil society (Pratt, 2005, pp. 69–70). In this regard, she uses 
Gramsci’s theorisation of the role of culture in structuring politics, explaining 
how the dominant forces use both coercion and consent – a variety of non-
coercive means – because the regime cannot apply coercion alone to maintain 
hegemony; therefore, culture plays a fundamental role in maintaining 
hegemony (Pratt, 2005, 2007, p. 11).  
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Pratt argues that ‘civil society under authoritarianism continues to exist but 
does not necessarily behave or resemble civil society in liberal democratic 
systems’ (Pratt, 2007, p. 12). In this regard, Pratt considers democratic forces 
– in liberal terms – as counter-hegemonic (Pratt, 2007, pp. 13–15). Civil society 
is not only the arena of authoritarian consent but also the terrain of counter-
hegemony developed through what Gramsci defines as a war of position, an 
attack on the ideological structure of the state. Pratt claims that civil society 
actors that embrace political freedoms and civil rights represent the wars of 
position against the regime (Pratt, 2007, pp. 13–14). National unity is 
constructed as threatened by the introduction of human rights, perceived as 
Western cultural imperialism. Pratt continues that these pro-democratic forces 
are portrayed as an internal enemy to national unity; therefore they are often 
repressed for the salvation of the nation (Pratt, 2005, p. 70, 2007, pp. 13–19).  
In the aftermath of the Egyptian Uprising, we should reflect on to what extent 
those pro-democratic counter-hegemonic forces described by Pratt (2005, 
2007) played a role in triggering the uprising and the counter-revolution. The 
analysis of counter-hegemonic forces is not confined to one specific group; in 
fact, if Pratt looks at pro-democratic forces as the manifestation of counter-
hegemony, others see in the Islamist movement of the Muslim Brotherhood an 
example of counter-hegemony (Simms, 2002; Bayat, 2007; Kandil, 2011; 
Ranko, 2015; Kennedy, 2017). Other scholars consider the cultural 
mobilisation of the Muslim Brotherhood as an example of a counter-hegemonic 
strategy. Simms analyses the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood as a reaction to 
British occupation, referring primarily to the counter-hegemony as ‘control of 
the culture’ rather than coercion; ‘using the Koran’ to politicise ‘the common 
folk with a religiously focused anti-western message’ (Simms, 2002, pp. 564–
570). The Muslim Brotherhood mobilised the population by framing Islamic 
doctrine as anti-Western, thus creating a completely new system of beliefs. In 
this regard, the basis of the society and the state are endorsed in the Quran 
and to establish such a new system it is necessary to educate the society 
according to Islamic precepts (Simms, 2002, pp. 573–578). 
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Others acknowledge that employees, students, professionals and the 
intelligentsia were the active political layer of Middle Eastern society which was 
able to mobilise the ‘street’ in the 1950s and 1960s via different ideologies like 
socialism, nationalism, Ba’athism and Islamism (Bayat, 2007, p. 8). Bayat 
argues that Egypt undertook an Islamist passive revolution since the 
authoritarian regime was threatened by the rising expansion of Islamist 
movements (Bayat, 2007, p. 12). Bayat argues that the Islamist movement 
launched a war of position which failed to penetrate the state, which is defined 
as ‘weak’ or non-hegemonic. He continues by defining the Egyptian Islamic 
‘passive revolution’ as ‘socioreligious change initiated from below by the 
Islamist movement and subsequently appropriated by the target of that 
change, the state which from then on attempted to contain and control its 
trajectory’ (Bayat, 2007, p. 138). Bayat (2007, p. 143) referred to the increasing 
control of the Muslim Brotherhood within civil society and its attempt to 
penetrate political institutions. However, this is not further discussed in relation 
to the war of position. It is puzzling how a non-hegemonic state can survive 
the attack of such a significant war of position; if the Egyptian state was non-
hegemonic as claimed, the war of position of the Islamist movement would 
have easily overthrown the state – something that did not happen even when 
the Muslim Brotherhood had become part of political society after winning 
parliamentary and presidential elections in 2011–2012.  
Other scholars investigate the MB war of position. For example, the analysis 
by Ranko of the development of the Muslim Brotherhood under Mubarak 
conceptualises well the notion of a war of position as ideational and material. 
Ideational in the sense of winning the consent of other subaltern forces, and 
material as seeking the conquest of the state institutions that hold political 
power (Ranko, 2015, p. 33). Yet, despite winning political contests like 
parliamentary and presidential elections, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) lost 
control of the state and civil society over two years, revealing the overstated 
strength of this component of civil society at the expense of its balance with 
the state. The mounting weaknesses of the MB are well captured by Kennedy 
who traced parallels between Italian and Egyptian state formation 
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characterised by similar state–society, state–religion and centre–periphery 
relations (Kennedy, 2017, p. 17). Kennedy – similarly to De Smet (2016) (see 
next section) – considers passive revolution as a dummy outcome based on 
the success of revolution (Kennedy, 2017, p. 3), arguing that ‘Egypt is trapped 
in the cycle of a “passive revolution” because a coercive state has persisted 
and there is an absence of lasting consent’ (Kennedy, 2017, p. 5). She argues 
that the Egyptian passive revolution started in the late 1980s with the attempt 
of the MB to form political alliances, which progressively deteriorated to reach 
the peak in 2012 when the MB lost the consent of their own members who 
defected and formed other movements (Kennedy, 2017, pp. 164–176).  
 Finally, Kandil (2011, p. 37) underlines how structural shifts are determinant 
in triggering a revolution; cultural mobilisation is an important catalyst to make 
it happen but it needs to be analysed within the context of structural shifts. 
According to Kandil (2011, p. 38), Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and counter-
hegemony offers the link between particular structural change and cultural 
transformation. Indeed, Gramsci stresses that the ruling classes maintain their 
dominance through ‘cultural hegemony’; that is possible because the power of 
the dominant force ultimately rests on brute force (Kandil, 2011, pp. 38, 58). In 
order to overthrow the ruling elite, the subaltern forces must counter this 
hegemony. Kandil (2011, p. 58) stresses that counter-hegemony was not 
merely cultural but worked in combination with violent confrontation. The 
Muslim Brothers are a counter-hegemonic force because they aim to create a 
Muslim civil society able to counterbalance the state and because they avoided 
a direct confrontation with the state – and so they attempted to infiltrate it 
through parties, the media, unions, the courts, the military and the police – 
applying Gramsci’s war of positions, so to speak (Kandil, 2011, pp. 47–49). 
Kandil argues that the counter-hegemonic struggle based on ‘cultural 
hegemony’ is not sufficient to overthrow the regime; in fact, state repression 
prevents Islamists from capitalising on cultural hegemony. In this regard, he 
stresses that ‘control over the organs of repression remains the final arbiter of 
political power’ (Kandil, 2011, p. 40). This conclusion falls short when we 
consider the ideological role that Tamarrod had in preparing the ground for the 
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military coup. Although the post-2013 regime is based on unprecedented 
brutal repression, Sisi’s uses ultra-nationalistic rhetoric to gain consent.  
To sum up, the literature that utilised Gramscian theory in explaining 
Egyptian state and society offers a better understanding of the Egyptian state–
society relation than the previous theory which looked at the lack of 
democratisation or persistence of authoritarianism at one single level of 
analysis. Nevertheless, the Egyptian Uprisings provided new evidence that 
stresses how the application of Gramscian theory has overstated the ability of 
groups like the Muslim Brotherhood to be able to control the state by 
attempting to transform society. Yet the new evidence that challenged the 
previous application of Gramsci offered the chance to reinterpret Gramsci’s 
theory. The Egyptian counter-revolution shows how a war of position and a 
war of manoeuvre go hand in hand in order to control and reform state 
structure. On the other hand, the assumption that the Egyptian state was 
based on a fragile corporative system that can easily fall apart under a crisis 
of hegemony does not stand against the counter-revolutionary outcome of the 
hegemonic crisis.  
 
2.3.2 Gramsci after the uprising  
As remarked several times already in our reflections, the Arab Uprisings re-
engaged the debate around structure and agency in MENA. In this regard, 
scholars revisited Gramscian theory on hegemony to explain the origin of the 
uprisings. In more detail, Chalcraft (2016, p. 8) analyses the uprisings through 
the combination of ‘objectivist historical sociology and subjectivist social 
constructionism’. In order to do so, Chalcraft reinterprets the concept of 
hegemony. Thus, he argues that mobilisation is the result of how identity 
shapes perceptions of actors, and how ideas and principles become ‘rightful 
guides for action’, together with strategies and social relations created within 
movements (Chalcraft, 2016, p. 32). He proposes his revised version of 
hegemony as hegemonic incorporation vs hegemonic contraction. Hegemony 
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combines domination and intellectual, moral and political leadership (Chalcraft, 
2016, p. 33). Hegemony expansion refers to the ‘structure and function of the 
state power’, not only in terms of the use of force to guarantee security, law 
enforcement and protection of liberties, but also in terms of participation – 
beyond the institutionalised channels (Chalcraft, 2016, p. 34). In this way, 
Chalcraft links hegemonic expansion with the use of intermediaries – wasta – 
that ultimately characterised such relations (Chalcraft, 2016, pp. 35–36). 
According to Chalcraft, when the elite starts to undermine forms of consent 
based on such relations with the subordinate intermediaries, then the latter 
utilise resources and capacities for a new purpose.  
This process is conceptualised by Chalcraft as a hegemonic contraction that 
puts in place reasons for mobilisation. Finally, he posits that hegemonic 
contraction leads to a ‘crisis of authority’ because ‘groups previously 
incorporated within the state can be pushed out or neglected’ (Chalcraft, 2016, 
p. 36). His analysis of hegemonic contraction is primarily focused on the role 
of the elite in managing the limits of hegemony in terms of expansion and 
contraction, reducing hegemony to forms of concessions through the formation 
of authorised dissent (Chalcraft, 2016, pp. 36–37). This approach offers a 
compelling account of how the uprisings emerged as from hegemonic crisis; 
nevertheless, it offers less to help our understanding of the counter-revolution. 
This thesis builds on the idea of the degree of hegemony and links it with the 
concept of subalternity to explain the counter-revolution. Chalcraft acutely 
observes that ‘the leading powers of decisions are in the hands not just of an 
economic class, but a complex dominant bloc consisting of polity members’ 
(Chalcraft, 2016, p. 38). Chalcraft points out that ‘the dominant bloc is not by 
any means cohesive or monolithic. Indeed, fragmented among different 
sources of power, the dominant bloc faces basic problems of cohesion, which 
can cause it to undermine the forms of hegemony on which it relies’ (Chalcraft, 
2016, p. 38). Based on a similar assumption, this thesis argues that the 
subaltern bloc should not be understood as a monolithic and homogeneous 
entity, either. Therefore – as Chapter Three will argue – in order to understand 
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the counter-revolution (as conceptually distinct from the passive revolution) we 
should look at the dynamics of actors within the subaltern bloc.  
Similarly to Chalcraft (2016) and Pratt (2007), De Smet (2014, pp. 11–12), 
too, prioritises the role of the agent over the structure. According to De Smet, 
the revolution occurs because the subaltern classes ‘reconfigure the existing 
“historical bloc” to their advantage’ (De Smet, 2014b, p. 12). At the same time, 
he argues that the counter-revolution also is the result of the agent’s actions – 
through practice, strategies and discourses – to maintain the status quo. 
Contrary to other scholars who have applied the Gramscian concept of passive 
revolution from the 1919 revolt to the 2011 uprising (El Shakry 2012), De Smet 
acknowledges the value of such interpretation only partially, arguing that 
although passive revolution captures the essence of the authoritarian 
character of Nasserism, it ignores the ‘populist’ and ‘socialistic’ aspects which 
according to De Smet are conceptualised by Caesarism (De Smet, 2014b, p. 
20). However, De Smet does not detail how the populism and Arab socialism 
of Nasserism emerge from the definition of Caesarism he puts forward. 
Caesarism is a form of power deadlock between progressive and conservative 
forces. The deadlock is due to the fact that the continuation of conflict between 
these forces will lead to mutual destruction. These forces can weaken each 
other and this allows a third force to intervene and dominate both forces 
(Gramsci, 1975, p. 1619 [Q13 §27]). On the one hand, the concept of 
Caesarism can describe the military intervention in 1952, because the military 
was considered a ‘semi-independent, “external” social force, which was able 
to “solve” the protracted and undecided power struggle between the national-
popular forces and the semi-colonial ruling bloc of landlords, the Palace, and 
British capital’ (De Smet, 2014b, p. 22). However, it is unclear why the regime 
of Sadat and Mubarak – and later Sisi – should constitute examples of 
Caesarism in this regard. Finally, De Smet attempts to stretch the concept of 
Caesarism to the Muslim Brotherhood’s interaction with the military, arguing 
that ‘both Morsi and Shafiq displayed Caesarist tendencies, as they claimed to 
be the only revolutionary force able to contain the danger of military or 
fundamentalist counter-revolution’ (De Smet, 2014b, p. 33). In his more 
Subalternity and Counter-Revolution 
48   
extended analysis, De Smet (2016) continues to stretch the concept of 
Caesarism in three distinct ‘Caesarist episodes’, with the SCAF in 2011, Morsi 
in 2012, and Sisi in 2013, resulting in ‘a new “Caesar” at every moment’ 
(Alexander and Naguib, 2018, p. 91). Likewise, De Smet gives little attention 
to subaltern forces, often referring to them with the single category of workers 
that failed to lead the subaltern bloc (Roccu, 2018, p. 107). 
This thesis builds on the gaps in this literature, redirecting the focus of the 
counter-revolution as the result of interactions between agency and structure. 
It builds on Chalcraft’s work because it applies the concept of subalternity to 
understand how hegemony is exercised within society; however, it does not 
assign hegemonic control only to the hand of the elite. For this reason, this 
thesis shifts the analysis to how the forces within the subaltern bloc shaped 
the counter-revolution by interacting with the structure. At the same time, this 
thesis builds on De Smet’s limitations, re-engaging with the concept of 
hegemonic crisis but offering an alternative outcome beyond Caesarism. The 
contribution of this thesis is a perspective on how the intermediary groups were 
able to shape the counter-revolution in Egypt. Contrary to De Smet’s (2014) 
assumption that the Egyptian counter-revolution is a form of passive revolution 
determined by Caesarism, because dominant and subaltern forces are two 
equal and opposite forces, this thesis argues that the Egyptian counter-
revolution was characterised by three forces – dominant, intermediary and 
revolutionary – and the continuous alliance shift determined the condition of 
counter-revolution. This thesis addresses the uprising of 2011 as a hegemonic 
crisis and it provides an interpretation of how subaltern forces concurred with 
the counter-revolution. The connection between the dominant and subaltern 
forces remains central to understanding the counter-revolution despite the 
manifestation of the hegemonic crisis. Chapter Three will propose an 
alternative understanding of the Egyptian counter-revolution, building on the 
limits of these theories. In doing so, this thesis offers a relational model that 
can explain the open-ended process of revolution; this will advance the study 
of revolutions by shedding light on the fragility of revolutions in MENA and 
elsewhere.  
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2.4 Reconsidering subalternity  
The concept of subalternity has been studied by two schools of thought: the 
British Marxist Historians and the Subaltern Studies Group. Both have the 
merit of popularising Gramsci’s theory and the concept of subalternity; 
however, neither investigated the agency of subalternity during the counter-
revolution.  
The British Marxist Historians posed the basis for the ‘history from below’ 
historical perspective, which aimed to provide an alternative view from the 
conventional history written by the ruling elite which assumes the passivity of 
the masses. Thus this approach stressed the involvement of the ‘lower 
classes’ in the making rather than the writing of their history (Kaye, 1984, pp. 
4–6). British Marxist Historians focus their attention on forms of resistance and 
rebellion while acknowledging the limitations that such struggles have had 
(Kaye, 1984, p. 230). Historians of the Middle East followed the ‘history from 
below’ and subaltern studies approach in the attempt to write the history of 
non-elite groups, focusing on ‘the oppressed and the marginal’ (Cronin, 2008, 
p. 1), reducing the action of the subalterns to being defensive (Beinin, 2008, p. 
230). 
Historians of Egypt analysed workers and peasants through the lens of 
subalternity; this led to a variety of interpretations of the concept of subalternity 
and the agency of these groups. First of all, Egyptian workers were not a 
passive mass, nor were they revolutionary forces. They aimed instead at 
engaging with the state in order to gain political and social rights (Chalcraft, 
2008, pp. 69–70). From this perspective, subalterns are part of the state-
building process, thus in contraposition to the assumption of passive revolution 
based on the exclusion and passivity of subaltern forces. Secondly, other 
interpretations argue that capitalism becomes hegemonic, affecting the 
transformation of the working class (Beinin, 2001, p. 20). The Tanzimat3 era 
                                            
3 Tanzimat, which literally means ‘reorganisation’, was a period between 1839 and 1876 that 
marked the modernisation policies of the Ottoman Empire. The effect of the Tanzimat reforms 
reached Egypt as well. Mohamed Ali, the Ottoman governor of Egypt at the start of the 
Tanzimat era, triggered the first modernisation reforms only within the military sectors, 
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had a profound impact on the economy of the regions, and the subaltern could 
barely resist or evade such pressure (Beinin, 2001, p. 42). This interpretation 
of the Tanzimat is very close to the concept of passive revolution as a form of 
state formation. Finally, the third application of subalternity is used to interpret 
the role of foreign workers within the integration of the Egyptian economy into 
the international capitalist system. This interpretation considers foreign 
workers as subaltern because they were not able to benefit from the 
penetrative capitalist system. In fact, the foreign workers were able to defend 
workers’ rights (regardless of whether they were foreigners or Egyptians) 
against the authoritarian capitalist state based on a multi-ethnic ethos beyond 
national and religious identities (Gorman, 2008, p. 237). From this perspective, 
the subalternity in Egypt is an expression of class resistance within 
international discourses (Gorman, 2008, pp. 254–255). Taken individually, 
these interpretations provide three different interpretations of subalternity: 
involved in the process of state building; remains excluded and unable to react 
to the emergence of capitalism; and a form of resistance to protect workers’ 
rights. Ultimately, because subalternity is used to understand state formation, 
its application in other radical phenomena like revolution and counter-
revolution has remained limited.  
The second school of thought that investigates subalternity is the Subaltern 
Studies Group. This was founded by a group of Indian and British scholars 
(Partha Chatterjee, Shahid Amin, David Arnold, Gyan Pandey, Dipesh 
Chakrabarty and David Hardiman) led by Ranajit Guha whose intellectual 
objective was to investigate ‘the most oppressed people’ due to 250 years of 
British domination. Their main investigation was primarily historical; indeed 
they aimed to trace the presence of oppressed people within the traditional 
historical narrative (Chakrabarty, 2015, p. 10; Ganguly, 2015, p. 5). Others like 
Gayatri Spivak, Gyan Prakash and Susie Tharu joined the group until it was 
officially disbanded in 2008 (Chakrabarty, 2015, p. 11). The fact that the 
                                            
whereas his successors promoted reforms to other sectors, like education, administration, 
economy, infrastructure, etc. (Cleveland and Bunton, 2013, pp. 75–94).  
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Subaltern Studies Group vanished as a formal collective of scholars did not 
mean the end of subaltern studies as a field of investigation.  
The historians of the Subaltern Studies Group were dissatisfied with the 
traditional interpretation of ‘free movement’ which stressed the prominent role 
of the elite in the Indian national-state formation, and the exclusion of the 
‘politics of the people’ (Chaturvedi, 2000, p. viii). The distortion of the concept 
of subalternity resulted also from the criticism that the Subaltern Studies Group 
made of the British Marxist Historians with whom the Subaltern Studies Group 
shared the ‘history from below’ approach. They criticised the Marxist 
determinist view of history. As well as the major division within historians into 
two main schools of thought, the cultural and political-economic approaches 
were considered incompatible (Chatterjee, 1985, pp. 53–54, 2015, p. 633; 
Ludden, 2002, p. 5). As a result, until 1985 subalternity was a fluid concept 
with broad defining features; however, after 1985 subalternity was deeply 
connected with cultural studies and discourses on power (Ludden, 2002, p. 
11). Subaltern studies moved from the analysis of tribes’, workers’, and 
peasants’ struggles to the discourse on colonial construction of cultural power 
(Ludden, 2002, p. 12). The postmodernist critique of Marxism resulted in a 
division of the project. On the one hand, some scholars continued to address 
the subaltern within the ‘history from below’ approach; on the other hand, other 
scholars embraced post-Marxist stances, which later became postcolonial 
theory (Chaturvedi, 2000, pp. xi–xii). 
 The first trend of the Subaltern Studies Group followed Guha’s interests in 
the relations between subalternity and hegemony. Guha equated the term 
‘elite’ with dominant groups. He distinguishes two main dominant groups: the 
first is the dominant foreigners, primarily the British officials as well as foreign 
business people (merchants, financiers and industrialists), landlords and 
planters, and missionaries. The second dominant group is composed of 
dominant Indians that operate at two levels: at national level as the most 
influential bourgeoisie, and at the local level the dominant group are actually 
in hierarchically inferior social strata which act in the interests of the 
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bourgeoisie and not their own social condition (Guha, 1982, p. 8). The 
assumption that subalternity is synonymous with the people spilt over into 
Middle Eastern politics. In fact, other scholars looked at subalternity as 
synonymous with social movements and ‘the people’ (Ismail, 2013, pp. 866–
867; Radsch, 2016, pp. 20–21, 27). Despite the heterogeneity of the 
subalterns being recognised, the understanding of subalternity as merely 
popular groups does not allow the investigation of groups like the Muslim 
Brotherhood – which mutated from a social movement to a political party by 
accessing political society. Nevertheless, the Muslim Brotherhood’s access to 
political society did not necessarily mean it had control of the state.  
The second trend of the Subaltern Studies Group turned their attention to 
postcolonial studies, replacing the capitalist and class analysis with an 
investigation on culture and ideology. Based on postcolonial studies, 
subalternist scholars reinserted culture as an essential element for agency 
analysis, and such culture has a specific connotation in ‘the East’ (Chibber, 
2013, pp. 1–8). Therefore, the trend of subaltern studies had developed their 
distinct interpretation far from Gramscian Marxism and closer to 
postmodernism and post-Marxism including Foucault, Deleuze, Badiou and 
Agamben (Chaturvedi, 2000, p. vii; Ludden, 2002, p. 7; Chakrabarty, 2015, p. 
11). The drift to postmodernism shifted the essence and the nature of the 
investigation of subaltern groups. In fact, for Foucault, the individuals who are 
subjectified by the dominant power cannot escape such a system of power, 
whereas Gramsci is interested in subalternity precisely to study their struggle 
to escape their subaltern condition (Currie, 1995, pp. 221–222). The 
postmodern turn of subaltern studies – which at the same time reflected the 
approach of cultural studies – focuses its attention on the form of resistance, 
as well as the manifestation of counter-hegemony, but it overshadows why 
hegemony persists (Buttigieg, 2008, p. 227).  
This thesis will offer an alternative interpretation of the concept of 
subalternity; in fact subalternity here is understood as a cross-group alliance 
that explains how hegemony is exercised within society and how social drivers 
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can transform the balance of power. Subalternity understood as a subaltern 
bloc captures the differences and complexity within society. For this reason, 
the concept of subalternity is relational and differentiated at various degrees. 
By unpacking the concept of subalternity in relational terms we can understand 
where the fragility of revolution lies within the revolutionary process. More 
specifically, such fragility highlights the shrinking of state integration and the 
increasing of the autonomy of subaltern forces within civil society. Indeed, the 
delicate balance between these two variables can determine the trajectory of 
the revolution.  
The theory of counter-revolution presented here builds on Gramsci’s original 
conceptualisation of subalternity. In fact, Gramsci developed the concept of 
subalternity in three main themes: (1) understanding the social–political power 
relation that determined the marginalisation of certain social groups; (2) 
analysing how ideology is used to cover and reframe power relations and the 
social activity of the social groups; (3) defining a theory of social transformation 
to empower counter-hegemonic social forces to escape their condition and 
establish a new social order (Green, 2006, pp. 12–13). The widespread 
concept of subalternity, which has spilt over to other fields and regions, derived 
predominantly from the Subaltern Studies Group’s interpretation. In this 
respect, the concept of subalternity has been related to the passive 
acceptance of hegemony or forms of counter-hegemony to promote revolution, 
whereas a thorough analysis of the role of social forces – analysed through 
the lens of subalternity – during counter-revolution remains unaddressed. 
Thus, the aim of this thesis is to investigate how the subaltern forces reacted 
during a moment of hegemonic crisis that allowed the potential for a revolution, 
and it analyses the counter-revolution, an alternative to the mainstream 
concept of passive revolution. Understanding the relations between the 
hegemonic crisis and the political activity of social forces through the lens of 
subalternity gives a new interpretation to the agency of the subaltern forces 
during the Egyptian Uprisings. I argue that the failure of the Egyptian revolution 
is due to the agency of the subaltern forces, specifically the tension within the 
subaltern bloc, and the solitary attempt of the Muslim Brotherhood to control 
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the Egyptian state, since the Muslim Brotherhood, as the most advanced 
subaltern force, was not able to challenge the judiciary nor the military despite 
its access to parliament and presidency. Although the Muslim Brotherhood had 
the organisation, its leadership disconnected with the subaltern bloc because 
the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to subordinate revolutionary forces rather 
than leading them.  
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This chapter addresses an alternative approach to understanding counter-
revolutions. The chapter discusses the theoretical framework of the thesis 
through the revision of the concept of subalternity. By using the case of Egypt 
between 2011 and 2013, this thesis stresses how the relations between 
agency and structure define the counter-revolution and how intermediate 
forces have a key role in it. Chapter Two discussed, firstly, how the debate on 
democratisation and authoritarian resilience reached a dead end in explaining 
the counter-revolution in Egypt, simply reproducing an old dichotomy based on 
normative expectations. Secondly, the literature on revolution shapes the 
debate on the understanding of revolution either as a process or an outcome. 
This again limits the understanding of the Egyptian Uprising and the military 
coup which were framed in different ways: a passive revolution of a coup 
backed by popular support, or revolution backed by the military. Thirdly, the 
concept of subalternity has been theorised differently according to various 
approaches – like those of the British Marxist Historians, Subaltern Studies 
Group, etc. The various interpretations of the concept of subalternity allowed 
the investigation of the role of subaltern forces in the context of counter-
revolution to remain under-studied. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
overstating the corporative system as flexible but precarious can help to only 
partially explain the uprising in 2011, whereas the assumption that opposition 
groups like the Muslim Brotherhood were able to take over the state falls short 
in explaining the popular support of the military coup.  
Therefore, this chapter argues that in order to understand the role of 
subalternity within a revolutionary and counter-revolutionary process it is 
necessary to establish clear relations between the subalternity, state, and 
hegemonic crisis. Therefore I argue that more integrated the subaltern are 
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within the state, the less likely the hegemonic crisis is to happen; nevertheless, 
in the unlikely case that a hegemonic crisis manifests, the integral state is able 
to resolve the crisis through passive revolution, whereas when subalterns are 
not integrated within the state, the hegemonic crisis is more likely to be 
resolved through revolution. Finally, in the case that subaltern forces are only 
partially integrated within the state, the hegemonic crisis turns into forms of 
counter-revolution. Thus, subalternity becomes a lens to understand power 
relations within civil society; these power relations are essential to understand 
the reaction that different social forces will have during a moment of hegemonic 
crisis and, finally, determine whether or not the crisis can be resolved in a 
revolution or counter-revolution. This chapter presents the theoretical 
framework necessary to explain the social dynamics that will be discussed in 
the chapters that follow. This chapter turns now on the rationale that the 
interpretation offered here of the concept of subalternity will provide an account 
for the relations between the concepts of subalternity, integral state and 
hegemonic crisis. Finally, it will briefly apply this model to the case of Egypt 
between 2011 and 2013 to account for the counter-revolution, which will be 
further unpacked in Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven.  
 
3.1 Rethinking subalternity  
The next section looks at how Gramscian studies on subalternity in 
conjunction with the state can explain counter-revolution. Gramsci investigates 
subalternity because he aims to understand how a social group can trigger 
uprisings but fails to establish a new social order. Indeed, this is the defining 
feature of the fragile revolution which remains unexplained by the fourth 
generation of revolution studies. As Chapter Two explored, the analysis of 
counter-revolution focuses the analysis on passive revolution only as a 
transformation from above with the exclusion and passivity of subaltern forces. 
In contrast, this thesis builds on the same starting point as Gramsci’s analysis. 
Gramsci’s aim is to understand how uprisings do not turn into successful 
revolutions, which are different from forms of passive revolution which imply 
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the exclusion or passivity of subaltern forces. He investigates subalternity to 
understand the role of certain social forces during a revolutionary process. 
Therefore, subalternity offers a better understanding of the social drivers of 
counter-revolution by analysing the dynamics within the subaltern bloc and the 
relations between civil and political society. For this reason, the investigation 
of subalternity in Egypt during the 2011–2013 period provides a better 
understanding of the Egyptian counter-revolution.  
The theoretical framework of this thesis builds on the work of Marcus Green 
(2002, 2006, 2011) and Guido Liguori (2016), who readdressed the concept of 
subalternity as conceptualised by Gramsci, since the aim of these scholars is 
to understand Gramsci’s political thoughts rather than their application. The 
criteria of interpretation are suggested by, not operationalised and applied to, 
any empirical case. This thesis provides a way to operationalise subalternity 
in a way that can be applied to empirical cases. Gramsci analyses subalternity 
from three different angles: (1) in the pre-prison writings, he analyses the 
‘intermediate forces’ between the dominant and the masses which is a specific 
concept within the subaltern bloc; (2) in the first version of prison notebook 1, 
Gramsci reflects on connections between subalternity and hegemony; and (3) 
in prison notebooks 3 and 25, Gramsci closely investigates the agency of the 
subalterns within their own system (Liguori, 2016, p. 90). The next section 
discusses the concept of subalternity and the peculiarity of the intermediate 
forces. The rest of the chapter then addresses the relations between 
subalternity and state and subalternity and counter-revolution. The focus of 
this thesis is to investigate the agency of the intermediary forces during the 
hegemonic crisis and their relations with the dominant and other subaltern 
forces. This thesis argues that during a specific structural condition, the 
intermediary forces had a significant role in shaping the outcome of the 
hegemonic crisis. This analysis explains how the oscillating position of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, from being the allied force of the dominant force to 
attempting to be the leader of the subaltern bloc, led to the counter-revolution.  
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3.1.1 Subaltern bloc  
Gramsci’s reconceptualisation of subalternity and intermediary forces 
between political and civil society helps us to understand the development of 
counter-revolution. Subalternity is the condition that links the various subaltern 
forces vis-à-vis the dominant force. However, subalternity should be 
understood as a form of social forces alliance which has a variety of 
manifestations. The dominant force is the one that controls the mode of 
production, coercion and political power. In fact, different categories can 
control the means of production but do not classify them as dominant; for 
example, big business, small companies, family businesses, and single 
shopkeepers all control the means of production to various degrees but not all 
can influence the mode of production. 
Subaltern is not the same as oppressed; neither is it synonymous with 
revolutionary. The concept of subaltern forces in Gramsci is not the equivalent 
of workers or labour; rather, it distinguishes specific hierarchical relations 
which put these actors in the condition of subordination (Gramsci, 1975, pp. 
299–300 [Q3, §14]; Modonesi, 2014, pp. 13–14). Subalternity should not be 
understood solely as ‘the subordination of the majority by a minority’ (Buttigieg, 
2018, p. 11). Gramsci did not aim to provide a precise definition of subalterns. 
In fact, Buttigieg observes that:  
It is futile to search for or attempt to formulate a precise definition of 
‘subaltern’ or ‘subaltern social group (class)’ as conceived by 
Gramsci, since in his view they do not constitute a single, much less 
a homogeneous, entity – which is precisely why he always refers to 
them in the plural. (Buttigieg, 2018, p. 9)  
This thesis will follow Gramsci’s starting point. He is not interested in 
analysing a specific group; he is interested in understanding how different 
social groups can escape their subaltern condition. Therefore, this thesis 
argues that subalternity is better understood as a social bloc formed by 
different social groups that share the same condition of subordination. Within 
the subaltern bloc, subalterns are a plurality of different social forces; their 
relations are primarily but not exclusively economic since their economic 
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relations overlap with factors like gender, age, religion, kin, region, etc. For this 
reason, subalternity is not a static concept; it is rather intersectional and 
relational (Green, 2011, p. 393).  
Subalternity is a form of intersectionality; in fact ‘Gramsci recognized that 
subalternity was not merely defined by class relations but rather an intersection 
of class, race, culture and religion that functioned in different modalities in 
specific historical context’ (Green, 2011, p. 395; see also Nilsen and Roy, 
2015, pp. 13–14; Liguori, 2016, p. 99). Subalternity is not only characterised 
by economic relations but it is shaped by other relations such as ethnicity, 
gender and regionality (Thomas, 2018b, p. 873). Therefore, subalternity 
depends on the power relations of different social groups, beyond their 
structural economic nature. This explains why the leaders of the Muslim 
Brotherhood did not manage to remain in power despite being democratically 
elected and being in the business sector, because even if they entered political 
institutions the effects of their decisions were limited by military control. In order 
to study revolution, Gramsci focuses his attention on how the various subaltern 
groups have organised and infiltrated institutions to represent their political will, 
and how the subaltern forces have used pockets of civil society autonomy to 
create counter-hegemony (Green, 2011, p. 394; Nilsen and Roy, 2015, pp. 13–
15).  
The relational features of subalternity emerge from the type of social groups 
investigated within the state. In fact, Gramsci analyses subalternity in three 
distinct historical contexts: ancient Rome, medieval communes and Italian 
Risorgimento. The aim of Gramsci is to understand the power relations 
between dominant and subaltern forces and how subaltern forces organised 
themselves politically despite the different forms of state and hegemony 
(Green, 2011, pp. 393–394). In fact, the political structure allowed different 
room for political actions; Gramsci carefully analyses how despite slaves in 
ancient Rome and medieval Ciompi4 both being in the same subaltern 
                                            
4 Ciompi were salaried wool artisans who did not have any corporate representation within the 
Florentine oligarchy guilds system at the end of the 14th century (Scaramella, 1931).  
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condition their relations with the state were different (Gramsci, 1975, pp. 2284–
2287 [Q25, §4]). Although both were in a system characterised by low 
centralised power, the slaves in Rome managed to reach an alliance with the 
plebs, exploiting the expertise of the slaves who were war prisoners. On the 
contrary, the wool artisans in the medieval commune were not able to develop 
any form of leadership and direction to engage artisans of other guilds, and 
remained trapped in the economic-corporate interests system (Green, 2011, 
pp. 394–395).  
Gramsci reflects on the political and economic context in which these two 
subaltern groups triggered their revolts. The fact that Gramsci’s starting point 
is the groups that trigger revolts does not mean that those groups are the only 
subaltern forces. In fact, as the case of ancient Rome shows, slaves who 
triggered the protests were supported by the plebs – subaltern forces as well 
– because they still had limited access to political power. Although Gramsci 
specifically analyses slaves and Ciompi to conceptualise subalternity, he 
investigates subalternity with the additional cases of the bourgeoisie during the 
Risorgimento and workers during the Biennio Rosso5 to understand how the 
outcome of these uprisings was different. The analysis of the bourgeoisie as a 
subaltern force reinforces the idea that subalternity is relational since 
controlling the means of production by the bourgeoisie does not necessarily 
imply its dominant roles within a specific context. Gramsci underlines the role 
of the bourgeoisie political party in leading other subaltern forces and remarks 
                                            
5 In Italy, the crisis of the liberal state after World War I allowed the class struggle to reach its 
peak in 1919–1920; this was the Biennio Rosso – Two Red Years. During these two years, 
Italy was on the verge of a socialist revolution since the confrontation between the 
revolutionary forces like anarcho-syndicalists and revolutionary syndicalists and reactionary 
forces like fascist Blackshirts escalated. The leaders of the workers’ unions and Italian 
Socialist Party were not able to capitalise and take the lead of the growing workers’ 
movements, which started with political demonstrations and strikes and led to more extreme 
forms of political participation like the occupation of factories in order to take over production.  
The Italian Socialist Party, in particular, was caught in internal strategic and ideological 
divisions; the three currents – reformist, communist and maximalist – were unable to reconcile, 
leading to the spin-off of the communists which created the Italian Communist Party (Gramsci 
was among its founders), while the reformists were pushed out the party and later formed the 
Unitarian Socialist Party, leaving the maximalist faction in control of the Socialist Party. These 
contrasts ultimately created a fertile ground for fascism to rise (Bertrand, 1982, pp. 383–384; 
Natoli, 2012, pp. 205–206; McNally, 2017, pp. 314–315). 
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that the interactions among the subaltern forces and the bourgeoisie – as the 
most advanced subaltern force – is central to understanding the outcome of a 
revolutionary process (Gramsci, 1975, pp. 372–373 [Q3, §90]). The focus of 
Gramsci’s analysis is to understand how certain groups triggered the revolts 
and why these revolts did not succeed.  
Gramsci developed his analysis by taking into account two variables: (1) the 
type of state and context in which these groups operated, and (2) the relations 
within the subaltern bloc. In the same way, this thesis will analyse the Egyptian 
counter-revolution by addressing the relations within the subaltern bloc and 
the type of state. This will ultimately contribute to a better understanding of the 
revolutionary process and the counter-revolutionary results more broadly. 
Equally importantly, understanding counter-revolution through the lens of 
subalternity explains how the counter-revolution was not exclusively a process 
led by the elite, but rather an organic process that set the basis for the 
formation of the counter-revolutionary regime. As already addressed, 
subalternity and dominance can be better understood as a composition of 
similar but not identical forces. The dominant bloc encompasses the control of 
the economic structure, the control of the political institutions and the control 
of coercion. Since dominance is not a zero-sum game, different forces within 
the dominant bloc can have a different degree of control over the economy, 
state institutions and coercion. On the other hand, the subaltern bloc is not a 
monolithic entity either, and subaltern forces have a different degree of 
development according to their structural conditions and their ability to develop 
organisation and leadership by exploiting pockets of autonomy within civil 
society (see sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3).  
Green addresses how the ‘system of class alliances’ is crucial to trigger the 
revolution (Green, 2002, p. 18). Indeed, Green argues that for Gramsci a broad 
alliance of subaltern social forces is essential to achieve a new state based on 
egalitarian social relations. Since subaltern forces have varying degrees of 
political organisation, the most advanced groups have to become leaders of 
the subaltern alliance because they are able to present the alternative values, 
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social relations and the conceptualisation of a new state (Green, 2002, p. 21; 
Nilsen and Roy, 2015, pp. 13–15). Using this perspective, in order to challenge 
the dominant force the most advanced subaltern force has to become a 
counter-hegemonic force, and it needs to win the consent of the other 
subaltern groups within civil society. In order to control civil society, the most 
advanced subaltern force needs to develop the ‘war of position’ which implies 
the promotion of counter-hegemonic values and the unification of the subaltern 
bloc (Green, 2002, p. 21). This reinterpretation of subalternity takes into 
account relations with the state structure and dynamics within the subaltern 
bloc, and this thesis presents a new analysis to understand how the Egyptian 
Uprising turned into a counter-revolution due to the agency of the most 
advanced force that alternated its position from ally of the dominant force to 
leader of the civil society.  
 
3.1.2 Intermediary forces  
This thesis turns now to the discussion of the role of a specific force within 
the subaltern bloc. As explained in the previous section, it is necessary to 
understand the relations of certain subaltern groups with the dominant bloc. 
For this reason, the intermediary forces are essential to understanding (1) how 
hegemony is exercised within civil society; and (2) how these actors can 
influence the hegemonic crisis’s resolution.  
I reconstruct the concept of intermediary force which emerges only 
marginally and in a fragmented way in Gramsci, and has been 
underdeveloped. The relations between the dominant and intermediary forces 
emerge also from the notebook Q1§44 entitled political direction of the class 
before and after governing. Gramsci addresses the dominant force as both 
dominant and leading (dirigente). The term dirigente (leading) establishes its 
relations with the allied intermediary force, while the expression dominant 
establishes its relations with the opposite forces. He stresses that even before 
reaching power, the class can (and should) be dirigente. However, Gramsci 
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clearly points out that before becoming dominant the force remains in the 
terrain of subalternity. Within the subaltern bloc, on top of their hierarchical 
structure, there are the intermediate forces which have the goal of connecting 
political and civil society. The intermediate forces are subaltern forces because 
they do not have autonomous decision making; rather, they implement the 
hegemonic functions within civil society to serve the interests of the dominant 
forces. The intermediate forces operate within a wide range of civil society 
organisations and economic structures. The intermediate forces become allied 
with the dominant forces because they either help by spreading consent or 
controlling coercion, since hegemony is not only ideological consent but also 
dominance via the use of force. Thus, the concept of intermediary force is 
placed in between the dominant and the subaltern bloc, where the intermediary 
force has a key role in keeping the balance of power in favour of the dominant 
force.  
Since subalternity is relational and shaped by structure and superstructure, 
Gramsci addresses how allied intermediary forces are not a single category 
but are contingent on the social-political structure and economic 
superstructure. For this reason, depending on the system, the allied 
intermediary forces are different groups. For example, in the agrarian context 
of the Po Valley, in Q1§44, Gramsci clarifies how the landlords controlled the 
peasantry by alternating metayage6 with direct control of the economy. Due to 
this alternation, the landlords were able to select privileged metayers as allied 
intermediary forces, especially within agrarian councils. In this way, the 
landlords were able to control the agrarian councils via the participation of the 
allied metayers. Generally, in the context of the modern capitalist state, allied 
intermediary forces can be highly skilled waged labour, like bureaucrats, public 
sector employees, professionals like doctors, journalists, lawyers, engineers 
etc. Depending on their field they are able to shape hegemony within civil 
society to serve the interests of the dominant forces. Indeed, in a democratic 
                                            
6 Metayage was a form of agrarian contract between the landowner and the metayer. The 
landowner allows the metayer to use the land and in return the metayer receives half of the 
land production. 
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capitalist system, the allied intermediary forces are intellectuals and petty 
bourgeoisie, because intellectuals shape the ideological component of 
hegemony while petty bourgeoisie second the capitalist system. 
The distinction between ‘subordination and resistance’ is central to 
understanding the degree of subalternity and its actions. Indeed, the 
acceptance of leadership and active support for the dominant force is a 
peculiar feature of the allied intermediary force. Subalternity remains within a 
continuum of acceptance vs resistance of domination, which will end only 
when the leader7 of the subaltern forces establishes its hegemony to become 
dominant and leading through revolution (Modonesi, 2014, pp. 21–22). This 
implies the existence of an allied intermediary force that is essential in 
balancing the relations between political and civil society because the allied 
intermediary forces organise the hegemonic function within civil society. 
Gramsci identifies direct and indirect hegemonic functions within the 
superstructure: as the direct domination of the political society, and as the 
indirect control of the private organisations within the civil society (Gramsci, 
1975, pp. 1517–1519 [Q12, §1]). In other words, hegemony is not only 
ideological but also administrative, and organisation of consent is via 
institutions of the civil society; in fact, when more and more subaltern forces 
are integrated within the state, the state needs to develop its ideological 
apparatuses to keep the consent. The inclusion of the subaltern within the state 
requires tight control of all the aspects of their lives (Frosini, 2016, pp. 133–
135).  
Gramsci addresses peculiar characteristics of the intermediary force. Due 
to its contradictory features – since allied intermediary forces are subalterns 
that actively serve the hegemony of the dominant force – during a period of 
hegemonic crisis the intermediary force oscillates between ‘the old and the 
new’. In fact, Gramsci argues that within the subaltern forces hegemony should 
be granted to the progressive forces rather than the privileged, otherwise this 
                                            
7 Cf. section 3.1.3 for a full discussion on leading and advanced forces.  
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oscillating pattern will occur (Gramsci, 1975, pp. 1138–1140 [Q9, §68] 8). This 
was the case with the Muslim Brotherhood at the dawn of the uprising; in fact, 
in early 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood had little intention of leading the uprising 
because it feared the repressive consequences of its failure. This provoked 
the oscillation of the Muslim Brotherhood between supporting the military and 
attempting to challenge it and become the leading force of the subaltern bloc.  
Gramsci uses the military metaphor to explain the relations and the role of 
intermediate forces and the link between political and civil society. The social 
relations between political and civil society should be interpreted as 
hierarchical, as in the military where the middle-rank officers are the ones in 
the position to trigger a coup because they are strategically positioned in 
between the head of the military organisation and the foot soldiers who control 
the tanks and artillery. In this metaphor, the middle-rank officers are the allied 
intermediary forces that can make a difference during the hegemonic crisis. 
On the one hand, they can support rather than crush foot soldiers’ mutinies, 
thus refuse to obey superiors’ orders – and take the lead in the mutiny. On the 
other hand, as Gramsci described in the development of subalternity, the 
middle-rank officers are the most advanced force, and precisely because they 
can control the subaltern they are in the position to trigger the coup.  
 
3.1.3 Development of counter-hegemonic subaltern forces  
Gramsci outlines the development of the subaltern forces from dominance 
to resistance, which is guided by four criteria: (1) the formation of the subaltern 
forces in relation to the economic situation, (2) organisation, (3) leadership, (4) 
autonomy (Gramsci, 1975, pp. 372–373 [Q3, §90]). Gramsci also stresses that 
the phases of development of subalterns’ consciousness are actually a 
crescendo of autonomy of the subaltern forces; in fact, they move from 
passivity to the formulation of their own demands. Thus we can assume that 
                                            
8 I prefer to address note Q9, §68 which is a text A instead of the text C of Q13, §36, because 
in the text A the oscillation between old and new is more articulated than in the text C.  
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autonomy is an active function to form an alternative hegemony. The first 
phase stressed the relations with the structure; for this reason, multiple 
categories belong to the subaltern bloc depending on their relations and 
integration with the structure. Once one or more subaltern forces become 
aware of their subaltern position due to their existing structure they attempt to 
counter the existing hegemony. The conscious subaltern forces build 
organisation and leadership in order to gather other subaltern forces to form a 
counter-hegemony and to conquer political power (Modonesi, 2014, pp. 18–
19).  
In Q3§43, Gramsci addresses the variety within the subaltern bloc which 
contains forces that have developed consciousness (via organisation and 
leadership), while other forces which do not develop the same level of 
consciousness as the leading force remain – based on Gramsci’s terminology 
– spontaneous. This differentiation of forces within the subaltern bloc as 
conscious and spontaneous serves the purpose of understanding different 
strategies of actions. In fact, the spontaneity of some subaltern forces needs 
to be controlled by conscious direction. This reinforces the idea of degrees of 
subalternity within political leadership. Gramsci continues in this note by 
addressing how only the unification between spontaneity and conscious 
direction (direzione consapevole) can lead to the struggle for hegemony 
(Liguori, 2016, pp. 100–101). Such conscious direction is echoed by what 
Gramsci writes in Q8§205 when he argues that the turning point of the 
spontaneity is when the subalterns become leaders and accountable, dirigenti 
e responsbili (Liguori, 2016, p. 109). Understanding this degree of 
development of social forces contributes to a better understanding of the 
original concept of Gramsci, and the understanding of these forces during the 
revolutionary process. Gramsci addresses how the subaltern moves from 
passivity to activity, in his own words from ‘resistant’ to ‘active agent’ (Gramsci, 
1975, pp. 1388 [Q11, §12]). This passage is particularly important because it 
sets out two main characteristics of subalternity. First of all, Gramsci here 
clearly describes various degrees of subalternity and that subalterns, despite 
moving from resistance to activity, still remain within the realm of civil society 
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and therefore subalternity. Thus subalternity can escape only by becoming 
dominant, not merely active. Secondly, it clarifies the scale of subalternity and 
the variety within the subaltern bloc, which is not a monolithic entity; rather it 
is in perpetual transformation due to economic and social relations.  
As the concept of allied intermediary forces was exemplified by Gramsci 
with the case of agrarian society in the Po Valley, so the relations between 
spontaneity and leadership are also explained within the prison notebook with 
concrete cases under analysis. In fact, Gramsci addresses how the Biennio 
Rosso has failed because of the spontaneity of specific groups within the 
subaltern bloc – in the case of Biennio Rosso these groups were factory 
workers. In fact, when the workers turned active – they attempted to occupy 
and take control of the factories – they met the incapacity of the party in 
managing their spontaneous rebellion and leading them. Gramsci addresses 
the relations within the subaltern bloc that determined the failure of workers’ 
revolts and factory occupations (Gramsci, 1975, pp. 320 [Q3, §42]). In 
contrast, Gramsci analyses how spontaneity and leadership worked together 
in the case of the Sicilian Vespers, where the popular uprising against the 
French rulers was later successful thanks to the secret organisation put in 
place by Giovanni da Procida who organised the Sicilian nobility against 
French domination. Based on the example of the Sicilian Vespers, Gramsci 
highlights the hierarchical organisation of the subaltern, both economically and 
strategically. In fact, the spontaneity of the mass movements allowed the most 
advanced subaltern forces to advance due to the weaknesses of the state. 
Finally, Gramsci states that the outcome of the revolution is due to the 
progressive character of the most advanced subaltern force. Interestingly, he 
remarks that the reality is rich with unusual combination; this means that 
outside the logic of revolution and passive revolution there are other 
combinations of actions and power relations (Gramsci, 1975, pp. 332 [Q3, 
§48]). Spontaneity and leadership are also related to the strategies of the war 
of manoeuvre and war of position, where to succeed the leading subaltern 
force has to conquer the institutions of civil society via the war of position and 
to mobilise of all of the subaltern strata via the war of manoeuvre.  
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Leading and advanced forces are closely related but they are not synonyms. 
The leading forces prompt political leadership and mobilisation. I identify three 
criteria to assess whether a force is leading or not. First of all, it has to lead 
from the front, to be confrontational. Secondly, it has to inspire togetherness, 
to gather different sectors of society. Thirdly it has to achieve, to reach the 
main goal that brings followers together. The definition of advanced force is 
based on the development of subaltern forces addressed by Gramsci. I 
consider three main criteria to define the development of the various subaltern 
forces: 1) organisation, 2) leadership and 3) autonomy. Organisation 
encompasses forms of: resilience, for example for how long the social forces 
have been organised in a formal or informal organisation; impact of civil 
society, for example fulfilling state functions for the community; control of civil 
society institutions, like professional syndicates, unions etc. Leadership is 
assessed by looking at: the formation of counter-hegemonic values; the 
establishment of political party and organisations that can access political 
society; and the scale of electoral victory when given the chance. Finally, 
autonomy is assessed on: the resistance of this movement to the confrontation 
of the state; and the ability to exercise alternative control of coercion.  
Nevertheless, it is important to understand that leadership as a criterion to 
assess the development of subaltern forces is different from the role of a 
leading force. In fact, the leading force shows two distinct attitudes: it is 
confrontational with the dominant force and it develops specific political goals. 
For this reason, Kefaya and April 6, despite the fact they were not the most 
advanced forces in Egypt pre-2011 (because in terms of organisation, 
leadership and autonomy they had a limited impact compared to other groups 
like the MB), attempted to lead the subaltern bloc because they were 
confronting the regime, challenging it on specifics. However, because they 
were not advanced, they were not able to keep up their leading role when the 
Muslim Brotherhood, as the most advanced force, utilised its capability to 
reach political society. In contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood was the most 
advanced force in 2011 until the 2013 coup, because it enjoyed a solid 
organisation which had adapted to different challenges since its establishment 
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in 1928. At the same time, it filled the gap left by the shrinking of state functions 
in terms of welfare, and managed to access and control civil society institutions 
that interacted with the state, like professional syndicates and unions. In terms 
of leadership, the Muslim Brotherhood is notorious for promoting Islamist 
society as an alternative form of societal organisation based on religious 
values. In the 2000s the Muslim Brotherhood managed to secure seats in 
parliament, running as independent, and post-2011 it capitalised on electoral 
consent via the formation of its own party. Finally, despite its moderation and 
abandon of violent confrontation, the Muslim Brotherhood remained the most 
advanced social force in Egypt on the eve of the 2011 uprising until it was 
ousted by the 2013 coup.  
 
3.1.4 Subaltern political activities – understanding the war of 
position and war of manoeuvre  
Gramsci utilised military welfare language to explain political activism. In 
fact, he distinguishes three different types of political actions: war of position, 
the war of manoeuvre and underground war. The war of position aims to 
conquer the key posts within political and civil society that held the hegemonic 
function. In other words, the counter-hegemonic leading force aims to replace 
the allied forces which exercise the hegemonic function via strategic positions 
within civil society. Instead, the war of manoeuvre is the actions on the ground 
that threaten the state, like protests, strikes, occupations, civil disobedience 
etc.; unless the state is non-integral, the war of manoeuvre supports the war 
of position, but it cannot alone be crucial to conquer the state. Finally, the 
underground war consists of a more organised violent form of political action 
like guerrilla warfare and armed resistance (Gramsci, 1975, pp. 122–123 [Q1, 
§134]).  
The war of manoeuvre is often associated with violent conflict while the war 
of position is associated with cultural and social transformation (Dodge, 2006, 
p. 456; Thomas, 2009, p. 150). These characterisations of the war of position 
and the war of manoeuvre derived from the Marxist tradition; in fact, in the 
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1960s the Marxist tradition considered the war of position conceptualised by 
Gramsci as an alternative to a ‘militarized Leninist strategy of insurrection’ 
(Egan, 2014, pp. 521–522; 2015, p. 103). The distinction that Gramsci 
introduced in terms of the war of manoeuvre and the war of position reflects 
the type of state (Egan, 2015, p. 102; 2016, pp. 438–439, 2019, pp. 55–56). In 
fact, in the context of a non-integral state, a war of manoeuvre as a form of 
armed insurrection is sufficient to allow a successful revolution. Conversely, 
within the boundaries of the integral state the war of position replaces the war 
of manoeuvre since revolution can be won only by controlling civil society 
institutions. In fact, within an integral state, the war of position needs to 
undermine the existing hegemony (Gramsci, 1975, pp. 972–973 [Q8, §52]). 
This thesis departs from this conceptualisation of the war of manoeuvre 
exclusively as a form of armed and violent insurrection to reflect on the 
components of the war of manoeuvre as a direct assault to the state. 
Therefore, this thesis offers a different interpretation of the war of manoeuvre, 
taking into account the economic and coercive aspects that have characterised 
the neoliberal Egyptian state. Indeed, the war of manoeuvre is not necessarily 
synonymous with armed insurgency. I, rather, focus on the expression of 
frontal attack the state. To put in simpler terms, I take out the ‘armed’ 
characterisation of the insurgency – also because I use the expression 
‘underground war’ to address an armed insurrection similar to a guerrilla 
warfare. In this way the uprising can be peaceful and likewise powerful in 
attacking core aspects of the state. In this way, we are able to disentangle 
various forms of political activities that fall under the umbrella category of war 
of manoeuvre without reducing the war of manoeuvre exclusively to a form of 
violent insurgency. In this regard, forms of non-violent collective actions that 
target the state should be considered as forms of a war of manoeuvre because 
they attack the state hegemony. By analysing the political actions that target 
the state directly within a continuum with violent vs non-violent means at the 
extreme, we can place violent insurgency at one extreme and civil 
disobedience at the other. In between these two extremes, there are a series 
of political actions – like protests, demonstrations, sit-ins, occupations, strikes, 
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etc. – that are able to target the core of the state without embracing violent 
actions.  
In fact, reducing the concept of the war of manoeuvre only to a violent 
insurrection would overshadow forms of peaceful political actions like strikes, 
protests, demonstrations, civil disobedience and all sorts of forms of political 
actions that had a significant impact in shifting the balance of power during the 
uprising. In the context of Egypt, strikes, protests and demonstrations 
converged to break ‘the barrier of fear’ (Allinson, 2015, p. 305). More important, 
these forms of political participation, directed to undermine various forms of 
hegemonic power, can create the conditions for activists to exchange ideas 
which might set the ground for a long-term war of position. For example the 
wave of demonstrations in the early 2000s allowed activists from different 
ideologies to come together to initiate their political demands in terms of 
constitutional reforms. Workers’ strikes had the ability to challenge both the 
economic and coercive components of the state – in other words, the state 
was weakened by these forms of political actions despite their being peaceful. 
In fact, on the one hand they showed the ability to undermine the authorities 
responsible for both abusive working conditions and the brutal repression of 
state apparatus. On the other hand, strikes and protests had a significant 
impact on the economy: strikes mean loss of productivity with factories and 
more broad social unrest creating insecurity for foreign investors, generating a 
domino effect in other sectors that impact other important sectors – for 
example like tourism which contributes around 11.3% of Egyptian GDP (Smith, 
2014).  
In order to turn the crisis of hegemony to its own advantage and resolve it 
into a revolution, the leading force of the subaltern bloc coordinates the war of 
position and war of manoeuvre. For this reason, the counter-hegemonic 
leading force needs to reach the positions that exercise the hegemonic 
functions within political and civil society. The war of manoeuvre is carried out 
by other subaltern forces that have been mobilised by the leading subaltern 
forces or led by ‘spontaneity’ (Gramsci, 1975, pp. 801–802 [Q6, §138]). 
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Gramsci stresses how the war of position is undertaken by the leading force of 
the subaltern bloc while the war of manoeuvre is left to the rest of the subaltern 
forces (Gramsci, 1975, pp. 810–811 [Q6, §155]). Therefore, the war of 
manoeuvre can lead to the manifestation of the crisis of hegemony, often in 
conjunction with an economic crisis which poses a challenge to the integration 
of the subaltern within the state. However, it is not sufficient to obtain a 
significant victory, because the war of position is linked to the social and 
economic organisation of civil society (Gramsci, 1975, pp. 1615–1616 [Q13, 
§24]). For this reason, the war of position and the war of manoeuvre should be 
considered complementary rather than opposed strategies.  
The war of position is the strategy of the leading subaltern forces to 
reconquer their institutions within civil society; at the same time, when the 
institutions of civil society are controlled by allied intermediary forces, the 
dominant force exercises its control over civil society and integrates the 
subaltern forces within the state. In the case of Egypt, the subaltern bloc failed 
the revolution because the war of position and war of manoeuvre were 
uncoordinated between the most advanced forces like the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which controlled civil society institutions like the professional 
syndicates and offered welfare services, and the revolutionary groups which 
undertook a war of manoeuvre. The direct confrontation with the security 
apparatus destabilised the weak balance within the dominant bloc. In other 
words, the counter-revolution was the result of the clashes between the war of 
position of the Muslim Brotherhood and the war of manoeuvre of the 
revolutionary social groups. To sum up, in Q3§48 Gramsci stresses how the 
subaltern forces were numerous and hierarchical. This passage remarks how 
the spontaneity of various strata of subaltern forces allowed the most 
advanced subaltern forces to gain control of the state (Liguori, 2016, pp. 101–
102).  
In Q3§18, Gramsci highlights the close relations between the political 
autonomy of the subaltern and the type of state they operate within. Gramsci 
stresses the importance of the autonomy of subaltern forces which allowed 
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them to develop their own institutions; in this way the pre-modern state was a 
confederation of classes (Gramsci, 1975, pp. 302–303 [Q3, §18]; Frosini, 
2016, pp. 136–137). Since subalternity is relational, when subaltern forces 
gain autonomy and therefore shrink the borders of the integral state, they 
remain in a subaltern position because they still interact with the dominant 
force as inferior, while they have not yet conquered the political society and 
control of hegemony. For this reason, although the leadership of the Muslim 
Brotherhood was composed of business people, they cannot be considered 
part of the dominant force because their access to political society was 
restricted by the military’s dominance. Subalternity is not a class in an 
economic sense but includes various relations; in fact, they are actively and 
differently incorporated in degrees, including: (1) incoherence rebellion, (2) co-
optation, (3) partial autonomy, (4) complete autonomy (Thomas, 2018b, p. 
873). Without a degree of subalternity and growing autonomy, a revolution (as 
a process, and its various outcomes) would be unthinkable.  
Civil society represents the relations among subaltern forces, which are 
constantly fragmented by the regulation of civil society by the political society. 
In fact, the integral state is the penetration of political society into civil society, 
what Gramsci defines as ‘società regolata’ (Gramsci, 1975, pp. 763–764 [Q6, 
§88]). The more integrated the subalterns are within the state, the less 
autonomy they have. Such integration and lack of autonomy are essential for 
the dominant force to develop its passive revolution (Thomas, 2015, p. 90). 
Subalternity occurs in various degrees, and such degrees are characterised 
by the specification of the groups, their organisation and activity within civil 
society and their relation with political society (Thomas, 2015, p. 90; 2018b, p. 
873). A better understanding of degrees of subalternity allows a better 
understanding of where the hegemony power of the dominant force lies within 
society (Thomas, 2015, p. 90). Within the integral state, subaltern forces are 
fully integrated into the political power of the state (Thomas, 2015, p. 92). In 
note Q3§90, Gramsci traces the relations between the dominant force, the 
subaltern and the state. Gramsci stresses how the dominant force leads the 
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subaltern and how this determines the ‘unity between state and civil society’ 
(Gramsci, 1975, pp. 372–373 [Q3, §90]; Thomas, 2018b, pp. 867–868).  
Based on this definition, it is easier to understand how, pre-2011, big 
business affiliated with the NDP was the predominant force over the military 
and police. Since political power is not a zero-sum game, the military with 
control of the Egyptian economy and coercion was still part of the dominant 
bloc but marginalised because business and the police outbalanced the 
economic and coercive control of the military. For the same reason, post-2011, 
when business and the police lost the consent of the subaltern bloc, the military 
became the dominant force. That is why the intermediate forces like the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the contractors were not dominant: because they did not 
control the state institutions. As already discussed, the dominant bloc is not 
monolithic and is rather formed by different components. In this case, the 
Egyptian dominant bloc pre-2011 was formed by business affiliated with the 
NDP as the actor with more leverage of power control, with the protection of 
the police. On the other hand, the military, which was still part of the dominant 
bloc, was pushed to its periphery because its control of the economy and 
coercion was limited. To recap, the conceptualisation of subalternity in 
relational terms is able to identify how hegemony is exercised within a society, 
which is crucial to understanding how forms of counter-hegemony can 
develop. Since subalternity encompasses different social groups, there is the 
potential that the subaltern bloc contains different forms of counter-hegemony 
and different power relations among these groups. 
 
3.2 State  
This thesis puts in relation the state and the resolution of the hegemonic 
crisis. In social science, the state is a variable that reflects ‘the varying political 
reality’ (Nettl, 1968, p. 562). As discussed in Chapters One and Two in the 
analysis of the Egyptian counter-revolution, the Egyptian states have been 
overshadowed by the analysis of elites and neoliberalism. According to Nettl, 
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a strong state that does not allow forms of dissent within civil society is more 
likely to form polarised anti-systemic groups that violently seek to overthrow it, 
whereas a weak state that has a strong civil society that can organise its 
dissent is unlikely to experience an overthrow because there is ‘no state as 
such to overthrow’ (Nettl, 1968, pp. 571–572). The form of dissent is ‘indirect 
evidence for the variableness of the development of stateness in different 
societies’ (Nettl, 1968, p. 571). This thesis shares the assumption that the state 
is a variable to take into account to explain revolution; however, it uses 
Gramsci’s conceptualisation of integral state to reverse Nettl’s argument. The 
next section will address first the limits of the conceptualisation of the state’s 
strength in understanding the Egyptian Uprising, and it will later move on to 
address the integral state.  
 
3.2.1 Limits of the strength of statehood  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the different generations of 
revolutionary study have also influenced the relations between state and 
revolution. The first generation considered the revolution as the pathological 
manifestation of a weak system. Therefore a weak state was the prerequisite 
that favoured revolution. This relation between state and revolution was 
dropped by the second generation of revolutionary study, which stressed 
popular discontent; in other words the ‘frustration-aggression’ explanation 
foregrounded in the psychological approach was the trigger of revolution. The 
third generation attempted to combine the previous two approaches, where 
revolution was the result of state weakening and popular mobilisation 
(Davidheiser, 1992, pp. 463–464). Finally, as addressed earlier, the fourth 
generation expanded the investigation of the structure, including not only the 
state but also international relations.  
However, addressing the relations between state strength and revolution is 
problematic in terms of operationalisation. In fact, the operationalisation of 
strength is contingent on the idea of the modern state and its control over the 
population. Thus, the strength of the state was operationalised via political and 
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military coercion to control civil society, and this led the first and third 
generations to assume that the weaker the state, the more likely revolution 
was to happen (Davidheiser, 1992, p. 464).  
Finally, the fourth generation shifted the attention from the strength to state 
stability. Indeed, Goldstone argues that ‘happy’ states do not have revolutions 
(Goldstone, 2001, p. 173), the starting assumption that attempted to move 
beyond the debates on strong vs weak states. Stable regimes can avoid falling 
into revolution by adapting to new situations and challenges. This assumption 
recalls the debates on the authoritarian resilience of the Arab state discussed 
in Chapter Two, and similarly, if it can explain the fall of a regime, it fails to 
explain the progression of the revolutionary process.  
The main scope here is to move beyond this idea of state strength or regime 
stability, because the state strength is rather problematic to measure as closely 
aligned with the idea of the Weberian state. The next section will highlight the 
limitations of the application of the idea of a strong state in Egypt, then it will 
move on to address how the concept of integral state is more explanatory for 
addressing the development of revolution and counter-revolution. Some 
scholars have argued that this lack of democratic electoral representation and 
welfare legitimacy led to the 2011 uprising, especially in cases like Tunisia and 
Egypt which were considered closer to the ‘strong state’ end of the spectrum 
as shown in Table 1 (Schwarz and De Corral, 2011, pp. 212–213).  
 
Table 1: Degrees of statehood 











Security X X  X X - 
Welfare X - X - - 
Representation X X - - - 
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Source: Schwarz and De Corral, 2011, p. 213 
According to this framework, Egypt is categorised as a reformed state in the 
sense that it provides security and representation but not welfare: in other 
words, Egypt is able to ‘keep the country stable’, due to its security function 
and the significant military aid derived from the peace treaty with Israel. At the 
same time, parliamentary and governmental representation derives from 
taxation – since Egypt does not have a natural resource that it can exploit to 
provide services without demanding taxation. In addition, welfare services are 
left to private initiatives, and it led the Muslim Brotherhood and charity 
organisations to gain support by filling the void left by the state in numerous 
services like provision of food and water, health and educational facilities. 
According to this approach, the Egyptian Uprising was the result of the 
‘unbalanced taxation-representation social contract’ and the lack of welfare 
state (Schwarz and De Corral, 2011, p. 214).  
We now point out the limits of this interoperation. First of all, being a ‘strong 
state’ regarding security remains questionable, in the sense that citizens do 
not necessarily enjoy protection from crimes; they rather face repression and 
coercion where the use of force is not necessarily legitimate. In fact, military 
spending does not automatically reflect a high protection of Egyptian citizens 
from external threats, whereas the support of the military is essential to the 
survival of the regime since the military is one of the founding institutions of 
the modern Egyptian state. Furthermore, high spending on the police budget 
guaranteed the repression of dissent via the increase of torture and police 
brutality, which was one of the triggers of the uprising – indeed, it started on 
National Police Day. Finally, such a massive security apparatus does not 
represent a strength of the state; it rather shows how Egypt has failed in 
protecting its citizens from various security threats. 
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Second, taxation does not take into account the sector of the informal 
economy which remains disjointed from the claimed taxation-representation 
relationship, where one of the weaknesses of the state is exactly the lack of 
ability to collect taxes consistently and transparently (El Dahshan, 2015, p. 
214). In fact, in terms of representation the limited electoral game and the non-
competitive multi-party system were designed not for a balanced and fair 
representation of interests but rather for co-optation. In addition, the 
interpretation of strong vs weak state fails to acknowledge the existence of a 
corporative system and clientelist forms of representation of collective and 
individual interests, which do not determine legitimacy in Weberian terms, or 
forms of consent in Gramscian terms.  
Finally, the private provision of the welfare state is not the result of an 
inefficiency of the state; it is rather the integration of Egypt within a global 
economy which pushes for neoliberal policy – reduction of public spending, 
austerity, and promotion of a less regulated free market. More generally such 
an approach does not acknowledge the more complex relations within a 
society, considering it only as a single relation between an abstract state – as 
service or function provider – and a united single category of society, affecting 
social relations. The wave of neoliberalism increased the marginalisation of 
informal areas, having a double effect. On the one hand, the emergence of 
informal labour remained confined within the informal district. On the other 
hand, liberalisation resulted in widening the gap between rich and poor; rich 
areas developed while poor areas suffered from the lack of basic services such 
as education and healthcare (Ismail, 2006, pp. xix–xx). This thesis now turns 
to discussing the relations between the integral state and the revolution.  
 
3.2.2 Gramsci’s integral state  
Gramsci’s idea of the state was introduced in MENA by Ayubi’s masterful 
work. Based on the Gramscian concept of integral state, Ayubi argues that the 
Arab state is ‘hard’ because it can impose coercion and repression with 
impressive state institutions but is not ‘strong’ because it does not have 
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consent (Ayubi, 1995, p. 3). For this reason, the Arab state is not integral; 
rather it is a gendarme/corporative state (Ayubi, 1995, p. 7). The core 
assumption of Ayubi is that the state is hard because it can control economic 
development and penetrate society via bureaucracy, but it is not strong enough 
to impose itself on civil society (Ayubi, 1995, pp. 448–450). Ayubi concludes 
his analysis by arguing that the Arab state will not survive the ‘hegemonic 
crisis’ (Ayubi, 1995, p. 448). 2011 was the manifestation of this hegemonic 
crisis; however, if the state was weak and civil society was strong, then the 
uprising should have transformed the Arab state and the uprising would have 
turned into a successful revolution. However, the hegemonic crisis manifested 
and was resolved in a popular supported military coup. This thesis will build on 
Ayubi’s starting point that the Arab state is not integral; however, it offers a 
different classification of the state that reflects the relations between the state 
and hegemonic crisis.  
In this way, this section analyses in detail how although the Egyptian state 
is not integral the revolution was not successful. From Ayubi’s perspective the 
state is either integral or gendarme, in the sense that if hegemony exists the 
state is integral, while if it does not exist the state is gendarme and bases on 
its reliance on coercion (Ayubi, 1995, pp. 7–10). In contrast, I argue that the 
state and hegemony should be conceptualised in a continuum where the 
extremes are integral and non-integral states, and in between there are a 
variety of degrees of integration and hegemonic control. Contrary to Ayubi’s 
interpretation that Egypt is not an integral state because of the corporative 
system (Ayubi, 1995, pp. 25–26, 33–35), I argue that this system is a way to 
integrate some social forces and exclude others. Therefore, Egypt is a form of 
semi-integral state, where corporative forms coexist with forms of the informal 
economy.  
In Gramsci the concept of state and civil society are bound by a relation of 
unity and distinction (Liguori, 2004b, p. 208). In other words, in Gramsci two 
concepts of state coexist: on the one hand, the minimal definition of state, 
which is identified with the government and governance of the state, in 
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Gramscian’s terms the political society; on the other, the integral state – stato 
integrale – which includes relations with civil society (Liguori, 2004b, pp. 214–
215). The enlargement9 of the concept of state occurred in two directions: on 
the one hand, the state reflects new relations between politics and economics; 
and on the other, it reflects new relations between political society and civil 
society. In the first case, Gramsci stressed that the state is the expression of 
the economic situation, and not vice versa (Gramsci [Q7§43:890] cit. in Liguori, 
2004b, p. 210). For Gramsci, state intervention in the economy is a way to 
protect the interests of specific groups and affects the class composition of 
society (Liguori, 2004b). Gramsci highlighted how a new function of the state 
is emerging – the hegemonic function (see section 3.3) – and comprehensive 
understanding of the state includes the understanding of the dominant bloc 
and its relations with the subaltern bloc (Gramsci [Q3§46, p. 326; Q3§90, p. 
372] cit. in Liguori, 2004b, p. 216).  
Therefore, the formation of the integral state implies a sophistication of 
social relations within the state structure (Thomas, 2009, p. 140). The integral 
state is characterised by the lack of autonomy of civil society vis-à-vis political 
society (Frosini, 2016, p. 143). The integral state reflects mutually constitutive 
relations between civil and political society; their relations of integration have 
various degrees of intensity and extension (from the more structured and 
directive political society to the various organisations within civil society). Civil 
society is not opposed to political society (as in the liberal tradition); civil society 
is ‘a politically overdetermined system for the regulation of needs, associations 
and conflicts’ (Thomas, 2018b, pp. 869–870). The dominant force that controls 
political society continuously intervenes within civil society to limit the 
autonomy of the subaltern forces (Frosini, 2016, p. 129). Therefore civil society 
becomes the battlefield for competing social forces for the control of hegemony 
(Thomas, 2009, p. 137). Thus, political society is an expression of 
governmental-coercive apparatus, whereas civil society reflects the 
                                            
9 The expression ‘enlargement’ to define a specific type of state does not come directly from 
Gramsci who used the expression ‘integral state’; it was first used by Buci-Glucksmann 
(1980). For a full discussion see Thomas (2009, pp. 137–141).  
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‘hegemonic apparatus’ (Gramsci, 1975, p. 800 [Q6 §136]; Liguori, 2004b, p. 
221). Indeed, the hegemonic process is not a ‘battle of ideas’, rather a proper 
apparatus that creates consent (Liguori, 2004c). In note Q11 §70 (pp. 1508–
1509), Gramsci stresses that a subaltern group becomes truly (realmente) 
autonomous and hegemonic when it can form a new type of state.  
In the case of Egypt between 2011 and 2013, the Muslim Brotherhood was 
not able to turn its autonomy into meaningful political power, since despite 
accessing political society it was still unable to control political power. This 
does not mean that hegemony does not exist, since both systems can be 
considered as an integral state. The state becomes integral because the 
dominant force is able to use its hegemonic function to integrate subalterns 
within civil society and reduce their autonomy; whether this occurs with the 
prevalence of persuasion or coercion is a secondary issue. In this way, it is 
important to clarify how the integration works. As the state reflects structure 
and superstructure, the integration works at both levels. In terms of integration 
at the economic level, Gramsci presents the notorious case of Fordism, where 
the transformation of workers into customers due to instalment payments was 
at the basis of the development of the economy of mass production (Gramsci, 
1975, Q22§13).  
Similarly, the case of the planned economy of the Soviet Union is a form of 
economic integration, because such structured industrial and agrarian 
production was imposed from above, and the subaltern forces were integrated 
due to the promise that they could have kept the surplus produced beyond the 
required quota (Davies, 1998, pp. 23–24). Another form of economic 
integration is social safety net policies which allowed citizens to remain 
integrated within society. Other forms of integration are also political, in fact: 
forms like representation in political decision forums, like democratic 
representation or Soviet democracy. Finally, the last superstructural element 
that determines integration is coercion, more precisely the unity of security 
forces which do not allow the non-state actors to exercise any form of coercion 
or supply parallel security providers. 
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To recap, the type of state determines whether or not hegemony is spread 
across all aspects of civil society, forming an integral state. In contrast, the 
pockets of autonomy within civil society allow the development of subaltern 
forces that can aspire to challenge the dominant force and conquer the state. 
Such a process reaches the peak of its potential during moments of the crisis 
of hegemony. The resolution of the crisis of hegemony forecasts three possible 
crisis outcomes: revolution, passive revolution and morbid symptoms as forms 
of counter-revolution. The role of subalternity and the relations within the 
subaltern bloc determine the outcome of the crisis resolution. This thesis 
contributes to the understanding of the role of the allied forces during the 
moment of crisis, since it is the core factor that has most leverage in the crisis 
resolution. 
 
3.3 Hegemonic crisis and its resolutions  
As discussed in the previous section, the type of state is the benchmark to 
follow to understand the links between the agency of subalternity and the 
crisis’s resolution. Before discussing the hegemonic crisis I will clarify the 
concept of hegemony. In Gramsci’s writings, the concept of the (integral) state 
is the sum of political and civil society (Gramsci, 1975, pp. 763–764 [Q6, §88]); 
therefore, the concept of hegemony is not equated exclusively with cultural 
consent reproduced within civil society, rather it is a concept that embraces 
consent and coercion exercised by both political and civil society. Gramsci 
underlines that hegemony is the result of leadership (via ideology) and 
dominance (via coercion) (Gramsci, 1975, pp. 41 [Q1, §44]). At Q4§49, 
Gramsci also provides a useful explanation of the relations between state, civil 
society and hegemony:  
These distinctions having been made, it is possible to conclude, for 
now, that: the relationship between the intellectuals and the 
production is not direct, as in the case of the fundamental social 
groups, but mediated, and it is mediated by two types of social 
organisation: (a) by civil society, that is, by the ensemble of private 
organisations in society; (b) by the state. The intellectuals have a 
function in the ‘hegemony’ that is exercised throughout society by 
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the dominant group and in the ‘domination’ over society that is 
embodied by the state, and this function is precisely ‘organisational’ 
or connective. (Gramsci, 1996, p. 200)  
This passage remarks how hegemony is a function directly exercised within 
political society, while within civil society it is mediated by a variety of structures 
and institutions – in this specific case, the intellectuals are the intermediates 
between the dominant force and the subaltern forces. Hegemony is 
characterised by the balance between force and consent; in fact, when the 
hegemonic apparatus crumbles, it is more difficult to maintain hegemony by 
relying only on coercion (Gramsci, 1975, p. 59 [Q1 §48]). Hegemony is a 
function exercised over the superstructure, and the two elements of the 
superstructure are political and civil society. The relations between these two 
elements offer different interpretations of the conceptualisation of the state.  
A function is an activity that a subject performs. I distinguish direct and 
indirect uses of such a function. The direct use is related to the dominant force, 
which directly exercises the hegemonic function to keep its power. Indirect use 
of the hegemonic function is when the subject performs an activity not for its 
own interest, but for the interest of a third party. For example, hegemony is 
exercised in political and civil society, and as discussed earlier, hegemony as 
domination is directly performed within political society, while hegemony within 
civil society is mediated by the ‘private organisation’ (Liguori, 2004b, p. 213). 
As anticipated in section 1.2.2, regarding the example of a school, the 
subaltern teacher who works within the educational institution exercises the 
hegemonic function of dominant force within the civil society; in other words, 
the teacher exercises the hegemonic function not for its own interest but for 
the interest of the dominant force. The hegemonic function can be fully 
understood by analysing the power relations between dominant and subaltern 
forces. At Q19§24, Gramsci stresses that the ‘supremacy’ of a social group is 
manifested in two ways, as ‘dominance’ and as ‘moral and intellectual 
leadership’ (Gramsci, 1975, pp. 2010–2011 [Q19, §24]). In the passage, 
Gramsci describes a dominant group as able to subordinate the opposite 
forces via coercion and lead the allied intermediary forces. In this context, 
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Gramsci stresses how a group has to become a leader even before reaching 
governmental power. This is the main condition to conquer power, and once 
in power the group becomes dominant; however, it has to continue to be the 
leader. This passage highlights how dominance is a component of 
hegemony.10 Understanding how a social force becomes the leader and 
dominant and how it loses this function is essential to understanding the 
historical development of social relations. The different options proposed by 
Gramsci to resolve the crisis of hegemony rest on the conditions posed by the 
integral state vis-à-vis autonomy of civil society.  
I will now analyse closely Gramsci’s note 3§34, which discusses the concept 
of the crisis. Note 3§34 needs careful consideration because it describes two 
important relations between the crisis and its consequences. First of all, it 
remarks on the relations between the two components of hegemony; in fact, 
the crisis of hegemony is the reduction of consent and coercion. Because 
consent is limited there is the chance for the subaltern to expand their 
alternative hegemonic function. If subaltern forces are able to take advantage 
of their autonomy and master their hegemonic function they can escape their 
subaltern condition by becoming a state (Gramsci, 1975, pp. 311–312 [Q3, 
§34]). This is also linked to Q6§98, in which Gramsci discusses the relations 
between custom and law, observing that the custom has to precede the law. 
The expansion of the rule of law and judiciary system is the instrument of the 
dominant force to impose a specific behaviour within society. However, since 
the custom precedes the law, Gramsci argues that before becoming dominant 
the subaltern forces need a long period to control civil society via the change 
of custom. Such expansion within the civil society never stops until the 
subaltern forces have absorbed the entire society. However, Gramsci 
observes that the expansion of subaltern forces within society is not the same 
for all the subaltern forces; in fact, there are forces that constantly expand and 
are able to control the entire society, while others experience mixed phases of 
expansion and regression (Gramsci, 1975, pp. 773–774 [Q6, §98]).  
                                            
10 Not opposed, as interpreted by Anderson (1976) and Guha (1997). 
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The second element that emerges from note 3§34 is that the resolution of 
the crisis does not necessarily lead to restoration, and at the same time a 
revolution is not ensured. According to Gramsci, the old order can survive or 
adapt to the crisis because the crisis opens a variety of possibilities rather than 
the deterministic formation of a new predefined order. These are the morbid 
symptoms that Gramsci addresses as the results of the crisis that go beyond 
the dichotomy between revolution and passive revolution (Gramsci, 1975, pp. 
311-312 [Q3, §34]). In fact, I argue that morbid symptoms are not necessarily 
the case in passive revolution which has specific features; rather, all are 
various options that cannot be classified within the categories of revolution and 
passive revolution. As discussed earlier, passive revolution has two definitions. 
On the one hand, it is a form of state formation; on the other, it is the resolution 
of the hegemonic crisis by the dominant force with the exclusion of subaltern 
forces. 
 Therefore, I will highlight in the discussion on Egypt, as an illustrative case 
of a crisis resolved, how the Egyptian case was neither a revolution nor a 
passive revolution, whereas it displays the formation of morbid symptoms. In 
the specific case of Egypt, I argue that the internal struggle of the subaltern 
bloc, as well as the oscillation of the intermediary forces, was the manifestation 
of morbid symptoms. Gramsci remarks that ‘the crisis consists precisely in the 
fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be Born’ (Gramsci, 1975, Q3§34, 
cit. in Filippini 2017, p. 89); in other words, the crisis is ‘an opportunity for 
political struggle, rather than a given point at which existing contradictions 
erupt’ (Filippini, 2016). However, this opportunity needs to be exploited by the 
autonomy of the subalterns. The link between the crisis and the imbalance of 
forces is a core element in Gramsci. The intensification of existing phenomena 
that do not have counterbalancing elements will define the crisis. Thus, 
Gramsci argues that the crisis is ever-present but latent due to the balancing 
of opposing forces. However, the crisis becomes manifested when some 
elements strengthen while others become unable to oppose (Filippini, 2016). 
The revolution and the passive revolution have been categorised as a 
Subalternity and Counter-Revolution 
86   
dichotomy depending on which group becomes successful in resolving the 
crisis.  
According to this interpretation, the revolution is due to the victory of the 
subaltern forces, whereas the passive revolution is due to the victory of the 
dominant force (De Smet, 2016, pp. 69–71). Although this definition puts 
dominant and subaltern forces in relationship with the process of crisis 
resolution, such resolution is not necessarily a sharp black-and-white division. 
In the context of passive revolution, Thomas points out the importance of 
following the evolution of Gramsci’s concepts to understand how scholars have 
differently understood passive revolution. For example, passive revolution is 
often understood as bourgeois ‘revolution from above’. In other words, passive 
revolution is the process by which the existing political elite manages popular 
unrest and prevents the revolution (De Smet, 2016). This interpretation does 
take into account the passivity of subaltern forces, as an essential feature to 
define passive revolution. Others consider passive revolution as a form of state 
formation and modernisation (Allinson and Anievas, 2010, pp. 480, 485), 
based on the interpretation of the Italian case of passive revolution as a form 
of trasformismo – a political strategy and technique of statecraft. Finally, there 
are other interpretations of passive revolution as the transformation of 
capitalist order into a more aggressive form of accumulation like neoliberalism, 
where the dominant force can exploit the passivity of the subaltern to 
reconstruct economic relations (Roccu, 2017, p. 551). The combination of 
these interpretations frames the passive revolution as a continuum of different 
interpretations (Thomas, 2018a, pp. 3–4). 
Therefore passive revolution is a ‘distinct process of (political) 
modernization that lacked the meaningful participation of popular classes in 
undertaking and consolidating social transformation’ (Thomas, 2013, p. 23), 
where the passive revolution is a stage of hegemonic function, not its 
culmination. Therefore passive revolution is a ‘strategic intervention’ due to the 
failure of hegemony (Thomas, 2013, pp. 24–25). There are three possible 
ways to resolve the crisis of hegemony and those solutions depend on (1) the 
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type of the state, which reflects (2) the relations between the dominant and 
subaltern blocs. Rather than considering the resolution of the crisis as a 
dichotomous outcome, either failure or success of revolution, I rather 
conceptualise the resolution of the crisis within a spectrum containing a variety 
of options. However, in order to operationalise it, I state three main referencing 
concepts: revolution and passive revolution at the extremes of the spectrum, 
and morbid symptoms in between (Figure 3).  
Figure 3: Hegemonic crisis’s resolution scale 
 
Passive revolution   Morbid symptoms   Revolution 
   Caesarism   Insurrezione spontanea 
 
As anticipated in Chapter One and in the first part of this chapter, revolution 
is the outcome where the leader of the subaltern forces exploits the gap of 
autonomy within civil society and manages to establish a new order via the 
control of hegemonic functions thanks to the mobilisation strategies of the war 
of position and the war of manoeuvre. Gramsci identified two phases of action 
for the organised forces: the first phase is ‘objective’ linked to the structure. 
The elements of the economic crisis cannot be changed, for example the 
number of employed or unemployed, and the development of cities vs rural 
areas. The second phase allows the agency a range of actions and is 
characterised by political and military engagement. In fact, the political phase 
is characterised by ‘the degree of homogeneity, self-awareness, and 
organisation attained by the various social classes’ and their relations with 
military forces (Gramsci [Q13§17] cit. in Filippini 2017, p. 102). The core of a 
successful revolution is precisely the balance and organisation of political and 
military forces. However, Gramsci highlighted that when ‘spontaneous 
movements’ do not develop, ‘conscious leadership’ causes the formation of 
reactionary forces, and ultimately the manifestation of moments of imbalanced 
forces favour military forces (Filippini 2017, p. 102). Gramsci considers the 
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passive revolution as a mechanism for rebalancing the disrupted equilibrium 
through the action of the dominant forces. The more widely used core concept 
of passive revolution describes it as ‘absence of popular initiative’ (Thomas, 
2018a, pp. 15–16).  
To sum up, passive revolution can be conceptualised in two main directions 
depending on the state type. On the one hand, the concept of passive 
revolution as a process of state formation results in the formation of an integral 
state, where the hegemonic function of the dominant force allows the 
integration of the subaltern within the state. On the other hand, passive 
revolution as a political strategy to resolve a hegemonic crisis assumes the a 
priori existence of the integral state, in the sense that in the passive revolution 
the integral state is essential to allow the political society to disaggregate the 
civil society. Now, assuming that both directions can exist, once the integral 
state is formed via the passive revolution, during the crisis of hegemony the 
dominant force within the political society can resolve the crisis with a new 
passive revolution. However, what remains under-studied and under-
conceptualised is the possibility of a failure of a passive revolution. In the case 
of Egypt, both interpretations are puzzling. If we assume that the passive 
revolution was a case of state formation, then the uprising in 2011 should be 
considered as the interruption of such state formation; however, since the 
revolution was not successful some argue that even the counter-revolution 
was a form of passive revolution (De Smet, 2016). The 2013 coup that toppled 
Morsi was not a form of passive revolution like the Free Officers' coups in 1952, 
because the Free Officers' coup led to the transformation of the Egyptian state 
from above, without being preceded by a revolution, whereas the 2013 coup 
was a form of counter-revolution because the subsequent consolidation of the 
post-2013 regime is the direct result of the development of the uprising in 2011 
(Gervasio, 2013, pp. 72–73; Achcar, 2016, pp. 65–66). 
The scale of variation within the extreme outcomes of revolution and 
passive revolution is not fully discussed by Gramsci; nonetheless, the morbid 
symptoms can be reconstructed in different ways. Such reconstruction is 
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particularly sensitive to the scale of subalternity; in other words, since there is 
not a clear separation between the possible interactions between the dominant 
and subaltern forces since none of these blocs is uniform and monolithic, the 
various interactions should be analysed case by case. For the purpose of this 
thesis, Egypt is considered neither a case of revolution nor of passive 
revolution, rather the double failure of the intermediary force, on the one hand, 
in leading the subaltern and controlling the hegemonic function, and on the 
other, the failure of the intermediary forces in cooperation with the dominant 
force. For the sake of the explanation of the morbid symptom, I will discuss 
two cases in the notebook Cesarismo e insurrezione spontanea – ‘Caesarism 
and Spontaneous Insurrection’. These two examples are deeply linked with 
the balance of forces between and within the dominant and subaltern blocs. I 
want to stress that because the subaltern forces are involved in the process of 
crisis resolution, neither of these cases can be classified as a form of passive 
revolution because, as discussed above, passive revolution implies the 
exclusion of the subaltern forces. The fact that the paralysis of Caesarism can 
be resolved with and without the exclusion of the subaltern forces introduces 
further nuances into the crisis’s resolution within the two extreme cases of 
successful revolution and passive revolution. Therefore Caesarism should not 
be equated necessarily with a specific form of passive revolution; rather it 
should be understood as a form of what Gramsci called ‘morbid symptoms’. 
Gramsci classifies the episode of the Sicilian Vespers as insurrezione 
spontanea – spontaneous insurrection – the twin concept of Caesarism that 
characterised the concept of morbid symptoms. Thus spontaneous 
insurrection is closer to the extreme of the revolution, whereas Caesarism is 
closer to the concept of passive revolution. That the Sicilian Vespers – as with 
the Egyptian Uprising – is closer to the revolution does not make it an example 
of revolution. Gramsci investigates the case of Sicilian Vespers to understand 
the ‘spontaneity’ of the subaltern movements and their relations with the other 
subaltern forces. However, Gramsci takes the example of the Sicilian Vespers 
to understand the spontaneous insurrection. Indeed he stresses how the 
Sicilian Vespers is a combination of ‘spontaneous movements’ and ‘conscious 
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leadership’. The Sicilian Vespers started in Palermo in 1282 due to the 
spontaneous rebellion against a French soldier who represented the Angevin 
domination. Similar rebellions spread quickly to the rest of the island. Later the 
Sicilian nobility took the lead of the rebellion to expel the Angevins and 
organise the resistance of the island calling for the support of Peter III of 
Aragon – claimed to be the legitimate king – against Charles I of Anjou. 
Gramsci did not investigate the Sicilian Vespers as a form of morbid symptoms 
because his scope was to investigate the relations among the various groups 
of subalterns. Even so, I argue that the spontaneous insurrection Vespers can 
be considered a form of morbid symptom closer to the revolution extreme point 
because the unity of the subaltern forces managed to oppose French 
domination. However, given the limited resources that the united subaltern 
bloc had vis-à-vis the French, the Sicilians had to call for the Aragoneses. In 
this way, Sicily did not become independent; rather, it passed from the 
domination of the Angevins to the control of the Aragoneses. Gramsci stresses 
that the spontaneity of the marginalised subaltern groups – which became 
active – allowed the most advanced subaltern forces – the nobility – to take 
the lead and organise the rebellion.  
I argue that, viewed from this frame, the Egyptian Uprising falls as a 
spontaneous insurrection morbid symptom rather than a clear case of passive 
revolution. Indeed, during the initial phase of the uprising, the dominant and 
subaltern forces do not reflect a catastrophic balance, nor did an external force 
intervene to take control of the transition (both core features of Caesarism). In 
fact, the military was a marginalised force of the dominant bloc rather than an 
external force. Similar to the Sicilian Vespers, the spontaneity of the civilian 
movements allowed the Muslim Brotherhood – as the most advanced force – 
to access political society without considerable political weight, rather than the 
leading force of the subaltern. However, the difference between the Egyptian 
Uprising and the Sicilian Vespers is that in Egypt the unity of the subaltern 
forces was precarious, and the Muslim Brotherhood turned out to be the actor 
that compromised such unity.  
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3.4 Subalternity and the Egyptian counter-revolution  
Egypt offers a very interesting case to explain the concept of subalternity 
and relations with the state and different forms of crisis resolution. By analysing 
the 25th January uprising with the 3rd July military coup as interlinked 
phenomena, this thesis unpacks the development of revolution as an open-
ended process that offers a better explanation of fragile revolutions, in line with 
the aim of the fifth generation of revolutionary study. Therefore, this thesis 
argues that the fragility of the revolutionary process is due to the existence of 
the semi-integral state, while the under-studied category of intermediary forces 
is able to influence the revolutionary outcome. In this regard, Gramsci’s 
concept of hegemonic crisis is able to unpack the causes of the uprising and 
at the same time address the potential of a different outcome. The crisis of 
hegemony develops from the failure of the dominant bloc: in delivering the plan 
they imposed the hegemony over masses, and at the same time the oppressed 
social forces turned active and attempted to change the existing order 
(Antonini, 2016, pp. 168–169). In Egypt, the economic performances of the 
country improved thanks to the neoliberal policies implemented since 2004; 
however, such economic improvement went hand in hand with economic 
difficulties faced by the lower as well as the middle class, especially the youth. 
As Chapter Four addresses, the elite forces were unbalanced, where the NDP 
dominated by crony capitalists sought the closer support of the police rather 
than the military. Revolutionary forces were strengthened due to the 
galvanising event of the Tunisian uprising, while the weaknesses of the ruling 
elite, due to the marginalisation of the military, affected the ability of the ruling 
elite to react cohesively towards the revolutionary forces. The counter-
revolution and the formation of the post-2013 regime is the stabilisation of a 
hegemonic crisis that in Egypt manifested as the beginning of the 25th January 
uprising.  
According to Gramsci, the old order can survive the crisis because the crisis 
opens a variety of possibilities rather than the deterministic formation of a new 
predefined order; these possibilities depend on the adaptability of dominant 
forces and activism of subaltern forces, and their ability to control the state 
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(Gramsci, 1975, pp. 1603–1605 [Q13, §23]). The uprising expressed a partial 
unity among subaltern forces, like middle-class revolutionary youth, workers 
and Islamists; however, it affected the neoliberal structure marginally: the 
military and a very limited number of corny capitalists remained in power post-
2013, but with different power relations compared to pre-2011. The emergence 
of various social movements in the 2000s, distinct from the predominant 
Islamist groups, stressed how 2011 was the result of a political struggle started 
earlier. Gramsci highlighted that when ‘spontaneous movements’ do not 
develop ‘conscious leadership’ it causes the formation of reactionary forces, 
and the manifestation of moments of imbalanced forces ultimately favour 
military forces (Filippini, 2016). Gramsci made an example of the young 
generation in Italy who briefly supported the working class but later supported 
the fascist regime (Filippini, 2016). This reflects the case of Tamarrod, a 
movement derived from other ‘leaderless movements’ – like the proto-
democratic Kefaya – that ultimately turned to support the military coup, as well 
as workers’ leaders like Kamel Abu Eita. Finally, the post-2013 order re-
establishes the neoliberal structure, but with different dominant forces. Sisi’s 
regime is the result of the counter-revolution. In other words, post-2013 is a 
counter-revolutionary regime, different from the pre-2011 liberalised 
authoritarian one;11 it is not a replica of Mubarak’s regime (Gervasio, 2013, p. 
75). The period between 2011 and 2013 was characterised ‘by a retreat of the 
regime and the achievement, in practise of revolutionary demands’ (Allinson, 
2019b, p. 325). For this reason the period between 2011 and 2013 should be 
investigated in its own right regardless of the successful outcome of the 
revolution, otherwise the transformation of the post-2013 state into a counter-
revolutionary regime could not be understood.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the literature on subalternity does not 
investigate the relation between subaltern and counter-revolution. In addition, 
the uprising was quickly deemed a form of passive revolution without reflection 
on the relations between the state type and passive revolution. This section 
                                            
11 Cf. the literature on liberalised autocracy (Brumberg, 2002; Volpi, 2004; Heydemann, 2007).  
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will explain how Egypt is not an integral state and therefore that the 
interpretation of passive revolution as a resolution of the crisis of hegemony is 
hard to sustain given the interaction of the social drivers in the counter-
revolution. It will also map out the scale of subalternity within civil society, to 
show how the interaction between various subaltern groups can determine the 
resolution of the crisis.  
The literature that analyses Egypt as a form of passive revolution considers 
the dominant and subaltern forces as two homogeneous blocs who are 
opposed and compete over hegemony. This interpretation is not per se 
inaccurate; rather, it is too simplistic because it ignores the variety that exists 
within the subaltern forces, and thus it reduces the dichotomy dominant-
subaltern to the economic relations existing between bourgeois and proletariat. 
Specifically, some scholars consider the Muslim Brotherhood as part of the 
dominant elite that attempted to crush the mobilisation of the working class 
which failed to emancipate and win the revolution (De Smet, 2014c, 2016). 
Contrary to this interpretation that considers neoliberalism a form of passive 
revolution both before and after the uprising, I argue that the case of the 
Egyptian counter-revolution cannot be categorised as a form of passive 
revolution because the subaltern forces were not excluded from the process 
of crisis resolution; rather, the agency of the intermediary forces – the Muslim 
Brotherhood – as well as subaltern groups – youth and workers’ movements – 
determined the reverting of the initial revolution into a counter-revolution which 
still is different from a passive revolution. The Muslim Brotherhood acted as an 
oscillating force which was able to steer the direction of the revolution from 
supporting the subaltern to seconding the military. In contrast to the literature 
that considers the uprising as a form of passive revolution and Egypt an 
integral state because it embraced neoliberal polices (Roccu, 2012; De Smet, 
2016), I argue that the uprising is rather the result of failure of the formation of 
the integral state, for two main reasons: first of all, the neoliberal policies have 
alienated rather than integrated the subaltern forces within the state; this 
emerges from the steady expansion of the informal economy. The informal 
economy flags the existence of an autonomous space within civil society. Such 
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a space allowed the consolidation of the civil society organisations which 
provided welfare services unfulfilled by the state to local communities (Ismail, 
2006). 
Secondly, the Egyptian state does not control civil society enough to impose 
significant changes. Examples relate to the fact that the state is not able to 
reinforce systems like taxation or control of the security of the whole territory; 
in fact, areas like Sinai are not fully controlled by the state coercive power 
(Burgrova, 2014). The phenomenon of baltagiya illustrates the undermining 
control of the territory by the state, a further limitation to the existence of the 
integral state. In fact, baltagiya act as a buffer zone between the police and 
the local population, in two different ways. First, baltagiya seek inclusion within 
the state; indeed, baltagiya often inform the police in an exchange of protection 
or licences. The failure of the police should not be interpreted as neglect of 
duty; instead, it is a strategy to control the territory via a network of informants 
(Ismail, 2012, pp. 451–452). Nevertheless, at the same time, the baltagiya fill 
the void left by the inefficiency of the police, serving the population, and so 
have gained wider control of the territory; this might eventually threaten the 
police. On the other hand, Egypt cannot be classified as an extreme case of 
the non-integral state where political society is disjoined from civil society. In 
fact, the repressive system showed the strength of political society (Ismail, 
2011, p. 846).  
Therefore I argue that Egypt is in between the two extremes of integral and 
non-integral state, making it a semi-integral state. Precisely because Egypt is 
a semi-integral state, the crisis of authority emerged easily due to the 
imbalance provoked by both the increasing autonomy of subalterns and the 
lack of control of dominant forces within civil society. Therefore the resolution 
of the Egyptian crisis of authority is made more challenging due to the narrow 
difference in power between dominant and subaltern forces.  
How are intermediary forces able to shift the hegemonic balance during a 
moment of crisis? This was made possible because these forces were 
operating in the context of the semi-integral state where the actors in both 
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blocs had room for manoeuvre. Pre-2011, the dominant bloc was composed 
by the NDP and the crony capitalists who had become predominant in 2000 
and marginalised the military, which was at the periphery of the dominant bloc 
with limited control of hegemony. Pre-2011 the crisis of hegemony could 
emerge because the two blocs (dominant and subaltern) were undertaking 
significant transformation (see Chapter Four); the dominant force was slowly 
alienating part of its component, while at the same time the subaltern forces 
increased their activity in enlarging the gaps of autonomy within civil society. 
Crucially, the lack of intermediary forces in the pre-2011 period determined the 
lack of balance between the dominant and the subaltern bloc. This allowed the 
crisis to emerge. The marginalisation of the military allowed it to be considered 
by part of the subaltern forces (the protesters who cheered and fraternised with 
the military after the resignation of Mubarak) as an external force not part of 
the dominant force. Further investigation is required to understand the 
transformation within the subaltern bloc; in fact, if the dominant and subaltern 
forces were in a catastrophic balance, as argued by De Smet (2016), the 
uprising could not result in a power struggle among the three actors: the 
military as a dominant force, the Muslim Brotherhood as the intermediary force, 
and civil movements as the leading force of the subaltern bloc – as visualised 
in Figure 4.  
Figure 4: Power dynamics between dominant and subaltern forces during the uprising 
 
 
The dynamic that developed between 2011 and 2012 shows the shifting 
positions within the subaltern bloc, that the dominance of the military remained 
precarious, and that the Muslim Brotherhood, as the most advanced force 
within the subaltern bloc, failed to take the lead in the uprising, even if the 
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Kefaya movement led the pre-2011 mobilisation because it started the direct 
confrontation with the regime by demanding constitutional reforms. 
Nevertheless, Kefaya and April 6 failed to become a leading force post-2011, 
because it remained distant from the rest of the revolutionary youth organised 
on the ground. In this scenario, the Muslim Brotherhood started to oscillate 
between two different positions within the spectrum of subalternity. On the one 
hand, it aspired to become the leading force of the subaltern bloc, as 
exemplified in its cooperation with the youth against the military imposition of 
the Selmi document. On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood acted as an 
allied force of the dominant military, thus shifting the balance of power in favour 
of the military, as with the early approval of the constitutional referendum. The 
Muslim Brotherhood kept oscillating between these two positions, especially 
during Morsi’s presidency. In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to 
consolidate its position within political society; this is crucial because it 
addresses how a subaltern force like the Muslim Brotherhood, with a partial 
control of the economy, minimal control of coercion and reliance on Islamist 
ideology, can infiltrate political society but still lack hegemony. This empirical 
case disproves the equation of the subaltern as the masses vs the dominant 
as the elite, proving also that part of what can be considered elite remains in a 
subaltern position.  
At the same time, Tamarrod needs to be analysed within the same logic; in 
fact, Tamarrod can be considered as an attempt of the leading force of the 
subaltern bloc. The tension between Tamarrod as the new emerging leading 
force and the Muslim Brotherhood as oscillating between leading and allied 
prepared the ground for the military coup. In fact, the military coup should not 
be interpreted as the re-appropriation of the military’s control; rather it was the 
manifestation of the removing of a challenging allied force and its replacement 
with another that was more reliable. The target of the protests in 2013 was not 
the dominant force, as happened in 2011, but the allied intermediary force – 
which is by definition a component of the subaltern forces. Such an attack 
provoked the reaction of the Muslim Brotherhood which attempted to challenge 
the hegemony of the military without any concrete support from the subaltern 
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bloc. Finally, the popular support for the military coup, considered as a form of 
corrective revolution, was the result of the transformation of Tamarrod from the 
embryonic leader of the subaltern bloc to the new allied force in the immediate 
aftermath of the coup. The Egyptian state after 2013 undertook a series of 
transformations. The most relevant was the lack of a clear party able to support 
the military. I argue that the lack of a regime party was nothing more than the 
military’s fear of the presence of an allied force that could shift the balance of 
power towards the subaltern force within civil society. In fact, the aim of Sisi’s 
regime is to form an integral state which integrates the subaltern to reduce 
their autonomy. As long as the dominant does not create an integral state, the 
dominant force has to further fragment the allied forces to avoid the same 
oscillating behaviour as the Muslim Brotherhood, supporting and at the same 
time challenging the military.  
To conclude, this thesis analyses the Egyptian Uprising using the lens of 
subalternity. Starting from a new philological interpretation of Gramsci’s 
concept of subalternity, this project builds on this interpretation of subalternity 
and relates the concepts to Gramsci’s theory of revolution. This 
reconceptualisation and empirical application enhances our understanding of 
the nature of revolution as an open-ended relational process. Figure 5 
represents the link between state, society and revolutionary process, along 
with the application to the Egyptian case. This thesis argues that the Egyptian 
Uprising of 2011 was the U-turn of the state dis-integration – the reverse 
process of integration; while the military coup of 2013 shows the dominant 
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Figure 5: Type of state–civil society relation and implication for revolution 
 
Type of state 
Integral Non-integral 
High hegemonic control    Low hegemonic control 
Less civil society autonomy  More civil society autonomy  
Passive revolution (I) 
Crisis of authority 
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The Free Officers' coup in 1952 was a form of passive revolution because 
it achieved a transformation of the Egyptian state, and integrated the civil 
society. Nasser’s successors reversed his policies to maintain the stability of 
the regime, challenged by military defeat in 1967, the revamping of Islamist 
movements and the poor economic performances which had a negative effect 
on other sectors like education, administration, housing, and foreign trades. 
However, these policies resulted in the dis-integration of the subaltern forces 
until the 2000s. The activism of civil society began to reach its peak in 2011, a 
year which marked the conjunction of two parallel opposite changes, the 
integration of the subaltern forces and the capitalisation of their autonomy. 
Therefore, contrary to the interpretation of passive revolution, Egypt is a case 
of spontaneous insurrection because of the contradictory behaviour of the 
intermediary force. In fact, the period between the uprising and the coup was 
characterised by the oscillation of the intermediary force, because the Muslim 
Brotherhood acted sometimes as the leader of the subaltern bloc by 
challenging the military’s dominance, while at other times it acted in support of 
the military. By doing this, the Muslim Brotherhood attempt to stabilise the state 
via the reintegration of civil society. Furthermore, the failed attack of the Muslim 
Brotherhood to the military’s dominance allowed further integration of the 
subaltern bloc after the military coup. Finally, the post-coup regime has 
progressively attempted to reintegrate the subaltern forces within the state.  
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This explicative model of the Egyptian counter-revolution (Figure 5) will be 
discussed further in the following chapters. Nevertheless, the organic relations 
addressed in this model can be generalised and applied to other cases. In this 
way, this model advances the dynamic that characterised revolutions as a 
relational organic process between the state integration and the subaltern 
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Chapter 4 The dis-integration of the Egyptian 
state and the war of position and 




This chapter analyses the relationship between the dis-integration of the 
state and the manifestation of the crisis of hegemony. It stresses how the 
transformation of the state – from integral to non-integral – allows pockets of 
autonomy within civil society that can be exploited by a variety of subaltern 
forces to overthrow the state. The chapter argues that progressive state dis-
integration underlines the growing need for the dominant force to seek to ally 
with an intermediary force in order to connect with civil society. In fact, in the 
case of state integration there is little need for the dominant force to have an 
allied force, because various subaltern social groups are integrated within the 
state via the economic structure or ideological superstructure or both. On the 
contrary, in the case of a non-integral state the allied intermediary force that 
connects political and civil society is necessary to prevent a hegemonic crisis. 
In this regard, Egypt provides an excellent example of state dis-integration 
which progressively developed a hegemonic crisis.  
The events of 25th January 2011 were the manifestation of a latent crisis of 
hegemony. The crisis was ever-present; however, in the 2000s the various 
subaltern social groups strengthened while the dominant bloc weakened and 
the crisis became manifested in 2011. The manifestation of the hegemonic 
crisis cannot be fully understood without taking into account the Egyptian state. 
Contrary to other interpretations that consider neoliberalism as a form of 
passive revolution, I argue that the Egyptian state moved from a more 
integrated form under Nasser – due to its Nasserist ideology and the planned 
state-controlled economy – to a progressive dis-integration of the state started 
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by Sadat and exacerbated by the last decade of Mubarak’s rule. The state dis-
integration also affected relations within the dominant bloc, since the 
upgrading of crony capitalist figures from economic allies to political dominant 
force compromised the stability of the dominant bloc due to the marginalisation 
of the military. On the contrary, the upgrading of the cronies from allied to 
dominant was not followed by the formation of a new intermediary force that 
could connect political and civil society.  
Within civil society, various subaltern forces started to take advantage of the 
state dis-integration. This chapter traces the development of the Muslim 
Brotherhood who in 2011 became the most advanced force within Egyptian 
political society. This was thanks to the use of the war of position – which 
served to access key posts within civil society that held hegemonic functions. 
Although the Muslim Brotherhood was the most advanced subaltern group 
within civil society, it was not the only one that attempted to contrast the state. 
In fact, other movements like the workers, Kefaya and April 6 used the war of 
manoeuvre to confront the state directly. The success of these two strategies 
allowed social movements to target the state on political and economic issues.  
 
4.1 The dominant bloc and the dis-integration of the 
Egyptian state  
4.1.1 Nasser and the integration of the state  
As discussed in the previous chapter, according to Gramsci passive 
revolution has two interlinked meanings: (1) as a type of state formation (of the 
integral state) and (2) as a type of state transformation to overcome hegemonic 
crisis. In both cases, the initiative of social forces is excluded and such 
processes are firmly controlled by the dominant bloc. Passive revolution also 
has another key feature that encompasses the integration of subaltern forces 
within the state. Indeed, passive revolution as a form of state formation aims 
to integrate the various social forces to form an integral state, in which political 
and civil society are in alignment; this is similar to passive revolution as a form 
of hegemonic crisis resolution, intent on transforming the state through the 
integration of social forces within the state. In this respect, the Egyptian state 
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underwent a series of transformations after 1952; however, not all the top-
down transformation that occurred in Egypt before and after the 2011 uprising 
can be considered as a form of passive revolution. In fact, this chapter argues 
that only the period from 1952 until 1967 can be considered in this way.  
The 1952 revolution was the result of the dissatisfaction and anti-imperialist 
feeling which also targeted the ruling elite considered close to the British; the 
malaise was understood by the emerging middle class, and new social 
changes like urbanisation and workers’ migration from rural areas to the cities 
exacerbated the feeling of instability (Podeh and Winckler, 2004). The Free 
Officers’ coup was a pivotal moment for Egyptian state transformation, 
because the coup marked the creation of a new constitutional order (Osman, 
2013, pp. 53–54).  
Nasser was able to understand the needs of the masses and so deliver the 
right message. He was able to integrate various social forces within the state 
at structural level via social reforms and as superstructural-level populist 
ideology and state repression. Nasser often used symbolism praising a simple 
and humble life; portraying himself as one of the people, opposed to the 
wealthy classes, Nasser used the bureaucratic system to ensure employment, 
thus the enlargement of the public sector allowed the population to feel 
engaged in the participation of building a new Egypt. Indeed, forms of socialism 
were used to spread nationalism (Podeh and Winckler, 2004).  
The integration of different social forces within the Nasserite state took place 
within the context of the creation of social equality and social justice. The 
economic development of the country was tightly linked to the expansion of 
the public sector; this led the nationalisation of banks, corporations, and 
insurance companies. This manoeuvre allowed the state to penetrate civil 
society via state-led economic development (Lenczowski, 1965). Prior to the 
land reform in September 1952, Egypt was characterised by a profound social 
inequality, where 0.5% of Egyptians controlled one-third of the fertile land while 
95% of farmers shared the remaining land (Osman, 2013, p. 54). Such reforms 
ended absentee ownership, strengthening farmers’ legal rights, limiting 
families’ holdings. The surplus land was redistributed to peasants who paid for 
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it by instalments, whereas the expropriated landowners were compensated 
with bonds (Vatikiotis, 1991, p. 395; Osman, 2013, pp. 54–55).  
The second major social economic reforms embraced the industrial sector. 
Different types of business, like factories, enterprises and companies, were 
nationalised, transferring the ownership from a limited number of business 
people to workers and employees. This allowed the rapid industrial 
development of the country (Osman, 2013, pp. 55–56). With these two major 
reforms the Nasserite state managed to integrate different social forces. By 
redistributing the land to farmers and allowing them to pay for it by instalments, 
the state ensured that even the poorest farmers could access the benefit of 
the redistribution of wealth. At the same time, the compensation of the 
expropriated landowners with bonds tied the economic conditions of these 
forces to the strength of conditions of the economy in general.  
Similarly to the integration of farmers within the state, the nationalisation of 
business and the state led to capitalism-integrated workers within the state. 
The integration of workers within the state was necessary to develop the 
Nasserite economy based on state-led development. Indeed – similar to the 
Soviet model of workers’ integration – the workers were motivated to increase 
their production to meet specific goals, and similar to the metayage system 
addressed by Gramsci, political representation of workers was controlled via 
the regime’s representative bodies (Alexander and Bassiouny, 2014, p. 43). 
Nevertheless, the integration occurred at the price of brutal repression, since 
at the very beginning the new military regime crushed workers’ protests 
despite the fact that the demonstrators were sympathetic to the military 
(Alexander and Bassiouny, 2014, p. 42; Chalcraft, 2016, pp. 320–321). 
Workers were also integrated within the Nasserite state through the application 
of labour law that guaranteed them job security, longer holidays, free medical 
care, and free transportation to the workplace (Chalcraft, 2016, p. 322). The 
integration of various marginalised groups in society occurred with the 
subsidisation of primary goods and commodities to prevent inflation (Chalcraft, 
2016, p. 324). 
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The nationalisation of the Suez Canal inaugurated the expansion of the 
public sector in Egypt (Abdel-Malek, 1964). The economic development 
materialised with the implementation of spectacular projects like the 
construction of Aswan Dam, the widening of the Suez Canal, the establishment 
of the steel plant in Helwen, and the development of the state-owned 
petroleum industry (Lenczowski, 1965). This set the basis for economic 
planning, and finally the regime established the Arab Socialist Union as a 
central organ to control all the productive forces from the national capitalists to 
the working classes. Such significant economic reforms necessitated the 
development of the state machinery. The growing of the state bureaucracy 
allowed the integration of social forces like the middle class. The socialisation 
of the economy allowed the regime to control the economic resources of the 
country and encourage consumption through welfare state policy (Abdel-
Malek, 1964). In addition, in companies with a foreign majority, the 
shareholding was ‘Egyptianised’ (Abdel-Malek, 1967).  
The expansion of the public sector, the increasing services to the population 
and the reform of the educational system increased the integration of various 
subaltern groups; however, at the same time, the educational reform was a 
way for the regime to spread its propaganda. In fact, Nasser claimed that one 
of the aims of the revolution was to eliminate the cultural anarchy existing in 
the Egyptian system, where foreign schools were reduced in order to 
‘Egyptianise’ education (Mansfield, 1973). The impact that Nasser had in 
promoting Egyptian nationalism is rooted in the process of ‘Egyptianisation’ 
[tamsir] of the country’s economy and cultural life by eliminating any foreign 
domination (Mansfield, 1973). The Nasserite state in these terms integrated 
different social forces which were kept together by state-led development and 
populist ideology.  
In fact, Nasser’s state transformation went hand in hand with his ability to 
gather civil society consent by creating the image of a national ‘hero’, and 
culturally transforming the country. In particular, the nationalisation of the Suez 
Canal in 1956 and the successful resolution of the Suez Crisis allowed Nasser 
to consolidate his image (Osman, 2013, pp. 56–57). The Egyptian victory 
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against the tripartite attack – the UK, France, and Israel – not only raised Egypt 
as a key actor in international relations, but helped Nasser reach the peak of 
his support within the population (Osman, 2013, pp. 58–59).  
Some scholars argue that Nasser did not leave a state behind because state 
institutions revolved around his figure (Osman, 2013, p. 78). Often Nasser’s 
state is considered weak because of its unstable institutions; for example 
government and parliament lifespans were 13 months and two years 
respectively, while the constitution was promulgated six times (Vatikiotis, 1991, 
p. 424). 
This conclusion highlights the liberal idea of the state as either strong or 
weak, reducing the negative consequences of economic and social reforms to 
the failure of the state. As discussed in Chapter Three, this interpretation 
overshadows the complex relations and balance of power between political 
and civil society. In contrast, by looking at the transformation of the state 
through the lens of subaltern integration, we can grasp a more comprehensive 
development of the Egyptian state since 1952. In fact, from 1954 to 1967 the 
Egyptian state progressively integrated various social forces in order to 
maintain their consent. In this regard, the Nasserite project until 1967 was a 
form of passive revolution, not just because it implemented top-down policies 
but precisely because more sections of the subaltern bloc were integrated 
within the state. The fact that the negative consequences of the Nasserite 
project emerged post-1967 does not mean that ‘Nasser did not leave behind a 
state’ (Osman, 2013, p. 78); it rather means that the subaltern bloc was no 
longer fully integrated within the state. The dis-integration of the state 
progressed further under Sadat and Mubarak until groups of the dis-integrated 
social forces exploited pockets of autonomy to counterbalance the dominant 
bloc. For example, Sadat’s institutional crafting, like the 1972 constitution – 
which survived until the uprising – and the formation of a non-competitive multi-
party system – which further ‘liberalised’ under Mubarak – did not necessary 
guarantee the stability of the state.  
Indeed, Nasserism was not a social contract based on the trade-off of 
liberties for welfare. On the contrary, the ruling elite imposed authoritarianism 
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by offering ‘them [workers and peasants] more meaningful participation’ 
(Brown, 2004, p. 134). This inclusive process related to the promotion of 
equality where under Nasser class differences were less marked contrary to 
the pre-revolutionary era when lower classes were ghettoised (Brown, 2004). 
Indeed, the Nasserite regime transformed the Egyptian state via ‘political 
suppression’ and ‘social incorporation’ (Alexander and Bassiouny, 2014, p. 38, 
emphasis in original). 
 
4.1.2 The progressive dis-integration of the Egyptian state  
Although the concept of crisis refers to hegemony and is not reduced to an 
episodic economic crisis, the origin of this crisis developed from an economic 
contradiction at the structural level. In particular, the origin of the Egyptian 
hegemonic crisis goes back to the infitah – a series of neoliberal policies 
started by President Anwar Sadat in the 1970s – which marked the shift from 
a state-planned economic strategy to a development led by the private sector. 
The infitah sowed the seeds of the crisis of hegemony because neoliberal 
policy transformed the Egyptian integral state into a semi-integral state with 
the dis-integration of various subaltern forces – like workers, farmers and the 
middle class – who became impoverished while the gap between rich and poor 
increased (Kandil, 2012b). The dis-integration of workers, farmers and the 
middle class required the regime to seek the support of intermediary forces to 
link the state and the social forces that had been dis-integrated. In fact, as 
others have pointed out, Nasser’s corporatism and Sadat’s corporatism were 
different. Nasser used his charisma to establish ‘populist-corporatism’; in this 
way subaltern forces were directly integrated within the state, structurally via 
the economic transformation that allowed the workers and farmers to 
participate actively in the formation of the post-1952 state due to the state-led 
economic development, and ideologically through the direct relations between 
Nasser and the Egyptians. Sadat’s corporatism, on the other hand, became 
‘bureaucratic’ because the exclusion of the workers, farmers and middle class 
to favour the emerging business forces in the country started the dis-
integration of the state (Bianchi, 1989; Ayubi, 1995; Ranko, 2015, pp. 47–50).  
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Starting from this assumption, the argument proposed here highlights how 
the dis-integration of the state determines the increasing necessity for the 
dominant force to seek an ally in order to connect with civil society. In fact, as 
in the integrated Nasserite state, there was no need of a specific allied 
intermediary force because economic structure and political superstructure 
were able to integrate the subaltern forces directly. Sadat’s regime needed the 
business people to be the allied intermediary force to connect with the working 
and middle classes. In this regard, business people were not yet dominant – 
as they would be under Mubarak – and indeed ‘they continue[d] to be rather 
“junior” partners in the current informal coalition’ (Ayubi, 1995, p. 352). Finally, 
further dis-integration of the Egyptian state occurred under Mubarak; on the 
one hand, subaltern forces like the working and middle classes further suffered 
from the negative effect of the infitah. On the other hand, the crony business 
people who were an allied intermediary force under Sadat became a dominant 
force under Mubarak. The ‘upgrading’ of the business people – from an 
intermediary force to a dominant force – exacerbated the dis-integration of the 
state because the internal division within the dominant bloc prevented the old 
elite from surviving the hegemonic crisis.  
 
4.1.3 Sadat’s corrective revolution  
After Nasser died, opposition including the left – which was in disagreement 
with Nasser – started to use ‘Nasserism’ and its reinterpretation to attack the 
Sadat regime. To resist those attacks, Sadat put in place a ‘de-Nasserisation’ 
programme by releasing materials such as books, articles and movies to 
discredit his predecessor (Binder, 2004). The image of Nasser as a 
charismatic figure turned out to be the image of an autocrat, where his 
charisma was useful to oppress rather than modernise the country (Binder, 
2004). The formation of an alternative narrative about Nasser functioned to 
support a new political agenda. Sadat reversed Nasser’s socialism, reducing 
the public sector in favour of aggressive forms of capitalism (Osman, 2013, p. 
79). In fact, the de-Nasserisation was defined by Sadat as ‘corrective 
revolution’ (thawra al-tashyah), to justify all the opposing policies that he put in 
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place: the economic openness to foreign intervention, economic privatisation, 
reinforcing the role of Islam and signing the peace treaty with Israel (Ansari, 
1986, pp. 167–173; Hatina, 2004). The justification for such dramatic change 
was based on the idea that the free market would have allocated resources 
according to the needs of the market itself, opposing the wasta dynamics that 
flagellated the country with endemic corruption (Joya, 2017, p. 343).  
The rhetoric used to support the neoliberal reforms addresses privatisation 
as a way to empower Egyptian citizens (Osman, 2013, p. 130). Infitah was not 
only an economic reform but it deeply changed the political environment in 
Egypt (Osman, 2013, p. 129). The new business people became the allied 
intermediary forces of the dis-integrating Egyptian state; because they were 
not accessing the government they remained in an allied but subaltern position 
– ‘junior partners’, in Ayubi’s words (Ayubi, 1995, p. 352). Nevertheless, they 
still functioned to connect the subaltern forces with the state. In fact, the 
transformation of Sinai after the withdrawal of Israeli occupation allowed the 
flourishing of the real estate industry in the peninsula. The new economy was 
now led by the private sector’s estate (Osman, 2013, p. 139). The bulk of the 
working and middle classes, which were – under Nasser – integrated into the 
public sector, were now employed within the private sector (Osman, 2013, pp. 
132–133). This transformation stressed how the business people were the link 
between the regime and the tourist workers needed to operate the tourist 
sector machine. In this way, social forces like workers were inserted into a 
specific economic relationship with the cronies as intermediary forces rather 
than directly with the state. Nevertheless, the signal that the lower classes 
started to dis-integrate from the state emerged in 1977 with the bread riot, a 
spontaneous protest to reject Sadat’s initiative to remove basic subsidies in 
response to pressure by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Vatikiotis, 
1991, p. 422; Alexander and Bassiouny, 2014, p. 47).  
The corrective revolution initiated by Sadat not only addressed neoliberal 
policies, it also attempted to reshape the limits of civil society by alternating 
tolerance and repression. This strategy ultimately created the opportunity for 
subaltern groups like the Muslim Brotherhood to exploit pockets of autonomy 
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to initiate their war of position against the state (Ranko, 2015). In the long run, 
this allowed the MB to become the intermediary between the civil and political 
society post-2011. Paradoxically, corrective revolution also had effects within 
the dominant bloc, because it started the progressive marginalisation of the 
military that further dis-integrated the state through the military’s parallel 
economy.  
The introduction of the infitah was not as worrying for the dominant role of 
the military as was the peace treaty with Israel, which directly affected the 
primary function of the military. Such a shift had destabilising effects for the 
military’s hegemonic relations. Following the peace treaty with Israel, the 
military suffered a reduction of its dominant role within the ruling elite, already 
damaged after the defeat of the 1967 war and partially restored in 1973’s Yom 
Kippur or October war. Therefore, to avoid dissatisfaction and dissent in the 
military, Sadat allowed the military to enjoy the new neoliberal policies.  
Established in 1979 by presidential decree n. 32, the National Service 
Products Organisation (NSPO) had the scope to re-engage the military with 
Egyptian politics and society. Hence, the military started to step into the 
economy of the country, in line with the infitah policy (Abul-Magd, 2015). This 
manoeuvre pushed the military to the border of the dominant bloc, but without 
turning it into a subaltern force because the military was still in control of 
coercion and a significant part of the Egyptian economy. This is not a minor 
detail since being marginalised within the dominant bloc allowed the military to 
control the transition post-uprising, contrary to the Muslim Brotherhood which 
reached political society as intermediary force but remained unable to enforce 
its decisions over the military’s opposition.  
The military economy went through different phases. Nasser pushed for 
industrialisation of the country via the lead of the public sector, and military 
factories focused on steel and aluminium industrial products. Following the 
neoliberal policies and privatisation, the military expanded on component 
assembly projects like electronic and vehicle industries as well as food and 
drink industries, like the subsidies of bread and meat, ‘Sinai’ olive oil, and 
‘Queen’ pasta as well as the supply of fuel by the Wataneyya chain of gas 
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stations (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 22). However, the military 
accepted this marginalised position within the dominant elite due to the initial 
economic profit, which did not reflect the hardship that the lower classes 
experienced. The Minister of Defence, Field Marshal and National Democratic 
Party (NDP) leader Abdel Al Halim Abu Ghazala, turned the NSPO into a 
proper business which provided services and products for civilian consumption 
(Abul-Magd, 2015, p. 56). The new role of the military as the economic provider 
of civilian goods allowed it to gain consensus from the lower classes and 
unskilled labour who were unfit to undertake a military career (Abul-Magd, 
2015, p. 56). This strategy allowed the state to keep the consensus of the lower 
classes who attempted to access the military for the state’s safety net, as a 
retired colonel commented:  
The private sector could not absorb the large numbers of retiring 
officers. Instead, the military prepared them, offered them training 
and the means to manage various businesses that benefit the 
military as an institution and the country as a whole. As an army 
major in my late 30s at the time, I could not afford an apartment, 
except in shantytowns and under-developed areas. When Field 
Marshal Abu Ghazala [defence minister, 1982–1989] surveyed the 
officers about their residence needs, almost all of them responded 
that they could not afford decent housing. This is how the military 
began its residential construction activities. The military imported 
the best building materials and sold the officers apartments at 
reduced rates. It was the only way for us to lead a dignified life, both 
while in service and after, and be able to find a place in which to get 
married and start a family. (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 21)  
However, while the military made an effort to keep the consent of the lower 
classes, it was losing consent from the upper middle class. As Minister of 
Defence, Abu Ghazala stressed how the tenure of officers was lowering 
compared to the living standards of the upper middle class. The increasing 
social inequality was reflected in the failure of the military to recruit officers 
from the upper middle class (Kandil, 2012a, p. 182). The dissatisfaction and 
economic hardship of the military also emerged from a reduction of the military 
spending that was not in line with progressive inflation. In fact, the military 
budget dropped from 19.5% GDP in 1989 to 2.2% GDP in 2010 (Kandil, 2012a, 
p. 183). 
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4.1.4 Mubarak’s ‘upgrading’ of crony capitalists and the 
‘downgrading’ of the military  
After Sadat’s assassination his vice president – Hosni Mubarak – took 
power. Mubarak’s initial plan was to continue the economic reform and regain 
a strong coercive grip on the country (Osman, 2013, p. 140; Ibrahim, 2015, p. 
75). In this regard the transformation within the dominant bloc involved the 
‘upgrading’ of the crony capitalists to political power due to the transformation 
of the economy; and the ‘downgrading’ of the military, not only because of the 
economic transformation but also due to the increasing competition with other 
forces within the security apparatus.  
Between 1975 and 1985 the dis-integration of workers and the well-
educated middle class from the state was mitigated by the massive migration 
of Egyptian workers to the oil-rich countries (Amin, 2009, p. 7), mostly in the 
Gulf (Joya, 2011, p. 370). In fact, the following two decades (1985–2004) were 
characterised by the decline of Egyptian migration due to the decline of oil 
prices and the reduction of earnings from the Suez Canal as well as remittance 
from Egyptian migrants (Amin, 2009, p. 7; Joya, 2011, p. 370; Hanieh, 2014, 
p. 41). The bureaucratic apparatus which used to be the pivotal state 
apparatus to integrate the educated middle class and unskilled workers turned 
into an ineffective institution which prevented economic development due to 
pervasive bribery (Ibrahim, 2015, p. 75).  
Mubarak revised the neoliberal reforms in two main areas: agrarian reform 
and reductions of the public sector. Law 96 of 1992 granted landowners the 
power to evict farmers, who were forced to migrate abroad or to move to 
urbanised areas and rely on the informal economy, whereas the reduction of 
the public sector reversed the integration undertaken under Nasser – where 
well-educated youth could seek secure employment within state institutions or 
state-owned enterprises. Law 203 of 1991 authorised the privatisation of state-
owned companies. By 1999, 137 out of 314 state companies were sold, and 
by 2004 the privatisation had a further push under Ahmed Nazif’s government 
to 200 out of 314 (Alexander and Bassiouny, 2014, pp. 48–51; Hanieh, 2014, 
p. 41).  
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In the 1990s, in return for its support in the First Gulf War, Egypt benefited 
from debt relief from the Western powers, arranged by the IMF with the 
imposition of neoliberal reforms such as support for the private sector and 
privatisation of state-owned companies. The privatisation transformed the 
managed and related profits of public resources, placing them in the hands of 
a small circle of crony capitalists allied with the NDP. This alliance allowed 
crony capitalists to play a role in policy making, and at the same time the state 
promoted the interests of a few at the expense of the entire community (Joya, 
2011, p. 370).  
In the 2000s, the more aggressive neoliberal policies of Ahmed Nazif’s 
government and the grooming of Gamal Mubarak to the presidency 
transformed the crony capitalists from an allied force to a dominant force which 
entered into collision with the military. In fact, the rise of Gamal Mubarak posed 
challenges to military interests. First of all, Gamal was not perceived as ‘one 
of them’, not only because he was not an officer but also because he did not 
even serve in the military. Instead, he was sent to London to work at the Bank 
of America and then helped found and managed a private company. In 1995, 
at the young age of 22, he was recalled to Egypt and in 2000 joined the NDP 
which gave him the leadership of the Policies Secretariat of the party – a board 
of liberal economists and business people – which was known sarcastically as 
‘Gamal’s Cabinet’ (Frisch, 2013, p. 187) . Those were alarming signals for the 
military which had already seen Bashar Al Assad inherit the Syrian presidency 
after the death of his father Hafez (Bou Nassif, 2012, pp. 18, 21). 
In order to pre-empt the hostile reaction of the military towards the grooming 
of Gamal, Mubarak gave a generous economic concession to the military. In 
fact, the project of developing infrastructure – like telecommunications and 
construction – allowed the military to be involved in projects like the Ain Sokhna 
highways in 2004. In addition, Egyptian land which is not owned by industries, 
investors or government is by default owned by the military (International Crisis 
Group, 2012, pp. 21–22). The military acquired Semaf, a state-owned railway 
factory, via the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI); and in 2005 a 
steel factory in Qaliubiyya was bought by the Ministry of Military Production 
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(MoMP) (Abul-Magd, 2012, 2015). In 2009, the civil production of the military 
was worth 1.8 billion LE, while the military production was lower at 10 million 
LE (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 22).  
Despite the coup-proof strategy attempted by Mubarak, who appointed 
retired officers in all branches of bureaucracy (Abul-Magd, 2015), the period 
2004–2010 was characterised by aggressive neoliberal reforms which 
consolidated the crony business people as the dominant force. Indeed, the 
number of MPs who were business people increased from 8 to 150 in a decade 
(in three electoral turnouts 1995, 2000 and 2005). Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif 
(2004–2011) became a symbol of this bond between the ruling NDP and the 
crony capitalists. In fact, during his premiership, Nazif’s government was 
nicknamed ‘the business cabinet’; this government was composed of business 
people who controlled vast parts of the Egyptian economy: Rashid Mohamed 
Rashid – as Minister of Foreign Trade and Industry – is owner of FineFoods, 
the main food company in Egypt, and senior executive of the Unilever group 
in Egypt; Ahmed Al-Maghraby became Minister of Housing as owner of a real 
estate company and the Mansour and Maghraby Group investment company; 
Mohamed Mansour from the Mansour group, division of General Motors and 
Chevrolet in Egypt, became Minister of Transportation; and Yousef Boutros 
Ghali, senior economist of the IMF, became Minister of Finance.  
In addition, a new Ministry of Investment was established and was led by 
Mohamed Mohieldin with the goal of privatising; as result the ministry 
privatised 59 public companies in 2005–2006 with the total value of $2.6 billion, 
and last but not least Ahmed Ezz – steel tycoon – became Head of the 
Economic Committee of the Parliament (Joya, 2011, p. 370; Abdelrahman, 
2015, pp. 7–8). The effects of the transformation of economic relations did not 
emerge as an economic crisis per se, since the performance of the Egyptian 
economy was actually improving; however, the redistribution of the increasing 
wealth was denied, exacerbating existing issues of inequality. In mid-2004, the 
reforms launched by Ahmed Nazif’s government allowed the expansion of 
finance, reducing investment regulation, lowering tariffs and privatising state-
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owned enterprises (Khan and Miller, 2016, p. 2). The result of such reforms 
determined growth from 4.5% in 2005 to 7.2% in 2008 (see Figure 6).  
Figure 6: Egypt’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth 
 
Source: http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/EGY  
Egypt continued to grow despite the recession caused by the global 
financial crisis in September 2008. Despite the constant growth between 2005 
and 2010, such benefits remained in the hands of few people and the structural 
economic and political issues affecting the country – like youth unemployment, 
crony capitalism, inadequate infrastructure, insufficient bureaucracy, and a 
widening wealth gap between rich and poor – remained untouched (Khan and 
Miller, 2016, p. 2). This inevitably led to the dis-integration of workers, farmers 
and the middle class from the state. 
The devaluation of 2002 and the increased revenues from gas allowed the 
Egyptian economy to grow fast and steadily after 2003. The global financial 
crisis of 2008 reduced revenue in all key sectors (remittance, tourism, Suez 
Canal revenue, gas export and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI)) (Springborg, 
2011a, pp. 91–92). Before the uprising, Egyptian GDP grew steadily by 6% 
after 2005, making Egypt the 26th largest economy in the world by 2010. 
Nevertheless, such growth was not equally distributed and half of the 
population was still below the poverty line. At the same time, the 
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exploitation. The situation was exacerbated by inflation, especially for basic 
goods (MacQueen, 2012, pp. 17–18).  
The expansion of the military economy highlights how military control shifted 
from the direct control of political society to the indirect control of civil society. 
This process went in the opposite direction to the participation of the business 
people within political society who nevertheless failed to integrate the subaltern 
forces within the state. However, the military were not marginalised only in the 
economic terrain; further marginalisation derived from the competition over 
coercion with other security. On the other hand, the new emerging dominant 
crony capitalists force ensured that the means of coercion were dispersed 
among different apparatuses; in fact, on the eve of the uprising the Ministry of 
Interior – rather than the Ministry of Defence – was in charge of protecting the 
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Table 2: Security apparatus  
President (above all branches and coordinator) 
Ministry of Defence  Ministry of Interior  
Military – SCAF  General investigation police  
Military intelligence  General Intelligence 
Service (GIS) 
State Security 
Investigations Service (SSI) 
Transformed into National 
Security Agency 
Transformed into Homeland 
Security 
(police intelligence) 








   









Adapted from: Amnesty International, 2012b, pp. 6–7, 2012a, pp. 1–4 
 
Table 2 shows the division among the coercive forces in Egypt. Despite the 
institutionalised armed forces’ accountability to the president there is an 
ongoing tension between the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence, 
which protect different interests. Finally, the presence of a grey zone in which 
non-state actors can develop their own coercion highlights the lack of integral 
state.  
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The powers of the State Security Investigations Service (SSI) were 
reinforced by the emergency law issued in 1981 in response to Sadat’s 
assassination, although it was meant to be in place only during ‘exceptional 
circumstances threatening the stability of security and order in the country’ 
(Tadros, 2011, p. 83). The emergency law as well as the SSI remained in place 
until the uprising (Tadros, 2011, p. 83; Amnesty International, 2012a, p. 12). 
The emergency law allowed the SSI to justify arrest to protect national security. 
Until the uprising the Mukhabarat, the external intelligence agency, and the 
SSI, for internal security, were the two most relevant state coercive 
apparatuses, in competition with each other and held accountable to the 
president (Tadros, 2011, p. 83). At the same time, the other security 
apparatuses had economic appetites, like the General Intelligence Service 
(GIS) whom the military had to compete with. In fact, Omar Suleiman, Head of 
the GIS, negotiated the price of the natural gas to export to Israel instead of 
officials like the Prime Minister or the Minister of Petroleum (Abdelrahman, 
2015, p. 22).  
Finally, Mubarak moved a further distance from Nasser than did Sadat. He 
allowed a multi-party system, a tolerable opposition and more freedom of 
speech, picturing a more concrete road to democracy (Hatina, 2004). In 
addition, Mubarak’s economic reforms reversed Nasserist polices; he started 
privatisation and incentives to attract foreign investments, and launched a new 
agrarian reform (Hatina, 2004). Mubarak’s supporters perceived his regime as 
the third stage of the 1952 revolution, where finally systemic reforms like the 
reinforcement of the judiciary and legislative powers, free press and new 
parties gave the feeling that Egypt was on the road to democracy (Hatina, 
2004). The poorest sectors of society, like workers and peasants, were the 
most affected by privatisation of the public sector. From this perspective 
Hatina’s words seem prophetic, because he observed that ‘the ethos of social 
justice nurtured by Nasserism cast a threatening shadow over Mubarak’s 
regime’ (Hatina, 2004, p. 116). The tension between the crony capitalists and 
the military remained latent until the 2011 uprising when it emerged because 
various groups of the subaltern forces turned from passivity to activity.  
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4.2 The subaltern forces: From passivity to activity  
As Gramsci explained, no matter how fragile the unity of dominant forces, 
unless subaltern forces turn from passivity to activity the hegemony of the 
dominant bloc remains in place and the crisis continues to exist but remains 
latent. In the Egyptian cases, the transformation from passivity to activity by 
the subaltern forces happened at different moments for different subaltern 
groups which used the war of position and war of manoeuvre in their counter-
hegemonic effort. These strategies were not always coordinated; in fact, the 
success of the 2011 uprising was due to the coordination of strategies by the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s war of position and the revolutionary movements’ war 
of manoeuvre.  
Once the Muslim Brotherhood and the revolutionary movements failed to 
integrate each other’s strategies, the revolutionary process turned towards the 
counter-revolution. Indeed, the unity of the subaltern forces was often episodic, 
manifesting the intrinsic lack of counter-hegemonic character and therefore 
their failure to escape the subaltern position. Without the autonomy created by 
the dis-integration of subaltern forces from the state, the activism of the 
subalterns would have not been possible. Precisely because of the dis-
integration of the state and the increased autonomy within the civil society, the 
subaltern had room to develop appropriate organisation, leadership and 
autonomy as addressed by Gramsci. As discussed in Chapter Three, 
organisation, leadership and autonomy are three criteria that allow us to 
understand how advanced a subaltern force is.  
 
4.2.1 The Muslim Brotherhood’s war of position  
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna; the 
organisation’s aim was to restore the moral and social renewal of the country 
based on Islamic values. The MB considered Western influence in the country 
to be the reason for its moral degradation (Wickham, 2013, pp. 22, 26). For 
this reason, the MB welcomed the Free Officers’ coup in 1952; however, 
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entering a power struggle with the military resulted in the MB becoming the 
target of Nasserite state repression via torture and exile. The state repression 
marked the internal division of the MB between conservatives, who advocated 
the ideological reform of society through the implementation of Islamic values 
in every aspect of life, and radicals, who called for violence (Kennedy, 2017, 
p. 41). On the one hand, the radicalisation of the movement via Qutb’s 
ideological work was in fact considered a response to state repression 
(Wickham, 2013, pp. 27–28; Kennedy, 2017, pp. 35–36); on the other hand, 
the brutal repression under Nasser forced the conservative MB to abandon its 
violent confrontational strategies (Wickham, 2013, p. 30). This split highlights 
how the MB started to separate the underground war – which remains a 
prerogative of radical Islamist groups – and the war of position, which started 
once the dis-integration of the state allowed the MB to conquer autonomy 
within civil society.  
Indeed, the MB’s war of position started with the opportunities generated by 
Sadat’s ‘de-Nasserisation’ via the corrective revolution. In fact, to 
counterbalance the Nasserists and socialists, Sadat released the MB from 
prison and allowed the return of its exiles – especially from the Gulf. His 
strategy was based on a self-portrait of believer-presidents appealing to 
religious feelings. To counterbalance the left, the MB was allowed to publish 
its magazine to explain its ideological stand to its followers and to the broader 
audience (Wickham, 2013, pp. 29–30). Nevertheless, the Brotherhood was 
excluded from political participation because religious parties were banned. In 
this way the MB was allowed to keep publishing and lobbying but was not 
allowed formal access to politics (Wickham, 2013, pp. 30–31). 
In 1976, the MB managed to win six seats in parliament as independent, 
and it attempted to influence the application of sharia law. Despite the fact that 
Sadat allowed the MB to be part of the parliamentary committee to discuss 
Islam, its actions remained ineffective because Sadat imposed his own 
decision over the MB’s proposals (Hamzawy and Brown, 2010, pp. 5–6; 
Wickham, 2013, pp. 31–32). This highlights how the MB’s access to parliament 
did not turn it into a dominant force; nevertheless, it allowed the group to exploit 
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its organisation to increase consent within civil society. By the late 1970s the 
contrast between the MB and Sadat started to emerge. The MB was 
dissatisfied with the infitah policy and the peace treaty with Israel because the 
former increased social inequality while the later clashed ideologically with 
solidarity towards the Palestinian cause. The open opposition of the MB to the 
peace treaty was met with repression by Sadat (Wickham, 2013, pp. 32–33). 
The fact that even the non-violent confrontation of the MB was met with 
repression forced the MB to focus its war of position towards civil society 
institutions more broadly.  
The low profile that the MB had during the initial few years of Mubarak’s 
presidency allowed it to take control of civil society institutions; in fact, the MB 
was filling the void left by the state in providing social services to the 
population, like mosques, cultural organisations, healthcare facilities, Islamic 
banking, manufacturing activities, and publishers (Wickham, 2002, p. 97; Al-
Anani, 2015, p. 530; Ranko, 2015, p. 86). Building on its war of position allowed 
the MB to attempt again to infiltrate political society. Although the election of 
1984 was less corrupt, the 8% electoral threshold and the prohibition of 
establishing religious parties posed considerable restrictions on the MB in 
accessing parliament. For this reason, the MB reached an agreement with the 
Wafd party to access parliamentary politics (Ranko, 2015, pp. 77, 82). The 
Wafd would provide the institutional channel – as a recognised party – while 
the MB would provide a popular base (El-Ghobashy, 2005). This allowed the 
Wafd to gain 58 seats in parliament, eight of which were given to the MB – still 
a very small number considering that the Wafd had limited support (Wickham, 
2013, p. 47).  
The MB’s war of position, started with service provision to the lower classes, 
expanded to reach the consent of the middle class. In fact, the MB infiltrated 
the professional syndicates in 1983, starting with doctors, engineers, lawyers 
and scientists; by 1987 it took control of the engineering syndicate, improving 
the services it provided for its members, and established the MB’s presence in 
university campuses by becoming active in the student unions as well (Ranko, 
2015, pp. 84–85). The activism within professional syndicates allowed the MB 
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to get the consent of another portion of civil society, and the growing consent 
that the MB gathered emerged in its more significant electoral victory in 1987. 
In fact, the MB’s coalition with Labour and the Liberal party (the Islamic 
Alliance) in 1987 stressed the larger majority the MB was able to capitalise on 
due to the consent it was building. In comparison with the 1984 election when 
the Wafd won 58 seats in coalition with the MB, in 1987 the Islamic Alliance 
won 56 seats, 17% – the MB took 38 seats out of the 56 – while the Wafd won 
only 35 seats, 10.9%. This highlighted the considerable weight that the MB 
had in the previous election in coalition with the Wafd. In 1987, the MB became 
the first opposition force in parliament (Wickham, 2013, p. 47; Ranko, 2015, 
pp. 115–116).  
Threatened by the strength of the MB’s war of position, In the 1990s the 
state cracked down on the MB’s social activities; the MB responded by 
boycotting the elections to discredit the regime (Al-Anani, 2015, p. 530). The 
state started to limit civil society space for the MB by restricting participation in 
syndicate and student union elections. Media censorship increased after 1995, 
and in 1999 NGOs’ activities were further restricted (Ranko, 2015, pp. 119–
120, p. 142). This was accompanied by coercive state repression; in fact, 
between 1992 and 1997 around 1,000 civilians were tried in military court 
(Kennedy, 2017, p. 137). As a result, the MB boycotted elections in the 1990s, 
stressing its strength within civil society: indeed, the MB had managed to gain 
control of important syndicates like medicine, engineering and law (Ranko, 
2015, p. 116).  
In this way, the war of position of the MB allowed it to mutually exploit its 
access to parliament and to civil society institutions. In fact, in the 1980s the 
increasing charity work with the lower classes allowed it to gather consensus 
to gain a political platform which was further amplified when the group 
achieved control of the professional syndicates. Ultimately this marked the 
stronger electoral victory of the MB that helped to discredit the façade of 
opening elections up to competition (El-Ghobashy, 2005, p. 376; Wickham, 
2013, p. 57). 
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As many scholars have addressed, the war of position of the MB allowed it 
to gain a significant electoral victory in 2011 parliamentary and 2012 
presidential elections (Al-Awadi, 2013; Wickham, 2013; Al-Anani, 2015; 
Ranko, 2015). However, the success of the 2011 uprising was not the result of 
the MB’s war of position alone. The MB’s war of position was combined with 
the war of manoeuvre of the growing revolutionary movement in the 2000s. 
The next section discusses how the war of manoeuvre and the position of 
different subaltern forces were able to manifest the hegemonic crisis of an 
expanding and conflicting dominant bloc that no longer had an allied force with 
which to connect with civil society.  
 
4.2.2 War of manoeuvre: Kefaya, April 6 and workers 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the war of manoeuvre is the direct 
confrontation of the state via protests, strikes, civil disobedience, 
demonstrations, occupation, marches etc., whereas the war of position aims 
to reach significant positions in political and civil society to counter the 
hegemony of the dominant force. As explained in the previous section, the MB 
exploited pockets of autonomy within civil society which were created by the 
dis-integration of the state. In this way, via the war of position within civil society 
institutions and activities, the MB gained consent that allowed it to access 
political society. However, this strategy had limited results in opposing the 
Mubarak regime without the war of manoeuvre started in the 2000s by various 
activists.  
The war of manoeuvre generated by the long-lasting activism of various 
subaltern forces was characterised by four main characteristics (Shehata, 
2012). The first phase that triggered the war of manoeuvre was the 
development of activism targeting external issues, like the Second Palestinian 
Intifada in 2000 and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The second phase of the 
war of manoeuvre laid the foundations to link with the war of position because 
it confronted the political superstructure; in fact, in this phase the mobilisation 
around Kefaya targeted the state directly with measures like constitutional 
reforms and elections. The third phase of the war of manoeuvre shifted its aim 
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to the economic structure, thanks to the mobilisation of workers’ movements 
towards their economic struggles. Finally, the last phase of the war of 
manoeuvre attempted to join political and economic struggles with the 
formation of the April 6 Movement (Shehata, 2012).  
 
The start of the war of manoeuvre: External issues bring 
internal episodic unity 
The hegemonic crisis of 25th January 2011 manifested when revolutionary 
forces, strengthened by social mobilisation that started in the 2000s, joined 
with the Egyptian Popular Committee for Solidarity with the Palestinian Intifada 
(EPCSPI), which gathered a broad range of activists from seculars and leftists 
to Islamists and representatives of syndicates and unions (Shehata, 2010, p. 
68; Abdelrahman, 2015, pp. 31–33). The first phase of the war of manoeuvre 
was characterised by the existence of an external enemy that brought episodic 
unity among various fragmented groups. The EPCSPI developed between 
2000 and 2003; this gathered different episodic movements like the Anti-
Globalisation Egyptian Group (AGEG), the 20th of March Movement for 
Change, and the Defence Committee for Labour Rights. The demonstrations 
in solidarity with the Second Palestinian Intifada were generated from the 
mobilisation of students in different university campuses across the country. 
These activities did not spread because security apparatus contained them 
within the university premises (Shehata, 2010, p. 69; Alexander and 
Bassiouny, 2014, pp. 103–104).  
The leaders of these movements later formed Kefaya: Kamal Khalil, Aida 
Seif Al-Dawla and Hamdeen Sabbahi, for example. The Second Palestinian 
Intifada provided a cultural framing to revive the resistance and linked the 
struggle to the local level (El-Mahdi, 2009, pp. 1024–1025). 20th–21st March 
2003 marked another episodic founding moment of the war of manoeuvre: 
when Egyptian activists called for a demonstration against the US invasion in 
Iraq. This triggered a new wave of protests which did not remain confined to 
university spaces. In fact the protests moved to important urban spaces in 
Cairo, including Tahrir Square (Alexander and Bassiouny, 2014, p. 104). This 
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event was claimed to have the participation of 40,000 people, the biggest 
protest since the bread riots in 1977 (El-Mahdi, 2009; Shehata, 2012). Even at 
the early state of this episode of unity, the MB youth organised protests with 
Nasserist and socialist youth movements against the Iraqi invasion (Wickham, 
2013, p. 156). Arguably the impressive number of protesters reflected the anti-
American sentiment rather than being the expression of an emerging counter-
hegemonic formation, precisely because during the protests and later in April 
2003 the activists were brutally suppressed by the coercive apparatus, and 
demonstrations were stopped by police violence, legal prosecution, and 
imprisonment (El-Mahdi, 2009, p. 1026). The conclusion of this first episodic 
moment of unity had the merit of bringing close together different elements of 
the subaltern forces; at this stage they failed to develop any sort of subaltern 
unity beyond the episodic unity against an external enemy. This initial phase – 
similarly to the second phase – stresses the reactive rather than proactive 
character of the subaltern forces. Nevertheless, in Gramscian terms, this was 
necessary to gather awareness of their presence against the system. This 
awareness was further developed. In the second phase, Kefaya developed the 
war of manoeuvre to another level: first it shifted the issues from international 
affairs to domestic issues, and second it shifted from a mere act of solidarity 
and condemnation of foreign interference to proper concrete demands against 
the state.  
 
Kefaya: the war of manoeuvre against the political structure  
A further and more sophisticated sign of transformation of the subaltern bloc 
from passivity to activity was the formation of the Egyptian Movement for 
Change, also known as Kefaya, which targeted specifically the emerging of 
the crony capitalists in control of the NDP, manifested by Gamal Mubarak’s 
rise to power (El-Mahdi, 2009, p. 1012). Contrary to the very basic episodic 
pro-Palestinian and anti-US formation in the early 2000s, Kefaya became a 
uniting force of the subaltern bloc due to the composition of its founders; in 
fact, this new force embraced all sorts of ideological views including those of 
liberals, nationalists, leftists and Islamists, with a cross-generational base with 
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both veterans and inexperienced activists (El-Mahdi, 2009, p. 1013). What 
kept the factions of Kefaya together was the least-common-denominator goal; 
indeed, the aim of the group was to reform rather than control the state. In 
contrast to the MB, Kefaya adopted a confrontational strategy, and it became 
the first cross-ideological movement since 1984 (Clarke, 2011).  
In this regard, Kefaya’s manifesto consciously avoided clear political 
statements; instead, it was focused on the improvement of civil and human 
rights (Clarke, 2011, pp. 406–407). The core of Kefaya’s committee was 
composed of political forces not officially recognised by the state except the 
liberal Al-Ghad party, which was a spin-off from the Wafd party; other forces 
were the Marxist Revolutionary Socialists, the Nasserist Karama Party, and 
Islamist forces like the spin-off Wasat and Labour Party (El-Mahdi, 2009, p. 
1019; Clarke, 2011). Although members of other opposition parties were part 
of Kefaya on an individual basis, other official parties like Al-Tagammu, Al-
Wafd and the Nasserist party did not join Kefaya and kept their distance from 
the movement (Shorbagy, 2007; Clarke, 2011). In this regard, the MB youth 
asked the Guidance Bureau for permission to participate under the name of 
the Brotherhood Youth, but the leadership declined, allowing the youth to 
participate on an individual basis only while the organisation remained neutral 
(Wickham, 2013, p. 160).  
In this way, the MB youth were crucial to connect the Brotherhood with other 
revolutionary movements on the ground (Wickham, 2013, p. 162). This 
connection turned out to be useful when the US pressured Mubarak to 
liberalise elections in 2005. It allowed the MB to build on the first phase of the 
war of manoeuvre that the MB youth had undertaken with the other 
revolutionary movements. As a result, in 2005 the MB reached 88 (20%) seats 
in parliament, which is an impressive result considering that the MB contested 
only for one-third of the parliamentary seats (Shehata, 2010, p. 52; Al-Anani, 
2015, p. 530; Ranko, 2015, pp. 157–160). This promising result of the joint 
strategies of the war of manoeuvre and the war of position provoked the 
reaction of the state which manifested in a major crackdown on the MB and 
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Kefaya, with new waves of arrests in 2006, 2007, and 2010 (Al-Anani, 2015, 
p. 530; Ranko, 2015, pp. 163–165).  
The efforts of Kefaya’s mobilisation were focused on direct confrontation 
with the superstructural political institutions; in fact, Kefaya engaged in political 
demands like ‘no re-election, no to a new mandate, and no inheritance of the 
presidency’ (Oweidat et al., 2008, p. 8; Abdelrahman, 2015, pp. 36–37). 
Kefaya focused on three main institutional changes within political society: a 
constitutional referendum in May 2005; the presidential election in September 
2005; and parliamentary elections in November 2005 (Clarke, 2011). The 
strength of Kefaya emerged in targeting the regime in the person of Mubarak, 
which created a specific goal for the movement – as a Kefaya activist stated, 
‘We were not working against the police or for economic reasons. We were 
aiming just to remove Hosni Mubarak.’ (Medhat Fayez quote in Kennedy, 
2017, p. 31) However, its weakness was its inability to trigger a war of position 
within civil society. In fact, it was not able ‘to rebuild democratic institutions in 
villages and cities, trade unions, labour unions, and local assemblies’ 
(Mohamed Sayed Said quote in Oweidat et al., 2008, p. 39).  
Kefaya succeeded in increasing awareness across different sectors of 
society, from well-educated unemployed youth to farmers, from professionals 
such as engineers, doctors and journalists to judges (Oweidat et al., 2008). 
This success came from the use of a specific strategy to mobilise people. 
Primarily it documented corruption and brutality through recording and 
monitoring abuse, using blogs to share evidence and appealing to prominent 
media (such as Al Jazeera, BBC and CNN) to reach the international 
community (Oweidat et al., 2008).  
Kefaya’s short life was determined by several factors. First of all, it was 
unable to react to state repression, as it did not attempt to produce an 
alternative discourse to the state propaganda. Indeed, the regime repressed 
the movement by arresting, beating and torturing activists, as well as 
conducting street aggression. The immediate result of these repressive 
strategies was the decrease of numbers attending Kefaya protests (Oweidat 
et al., 2008). In addition, the government amended the constitution to ensure 
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it could continue to violate human rights like personal freedoms without the 
need to call a state of emergency (Human Rights Watch, 2008; Oweidat et al., 
2008, p. 30). In conjunction with this repressive state strategy, the state-
controlled media used propaganda against the movement. Anti-democratic 
discourses were spread by a pro-regime elite that portrayed democracy as a 
threat to stability and unity (Oweidat et al. 2008, p. 37). The different ideological 
components of Kefaya had to agree on the terms of their cooperation, but the 
cooperation did not mean these forces were willing to reconcile or reconsider 
their own goals. In fact, secular and Islamist activists contrasted over the role 
of religion (Oweidat et al., 2008; Abdelrahman, 2015, p. 92). Last, but not least, 
Kefaya faced financial challenges. It was supported by individual donations 
that ultimately were insufficient (Oweidat et al., 2008).  
Although Kefaya dissolved due to internal and external factors, the fact that 
its actions strengthened the cohesion of various social forces by attempting to 
formalise their demands should not be underestimated. Indeed ‘Kefays’s 
boldness and activism’ inspired the formation of other movements to pressure 
for reforms (Shehata, 2010, p. 69). In this regard, Kefaya met the three 
components needed to be classified as a leading force - confrontational lead, 
togetherness, and achievement. In fact it was confrontational and set a specific 
goal – the ‘no re-election’ and ‘no inheritance of the presidency’ which resulted 
in the removal of Mubarak. To some extent it could be argued that Kefaya was 
also able to gather a wide range of political positions; this was the base for 
further mobilisations that were set by April 6.  
 
April 6 and the war of manoeuvre against economic structure  
Kefaya dissolved at the peak of the workers’ mobilisation. This was a 
missed opportunity to join political and economic struggles. The strike of 
24,000 workers in at Misr Spinning and Weaving Company in Mahalla Al-
Kubra in December 2006 boosted the war of manoeuvre because it introduced 
new forms of collective action. In fact, the Mahalla strike was the only strike 
that ended with negotiation instead of brutal repression (Alexander and 
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Bassiouny, 2014, pp. 102–103). This increased the frequency of protests and 
the number of participants. By the end of 2009, the war of manoeuvre of the 
workers’ movement was marked by 1.7 million workers becoming involved in 
strike action (El-Mahdi, 2011, pp. 387–388). This phenomenon was not limited 
to specific geographical areas, but covered multiple sites, as well as spilling 
over into other sectors (Alexander and Bassiouny, 2014, pp. 106–107). The 
spillover of the activism, not only within the textile sector but also to other 
sectors like public transport, cement, and tax collecting, reflected the growth 
of class consciousness (El-Mahdi, 2011, p. 393). The workers' movement in 
Mahalla not only pushed for economic demands but turned them into political 
actions like resignation from the state-controlled textile workers’ union in March 
2007 and demanding the resignation of corrupt leaders of the union (El-Mahdi, 
2011, p. 392).  
A similar pattern, but still distant from the workers’ movement, was the 
development of professional associations like democratic engineers who 
unionised with the aim of establishing an engineering syndicate independent 
from state control, similar to the March 9th Group for Academic Freedom which 
aimed to ensure academic freedom from regime control over students’ union 
elections, appointing academics and approval of guest lectures (Abdelrahman, 
2012, p. 616). The war of manoeuvre of the workers was also supported by 
young MB members with the approval of the leadership, which remained 
distant (Wickham, 2013, p. 157; Ranko, 2015, pp. 170–171).  
The disappearance of Kefaya left a void filled by the newest generation of 
activists, the very same ones who engaged in politics for the first time in the 
early 2000s, and who with Kefaya had had their first organised political 
experience. The April 6 Movement aimed to bridge the war of manoeuvre over 
structural political demands started by Kefaya and the war of manoeuvre of 
workers over economic struggles. The movement was founded by a group of 
young activists to express solidarity with the workers’ strike of Mahalla Al-
Kurba on 6th April 2008. These activists were affiliated to Al-Ghad and Labour 
parties, including Esraa Abdel Fattah, member of Al-Ghad, and Ahmed Maher, 
former head of Al-Ghad’s youth committee (Shehata, 2012; Hafez, 2013; 
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Durac, 2015, pp. 246–247). Maher became the first general coordinator of the 
movement, which adopted a structure similar to Kefaya’s organisation, with the 
election of the general coordinator, sub-coordinators, and a number of 
committees (Shehata, 2012). The main focus of the group was mostly 
economic demands such as addressing unemployment and slowing down the 
rising price of primary goods, as well as increasing the minimum wage 
(Shehata, 2012, pp. 111–112). 
Similarly to Kefaya, April 6 had direct confrontation with the regime; 
however, April 6 developed new tactics to allow the war of manoeuvre to still 
be confrontational, but protected from state repression. In fact, with the use of 
social media April 6 avoided street repression in favour of cyberspace’s 
protection, and this allowed the movement to spread alternative discourses 
challenging the dominant propaganda (Shehata, 2012). For the first time, April 
6 started an embryonic war of position. The movement grew mainly on the 
virtual network of Facebook, seemingly developing spontaneously around 
webpages, and it framed its actions by using non-violent activities like civil 
disobedience and by networking with other transnational social movements. 
April 6 turned its economic demands into a more formalised systemic demand, 
along with other movements supporting the candidacy and campaign of El-
Baradei for the presidential election scheduled for late 2011, as an alternative 
to Hosni and Gamal Mubarak (Shehata, 2012). This stresses how an 
understanding of the war of manoeuvre as a variety of non-violent political 
action is complementary to the war of position and can facilitate its start. 
 However, the repression of regime surveillance ultimately limited the 
activists of the movement; given the limited space of manoeuvre that the 
regime left to any opposition movement, April 6 called for a protest on the same 
day as the public holiday of the armed forces (Frontile PBS, 2011). Finally, 
April 6, like Kefaya, was based on the loose common goal (Shehata, 2012). 
Nevertheless, it achieved reaching out to different elements of the subaltern 
forces – across social classes and ideologies, towards groups like workers, 
unemployed middle class, leftists and Islamists – to disrupt the balance with 
the dominant forces. This imbalance ultimately became manifested in January 
                                                          Subalternity and Counter-Revolution 
  131 
2011. The chapter that follows addresses how the subaltern forces – the MB 
and the revolutionary movements – failed to unite the war of position and war 
of manoeuvre. This created the basis for the hegemonic crisis to turn away 
from a revolutionary outcome, and develop as a counter-revolution.  
 
4.3 Conclusion  
This chapter has analysed the transformation of the Egyptian state along 
with the agency of dominant allied and subaltern forces. Since Nasser, the 
Egyptian state progressively dis-integrated the subaltern social forces at a 
different level; contrary to other interpretations (Roccu, 2012; De Smet, 2016; 
Kennedy, 2017), Egypt did not undergo a passive revolution which implied 
structural transformations that culminated in the formation of an integral state. 
Rather, the constant dis-integration of the subaltern forces from the state 
determined the failure of this transformation and determined the manifestation 
of the crisis of hegemony. Kefaya as April 6 developed following the pattern 
discussed by Gramsci – organisation, leadership, and autonomy (see 3.1.3). 
In fact, Kefaya progressed from the formation of its own political demands 
within the old framework to the formation of a movement with the potential to 
become a proper political party, whereas April 6 progressed the development 
of subaltern autonomy. Nevertheless, the revolution failed because the phase 
of autonomy did not follow the pattern of ‘political formations that assert 
complete autonomy’ (Gramsci, 1996, p. 91) to the subaltern forces.  
The latent crisis of hegemony was generated by the neoliberal system 
implemented by Sadat in the 1970s because it shifted the balance between 
dominant and subaltern forces, as well as within each bloc. The transformation 
from passivity to the activity of the subaltern forces was the result of structural 
changes due to the implementation of neoliberal policy which divided the 
subaltern forces since some groups like the MB gained from the liberalisation, 
while other like workers paid the price of austerity. Further complexity was 
added by a generational conflict between the 1970s generation and the youth 
that, similar to the workers, were affected by unemployment without being 
absorbed by the bureaucratic apparatus. The transformation from passivity to 
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activity went through four main phases that had different social actors as main 
protagonists and therefore became unable to establish any counter-
hegemonic bloc. Neoliberalism was not a form of passive revolution because 
it dis-integrated the subaltern forces from the state allowing them to become 
active and capitalised on their autonomy to challenge the hegemony of the 
dominant force. Otherwise, if neoliberalism was a form of passive revolution, 
the presence of the crisis of hegemony would mark the failure of the passive 
revolution.  
At the dominant level, relations of the dominant forces shifted due to 
controls over the mode both of production and coercion. In fact, if the military 
expanded within the civilian economy, that came at the cost of being relegated 
to the margin of power, especially when the military had to face limitations on 
the economy vis-à-vis the new emerging business elite, and of coercion, with 
the reinforcing of the police and intelligence as competing security 
apparatuses. 25th January was the manifestation of the crisis of hegemony 
generated by the dis-integration of the subaltern forces from the state and by 
the marginalisation of the dominant force who initially integrated the subaltern. 
The subaltern forces that demanded the fall of Mubarak targeted primarily the 
state; in such demands the military saw the opportunity to regain its dominant 
position by exploiting the grievances of the protesters but not fully meeting their 
demands. The next chapter will address the first phase post-2011, addressing 
the dominance of the SCAF and the fragmentation of subaltern forces, with the 
emerging of the MB as an allied force of the new dominant force. The dis-
integration of the subaltern allowed them to exploit pockets of autonomy within 
the civil society. Outside the hegemony of the state the subaltern forces 
developed their autonomy and the fragile complementary leadership of Kefaya 
and 6 April allowed the crisis of hegemony to manifest. However, since the 
leading force of the subaltern was not the most advanced force of the 
subaltern, the crisis turned into morbid symptoms. 
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The previous chapter highlighted how the manifestation of the hegemonic 
crisis in Egypt was the result of the state dis-integration that started in the 
1970s and allowed different social groups – the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), 
workers and youth movements – to exploit uncontrolled spaces within civil 
society to advance the war of position and the war of manoeuvre. The purpose 
of this chapter is to investigate how the interaction between the military, the 
MB, and the revolutionary forces determined the transformation of the 
Egyptian state and the crisis resolution. As discussed in Chapter Three, the 
hegemonic crisis can be resolved in various ways depending on the integration 
of the state and the development and control of subaltern forces of autonomy 
within civil society. The more the subaltern social groups are integrated within 
the state, the more likely it is that the dominant force will undertake passive 
revolution as a form of crisis resolution. At the opposite extreme, in the case 
of a non-integral state, the autonomy of subaltern forces within civil society 
would allow social groups to take down the non-integral state via a war of 
position, a war of manoeuvre and underground war. This would allow the 
hegemonic crisis to be resolved into a revolution. State integration and dis-
integration should not be considered as a dummy variable. Instead, they are 
the extremes of a continuum that contains several potential outcomes. In other 
words, in the case of a semi-integral state the hegemonic crisis turns into what 
Gramsci called morbid symptoms – a middle-ground situation between two 
extremes of revolution and passive revolution. Gramsci defines morbid 
symptoms as a condition when the old system – a semi-integral state in crisis 
due to the lack of an allied force to connect with civil society – is dying, and the 
new order – because of a temporary unity that cannot be translated into 
concrete structural and superstructural transformation – cannot be born. In 
Subalternity and Counter-Revolution 
134   
other words, the state transforms due to the persistence of an old system that 
intertwines with some features of the new order.  
This was the case in the aftermath of the Egyptian Uprising which ultimately 
shaped the counter-revolution. The promising revolutionary beginnings of the 
Egyptian Uprising – marked by the successful resignation of Mubarak and the 
possibility of political changes – soon drifted into forms of morbid symptoms, 
because the two main strategies – war of manoeuvre and war of position – that 
allowed the manifestation of the hegemonic crisis separated, and the two main 
actors – the MB and the revolutionary movements – that mastered these 
strategies continued their war of position and manoeuvre, but did not always 
coordinate. The unity of these strategies is crucial for the subaltern bloc to 
oppose the dominant force; in fact, only when the war of manoeuvre and the 
war of position were united did the MB and the revolutionary forces manage to 
push back the attempt of the military to further restrict the access of the political 
structure to revolutionary forces. In this regard, the military attempted to regain 
full control of the state by controlling the political and economic structure. In 
order to transform the semi-integral state, the dominant forces have to 
reconnect with civil society via an allied force. In this regard the military’s 
priority in the immediate aftermath of Mubarak’s resignation was to connect 
with civil society via the support of a suitable allied force.  
This chapter investigates the relations between the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces (SCAF), the MB and revolutionary movements that were 
involved in the transformation of the state, from the uprising triggered in 25th 
January 2011 to the presidential victory of the Islamist candidate Mohamed 
Morsi in June 2012. Drawing from the findings of the previous chapter, this 
chapter argues that the military exploited the manifestation of the crisis to force 
Mubarak to resign due to growing popular pressure, and this gave the 
opportunity to the military to turn from a marginalised position of the vanishing 
dominant bloc to a new emerging dominant (classe dominante in Gramsci’s 
terms). In this regard, the semi-integral Egyptian state undertook 
transformation to reflect the dominance of the new force. In other words, in 
order to maintain its renewed dominance, the military needed to develop 
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hegemony over the state political superstructure and economic structure. The 
partial control of the Egyptian economy, as well as the existence of the informal 
economy, forced the dominant force to seek the support of intermediary forces. 
During this phase the military allied with the MB, since the Brotherhood 
controlled portions of society but was not in the position to become a counter-
hegemonic force to challenge the dominance of the military; because the MB 
was the most advanced force, it was not the leading force (dirigente in 
Gramsci’s terms) of the uprising. In fact, the MB focused on its own war of 
position to reach state institutions and kept its distance from the war of 
manoeuvre of street protests that targeted the SCAF and demanded the end 
of military rule.  
 
5.1 The Egyptian military emerges as a dominant 
force  
The hegemonic crisis in a semi-integral state allowed the confrontation of 
the dominant and subaltern blocs over the control of economic structure and 
political superstructure. Hegemony is exercised by consent and coercion. The 
war of manoeuvre and the underground war are strategies to oppose the 
coercive power of the dominant force, while the war of position serves as a 
strategy to build counter-hegemony consent.  
The dominant forces attempted to use the existing structure of political 
consent via control of institutions and coercive apparatus to maintain their 
dominance. The clashes between a persisting dominant force and 
intermediary forces that operate in autonomous civil society determined the 
dynamics of the morbid symptoms. The contrasts between the old and new 
orders derive from the competition of the dominant and intermediary force over 
political institutions, control of coercion, and economic structure. The fact that 
the subaltern bloc separated its strategies enabled the military to control the 
political superstructure to contrast with the MB war of position, while the 
military contrasted with the war of manoeuvre of protesters and revolutionary 
movements on the terrain of coercion. Finally, the control of the economic 
structure represented the battlefield between the military’s economic empire – 
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which needed to safeguard its privileges and at the same time be used to 
generate consent of the lower strata of society – and the MB – which attempted 
to develop the economic initiative of the private sectors to gather consent for 
economic development led by the MB within the private sector. Therefore the 
military as the new dominant force needed to secure hegemony in each of 
these areas.  
 
5.1.1 Failed attempt of passive revolution  
Many scholars quickly deemed that the transition period that followed the 
resignation of Mubarak withered as a form of counter-revolution or passive 
revolution. In fact, on the one hand, the assumption that the transition period 
after Mubarak was a ‘conservative coup aimed at preserving the old regime 
with the support of the Muslim Brotherhood’ (Achcar, 2016, p. 105, emphasis 
in original) addresses the MB as ‘Islamic fundamentalist’, opposing the 
development of democracy. Addressing the MB as such, firstly, undermines 
the distance that the MB drew between the more radical violent movement and 
its renewed aim of democratic political reforms, such as electoral reforms and 
addressing corruption and police brutality instead of preaching the Islamisation 
of society (Kennedy, 2017, p. 33); secondly, it does not reflect on the fact that 
although constitutional reforms favoured the MB over poorly organised 
revolutionary movements, the victory of the MB in presidential and 
parliamentary elections was under free and fair elections. Thus Egyptian 
citizens for the first time experienced democratic elections. On the other hand, 
the argument that the transition period was a form of passive revolution due to 
the exclusion of subaltern forces which allowed the military and the MB to 
stage a ‘counter-revolution in democratic form’ (De Smet, 2016, p. 209) 
reduces the Muslim Brotherhood to a bourgeoisie force. 
Although the MB is ideologically conservative, addressing it as a counter-
revolutionary force because among the leadership there are business people 
that advocated the independence of the private sector disregards the 
relevance of work that the MB did within civil society in terms of welfare and 
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improving services for the members of professional syndicates that they 
controlled. In contrast, this section argues that if ever a passive revolution 
happened in Egypt it was short lived and undermined because of the very 
same reason that led the military to force Mubarak’s resignation: the lead of 
the dominant bloc. The SCAF aimed to verify if it had the support of other 
forces. The SCAF was cautious in dealing with cronies. Before acting against 
them the SCAF needed to enlarge the support and reinforce the unity of the 
military, to buy the support of the other generals by ensuring that the 
transitional government appointed retired officers in the public sectors; at the 
same time, decree law 45 of 2011 granted immunity from prosecution in civil 
courts to officers accused of corruption (Abul-Magd, 2015, pp. 60–61, 2016, p. 
32). Another attempt to keep the dominant bloc unified emerged from the fact 
that the SCAF had a relaxed and still-contained attitude towards Mubarak who 
was initially guaranteed freedom in Sharm el Sheikh, until the clashes of late 
June 2011 (Selim, 2015). On the same note, the SCAF, which previously 
allowed the NDP to keep dominant local councils, after these events dissolved 
all local councils through the State Council’s Administrative Court order (Selim, 
2015). 
In order to confront the subaltern bloc, the military attempted to strengthen 
the perishing dominant force and retake the lead from it. Initially the SCAF 
attempted to gain the support of cronies, as the case of Rashid Mohamed 
Rashid, Minister of Trade and Industry, and Yousef Boutros Ghali, Minister of 
Finance. Rashid was a prominent businessman with links to multinational 
corporations. He was SCAF’s first choice as prime minister after Mubarak’s 
resignation. However, following Rashid’s refusal of the premiership offer, he 
was immediately accused and convicted in abstentia. Yousef Boutros Ghali, 
and many other businessmen linked to the NDP, shared a similar destiny; they 
were convicted in June 2011 (Springborg, 2011a, p. 97). This strategy was 
directly to galvanise the masses and boost the military’s popularity, and at the 
same time intimidate crony capitalists close to Mubarak (Springborg, 2011a, 
p. 98). A similar strategy involved the arrest of businessmen like Ahmed Ezz 
and Ibrahim Sulayman; the SCAF ensured the protection of their interests to 
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reduce the control of the crony capitalists over the economic structure. At the 
same time a direct attack on the crony capitalists – who were the main target 
of the protests’ anger – was the attempt from the military to gather protesters’ 
consent. In fact, other business people close to the military were allowed to 
carry on with their business (Marshall and Stacher, 2012). Arguably, the SCAF 
initially attempted to create an alliance with the cronies, no longer now as the 
leader of the dominant bloc. Since the military’s attempt to unite the dominant 
bloc failed, in order to pre-empt further convergence between the war of 
manoeuvre of revolutionary movements and the war of position of the MB, the 
military had to seek a way to control a different part of civil society. In this way 
the cooperation between the military as a dominant force and the MB as an 
allied force served this purpose and it shaped the transformation of the state 
because it allowed the MB to access political society.  
The next section addresses the military’s need to recruit an intermediary 
force. Since the tentative passive revolution of the military failed, they needed 
to neuter the war of position and the war of manoeuvre of the subaltern force. 
 
5.1.2 Contrasting war of manoeuvre  
The manifestation of the hegemonic crisis also requires specific analysis of 
the use of coercion and its symbolic representation. The military had to face 
the impetus of the unorganised youth movement’s war of manoeuvre, an 
ambiguous war of position of the MB which moderated over time but never 
completely abandoned its aim of reaching power (Stein, 2012; Brownlee, 
Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, pp. 105–106). The call for protests on the day of 
the 25th January was chosen for its symbolic meaning. In fact, 25th January 
was declared National Police Day in 2009, to commemorate the effort of the 
police against the British occupation in 1952 in Ismailia (Ismail, 2012, p. 435). 
Anger towards police brutality built up for years due to the abuses that police 
perpetrated under the emergency law, involving arbitrary arrests, 
disappearances, torture and death in custody. Emblematic remains the case 
of Khaled Said, a young activist of Alexandria, who was beaten to death for 
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uploading a video on YouTube testifying to police brutality in June 2010. His 
death became the symbol of police brutality and the webpage ‘We are all 
Khaled Said’ reflected the dissatisfaction of Egyptian youth (Abdelrahman, 
2015, pp. 46–47). The second call for protest was on Friday 28th January 2011 
– the ‘Friday of anger’ – which symbolised the police as the target of the 
protesters’ anger (Ketchley, 2017a, pp. 27–28).  
As discussed in Chapter Four, the military was slowly sidelined in favour of 
crony capitalists within the NDP and other competitive security apparatuses. 
For this reason, the military saw in the 25th January uprising the chance to 
regain the dominance of the country. When the uprising seemed to gain 
momentum, the military saw the opportunity to regain power against the crony 
capitalists and police (Kandil, 2012a, pp. 228–229). To disassociate from the 
cronies and police and to gain the support of protesters the military portrayed 
themselves as supporters of the ‘people’; allegedly the military Minister of 
Defence ordered troops to not fire (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 1). 
Arguably to avoid the defection of ranks who potentially had access to 
weapons, the military declared it would not have used force against protesters. 
In addition to the threats on the borders with Gaza, Sudan and Libya, the 
withdrawal of the police from the street forced the military to deal with domestic 
security, performing daily policing duties like dealing with in sit-ins and strikes 
including those at military factories that paralysed the economy as well 
(International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 20). 
The coercion of the military was further challenged by the patchy presence 
of the baltagiya which reinforced the sense of insecurity and danger within the 
country. This ongoing feeling of insecurity did not only affect Egyptian 
everyday life, but it also jeopardised the state economic structure, making 
difficult the recovery of economic activities such as tourism, production and 
export (Springborg, 2011a, p. 97). In this way, the military had to contrast with 
the war of manoeuvre of the revolutionary movement in order to move on with 
the transformation of the economic structure. In this regard, the military 
reaction to the war of manoeuvre was demeaning to the dignity of protesters 
and was accompanied by divisive rhetoric. 
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The initial phase of the Egyptian Uprising, namely the 18 days between the 
start of the protests on 25th of January – the police day – and the resignation 
of Mubarak on 11th February, was considered relatively peaceful compared to 
countries like Libya, Syria and Yemen, where there were violent conflicts. 
Nevertheless, 840 people were killed and over 6,000 were injured by thugs 
and security forces, and other activists were detained and tortured or subjected 
to disappearance – human rights activists, journalists, bloggers and doctors 
were the first targets of this repression (Amnesty International, 2012c, pp. 9–
12). This reflects the increasing control of direct repression by the military 
which ensured the same coercive pressure over society by keeping 
emergency law, and kept charging civilians before military courts (International 
Crisis Group, 2012, p. 2).  
The military opposed the war of manoeuvre of the protesters easily since 
the protesters did not undertake any form of underground war to escalate and 
properly contrast the coercion of the military. The protesters failed to challenge 
the military and, paradoxically, fraternised with the military; on the one hand to 
avoid repression, on the other to attempt to divide the security apparatuses 
(Ketchley, 2017a, pp. 46–77). In order to keep its dominant position in a semi-
integral state the military had to use its hegemony – as consent and coercion 
– to reintegrate different social forces within the state. This means that the 
military had to contrast both the war of position and war of manoeuvre as well 
as recreating the economic condition to reintegrate the subalterns within the 
state.  
In March 2011 the military police captured protesters in Tahrir Square and 
subsequently tortured them at the Museum of Egyptian Antiquities by beating 
and whipping them and giving them electric shocks. Protesters were 
interrogated by military prosecution in prison and summarily sentenced to up 
to seven days in prison; however, they were detained for two months (Amnesty 
International, 2011, pp. 25–26). In the same circumstances, 18 women were 
detained, beaten, given electric shocks and called prostitutes. They were 
forced to undress and were subjected to a ‘virginity test’. Threatened with a 
charge of prostitution if they were found not to be virgins, the women arrested 
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were charged with destroying private and public property, disorderly conduct, 
obstructing traffic and possession of weapons (Amnesty International, 2011, 
p. 26). Such a violation of human dignity and abuse was justified by a military 
general as protecting the reputation of the military; he argued ‘[w]e didn't want 
them to say we had sexually assaulted or raped them, so we wanted to prove 
that they weren't virgins in the first place’ (Amin, 2011; Amnesty International, 
2011, p. 27). He addressed these women as not honourable, arguing that they 
‘were not like your daughter or mine. These were girls who had camped out in 
tents with male protesters’ (Amin, 2011; Amnesty International, 2011, p. 27). 
The attack against protesters was not limited to violent clashes during 
protests but escalated to trials to contain the war of manoeuvre. According to 
Human Rights Watch (HRW), the number of civilians sentenced in military 
trials in the aftermath of the uprising was higher than the total sentenced during 
Mubarak’s rule (Selim, 2015). In fact, by August 2011 the military judiciary 
declared that 12,000 civilians had been tried before military courts since 28th 
January 2011. The charges were for ‘thuggery’, damaging of public and private 
property, rape and possession of weapons, insulting the military and violating 
the curfew. Sentences went from imprisonment to death (Amnesty 
International, 2011, p. 29).  
Finally, to ensure that the war of manoeuvre did not reinforce the war of 
position which takes root within civil society institutions, the military 
systematically targeted NGOs involved in protecting human rights and the 
freedom of expression of newspapers and the TV, and it arrested prominent 
activists. In fact, the SCAF attacked forms of war of manoeuvre like informal 
political participation such as protests, sit-ins and strikes, but also broke that 
link with civil society organisations that attempted to spread counter-
hegemonic ideas like the protection of human rights. Semi-institutionalised 
organisations and groups – like the April 6 Movement, Cairo Institute of Human 
Rights Studies (CIHRS), the El Nadeem Center for the Rehabilitation of 
Victims of Violence, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and the Hisham 
Mubarak Law Center – were declared illegal based on the allegation of 
receiving unauthorised foreign funds. In contrast, funds derived from Arab Gulf 
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donors to Islamist movements remained free of surveillance by the SCAF and 
it allowed the Islamists to have a wider range of financial support (Selim, 2015). 
Intimidation based on a restriction of freedom of expression increased towards 
newspaper and TV broadcasters. Dina Abdel Rahman – presenter of Dream 
TV – was fired because she criticised the armed forces while arguing with a 
former air force officer during a live show (Amnesty International, 2011, p. 11). 
Newspaper Sawt Al-Omma and magazine Rose El Youssef were both 
prevented from printing articles critical of the intelligence services (Amnesty 
International, 2011, pp. 11–12).  
In order to reinforce their hegemony and prevent the threat of the war of 
manoeuvre sowing the seed of the formation of a war of position of the 
revolutionary forces, the SCAF needed also to control the state political 
institutions dedicated to the control of coercion, by shaping the reforms of 
police and judiciary. First of all, the Minister of Interior, Mansour el-Essawy, 
was considered as an independent since he had not served in the government 
under Mubarak; however, he served as a top-ranking officer within the ministry. 
The Minister of Justice, Abdel Aziz al-Gindi, was closely linked with Mamdouh 
Marei (August 2006–March 2011), chosen by Mubarak after the 2005 election 
to purge the judges who acted independently to monitor the fairness of the 
elections (Springborg, 2011a, p. 96).  
In a more institutionalised way, in March 2011 participating in any activity 
that would ‘disrupt the work of public institutions or public authorities, or harm 
national unity and public security and order’ was criminalised by military decree 
n. 34 (later Law n. 34 of 2011) (HRW, 2012, pp. 16–23; Selim, 2015, p. 184). 
The penal code was amended by the SCAF: law 7 of 2011 added two articles 
that criminalised ‘hooliganism, terrorism and thuggery’. If any of these actions 
occurred with a crime of murder, the offender was sentenced to death. In April 
2011 the SCAF also extended the death penalty to rape in cases where the 
victim was underage; this applied also to offenders who were underage 
(Amnesty International, 2011, p. 34).  
The SCAF prosecuted activists and journalists for spreading ‘false news’. 
Many activists and journalists like Bothaina Kamel, founder of Shayfeencom, 
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were interrogated by military prosecutors for criticising the military; Hossam Al-
Hamalawy and Nabil Sharaf Al-Din were interrogated following their criticism 
of the military and the suggestion of a military deal with the MB (Amnesty 
International, 2011, p. 10). April 6 activists were targeted as well; Asmaa 
Mahfouz was detained for insulting the military and inciting violence, while 
Sherif Al-Rouby was detained and interrogated regarding the funding of the 
movement (Amnesty International, 2011, p. 10). Other activists like Alaa Abdel 
Fattah and Bahaa Saber faced military trials and were charged with inciting 
violence against the armed forces during the Maspero massacre. In addition, 
Alaa Abdel Fattah was also charged with stealing weapons and detained for 
15 days. This was a clear attack on the most prominent critic of the SCAF 
(Amnesty International, 2011, p. 11). Nevertheless, all of this did not stop the 
embryonic war of position of the revolutionary forces, which continued to 
demand clearly and loudly the transfer of power to civilian authority.  
 
5.1.3 The military contrasting war of position  
The war of position of the subaltern forces serves to secure key posts of 
power within civil society. In order to reach political power the subaltern forces 
need to expand the war of position to political institutions as well. In this regard, 
during the stage of morbid symptoms the dominant force attempts to control 
political power by preventing the success of the war of position of the subaltern 
forces in reaching political institutions.  
The emergence of the military as a dominant force derived from its ability to 
shape the transition period, and from its control of the state political 
superstructure to prevent the success of the war of position of intermediary 
forces like the MB which, as addressed in the previous chapter, had mastered 
the war of position to capitalise on portions of civil society. In February 2011, 
after Mubarak’s resignation, the SCAF led by the Minister of Defence – 
Mohamed Tantawi – and composed of 20 other senior military officers, took 
the lead in the transition process. After Mubarak’s resignation, the SCAF soon 
assumed both executive and legislative power, dissolving the parliament and 
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suspending the constitution of 1971 (Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, 
p. 105).  
The MB was not the only force to use the war of position; other revolutionary 
forces like April 6 attempted to initiate a war of position against the military, 
which remained ineffective given the lack of experience of the group. In this 
regard, the military easily refused to meet the demands of the protesters who 
called for an interim government of national salvation. The April 6 Movement 
posed a clear demand to reform state political institutions; the Revolutionary 
Youth Council – an umbrella organisation that gathered various social forces 
that took active action in the 2011 war of manoeuvre, such as the April 6 
Movement, the MB youth and the Campaign for Supporting El-Baradei, 
along with others (El Amrani, 2012; Abdalla, 2016, p. 47) – demanded the 
destruction of Mubarak’s power structure, from the removal of political figures 
close to Mubarak, like Ahmed Shafiq, his last prime minister, to dismantling 
the secret police. In fact, in February 2011 they demanded Mubarak should 
step down. Calls also came to dissolve the national assembly and the senate 
and, most relevant, to establish a national salvation group to form a coalition 
government and be responsible for drafting a new constitution (Jadaliyya, 
2011).  
The SCAF only met the demands that fitted its interests; it made sure that 
power did not pass into the hands of Ahmad Fathi Sorour, an NDP leader and 
speaker of the People’s Assembly – as prescribed by article 84 of the 1971 
constitution (Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, p. 105; Bassiouni, 2017, 
p. 81). The intention of the military to stay above civil scrutiny and to maintain 
its privileges was made clear by General Mamdouh Shahin, an SCAF member, 
while confronting the political party that the ‘special position’ of the military 
should be ensured regardless of the ‘whims of the president who might be a 
civilian’ (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 23). Contrary to the transfer pre-
2011 of the leading role of the subaltern bloc from Kefaya to April 6, post-2011 
was, rather, characterised by the inability of the leading force to materialise a 
war of position to establish any structural change beyond its immediate 
demands.  
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In contrast to the revolutionary youth movements, the continuation of the 
war of position by the MB was more successful, since it was able to use its 
influence. In fact, a delegation of the MB – the future President Morsi was part 
of this delegation – was invited by Vice President Omar Suleiman on 6th 
February 2011 to participate in a ‘national dialogue’ to solve the protest 
(Stacher, 2012b, p. 10; Wickham, 2013, p. 169). On 14th February 2011, 
constitutional amendments to seven articles of the 1971 constitution were 
introduced by an eight-member committee formed by the SCAF and led by 
Islamist judge Tariq al-Bishri, including members of the MB, like Subhi Saleh, 
and excluding other revolutionary forces (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 
13; Selim, 2015).  
These amendments resulted in prioritising elections over the constitution, 
regulating candidacy rules for presidential elections and limiting presidential 
powers. In this regard, the MB saw in the early election the possibility of 
capitalising on its war of position to access political institutions, since it 
managed to secure electoral victories under Mubarak (Brownlee, Masoud and 
Reynolds, 2015, p. 107). Nevertheless, the military introduced new structural 
barriers to discourage the war of position of the revolutionary forces in general 
and the MB in particular. In fact, the SCAF retained both legislative and 
executive powers until both parliament and president were elected. In March 
2011, despite the approved referendum on constitutional amendment, the 
SCAF unilaterally issued a ‘constitutional declaration’. This document kept the 
seven articles amended with the cooperation of the MB, plus another 54 new 
articles added after the referendum, one of which – article 56 – granted the 
SCAF both legislative and executive power (Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 
2015, p. 110; Selim, 2015; Bassiouni, 2017, p. 81).  
The SCAF acknowledged that the MB was the most advanced force within 
the subaltern bloc, and that if it decided to become confrontational with 
achievable demands that gathered the broad support of other social forces this 
would create the potential for the MB to become the leader of the subaltern 
bloc. At this early stage of the transition, the dominant force put in place 
strategies to prevent the war of position and the war of manoeuvre of the 
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subaltern forces. In fact, the constitutional referendum was very divisive for the 
subaltern bloc and the revolutionary forces, as the youth and seculars 
boycotted it (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 3). On the one hand, the MB 
enjoyed its grassroots organisation that was able to ensure considerable 
popular support. On the other hand, revolutionary forces complained that the 
new constitution could have resulted in the dictatorship of a temporary majority 
rather than having been the result of a confrontational and consensual process 
(Selim, 2015).  
The division of the subaltern forces does not mean that they were not 
organised or lacked agency to counterbalance the dominance of the military. 
Therefore it is difficult to sustain the thesis that the Egyptian Uprising was a 
form of passive revolution, since the subaltern were not passive during the 
transition period; rather, they acted in contradiction. One group protected the 
interests of the dominant force, while the other remained faithful to its values 
at the expense of pragmatic strategies. In this contest, Gramsci’s concept of 
subalternity fills the conceptual gaps that emerge by looking at the post-
uprising as an alternation of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary waves 
based on the ideological division of secular vs Islamist, where the access to 
political institutions is considered as the hijacking of the revolution by the MB; 
waves of social unrest like strikes, sit-ins and demonstrations are instead the 
manifestation of revolution (Achcar, 2016, pp. 105–106). This account 
overlooks how the parliamentary victory of the MB was an significant change 
in the Egyptian state, especially since in the parliamentary election in 2010 the 
MB’s seats dropped from 88 (in 2005) to 15 (Meital, 2006, p. 275; Dunne and 
Hamzawy, 2010).  
Instead, through the lens of subalternity – as the most advanced subaltern 
force – the MB managed to capitalise on the benefit of its war of position to 
reach political institutions, especially with the coordination of the war of 
manoeuvre. In fact, although the MB won 42% of seats during the 
parliamentary election, the performance at the presidential election was less 
significant. The first round of the election was on 23rd and 24th May 2012, 
when 13 candidates ran. The results saw Morsi gaining the majority with 25% 
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while Shafiq at 24% was a close second; Hamdeen Sabahi got a surprising 
21%, while Abdel Moneim Abul Foutoh received 17% of the vote thanks to the 
support of the Nour Party and the Wasat Party; finally, Amr Moussa got 11% 
of the votes (Ahram Online, 2012a; The Carter Center, 2012, p. 63; Brownlee, 
Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, pp. 118–119). At this point, on 16th and 17th 
June 2012, in the second round of the presidential election, Egyptians had to 
choose between the MB candidate Morsi or Shafiq – Mubarak’s minister of civil 
aviation from 2002 until he served as prime minister for the last two weeks of 
Mubarak’s presidency (Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, p. 118).  
Before the second round of the presidential election, the secular opposition, 
including Wael Ghoneim, creator of the Facebook page ‘We are all Khaled 
Said’; Ahmed Maher, founding member of April 6 Youth Movement; and writer 
and former member of Kefaya, Alaa Al Aswany, met at the Fairmont hotel in 
Heliopolis – a suburb of Cairo – to discuss their support for the MB candidate 
Morsi. When the SCAF on 18th June 2012 assumed both executive and 
legislative powers, the seculars asked Morsi to withdraw from the election; 
however, Morsi refused that possibility and the seculars decided to support 
Morsi against Shafiq. On that occasion, Ahmed Maher declared, ‘we were left 
no choice … Shafiq’s success would have symbolised the end of the 
revolution’, although not all pro-revolution groups agreed to support Morsi 
(Shukrallah, 2013). Morsi agreed with the secular opposition on forming a 
‘national salvation’ government, guaranteed that the prime minister would not 
be from the MB, and held regular meetings with the members of the Fairmont 
group – later renamed the National Front for the Salvation of the Revolution 
(Khorshid, 2013). Morsi appointed members of the Fairmont group like Sekina 
Fouad and Hamid Qandil in the presidential advisory team; however, he did 
not take into account their position nor keep regular meetings with the group 
as agreed, nor nominate a non-MB candidate as prime minister (Khorshid, 
2013; Shukrallah, 2013). With the electoral victory of the most advanced 
forces, the MB became the intermediary force able to connect political and civil 
society.  
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From this perspective, morbid symptoms emerge when a war of manoeuvre 
and a war of position are no longer coordinated, and, as the next chapter will 
discuss, the conflict between the war of position and the war of manoeuvre 
created fertile ground for the counter-revolution in terms of a military coup.  
 
5.2 Unity of war of position and war of manoeuvre  
During a hegemonic crisis within a semi-integral state, the convergence 
between a war of position and a war of manoeuvre is essential to counter the 
dominant force that resists holding on to the hegemonic power. Since the case 
of the Egyptian Uprising generated a power dynamic between three actors, as 
discussed in Chapter Three, the transformation of the Egyptian state and 
therefore the resolution of the hegemonic crisis depended on the interactions 
of these actors. The dominant force acts to oppose the two main strategies at 
the subalterns’ disposal – the war of position and the war of manoeuvre – to 
reach hegemonic power. However, as addressed in the previous chapter, the 
manifestation of the uprising was the result of the successful war of manoeuvre 
of revolutionary social movements and the war of position of the MB. The 
convergence of these strategies allowed the subaltern bloc to oppose the 
military, while, as the next chapter will discuss, the divergence and conflict of 
these strategies sowed the seed for the military coup. The increasing 
repression was the direct response of the military to the episodic unity of the 
subaltern forces, as in the cases of Maspero and Mohamed Mahmoud Street. 
Following the demolition of a church on 3rd October 2011 in Upper Egypt 
which was declared illegal by the local authority (Egypt Independent, 2011), a 
week later, on 9th October, the Copt community in Cairo organised a march 
from Shubra – the Coptic major district – to Tahrir Square. Once the protest 
reached the Maspero building – the building hosting state TV – allegedly, thugs 
started to attack protesters, and violence escalated when the security forces – 
military, riot police and a number of military police – joined the clashes, using 
military vehicles against protesters in addition to batons and bullets. The 
clashes resulted in 26 Copts, one Muslim and one military policemen dead 
(Amnesty International, 2012b, p. 11). Despite the Copt majority on the march, 
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youth movements joined the protesters, holding signs like ‘Muslims and 
Christians are one hand, Down With Military Rule, and Down with [Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces Chairman Mohamed Hussein] Tantawy’ 
(Abdellatif, 2011).  
The Maspero protest was the biggest demonstration since the events of 
25th January, representing the strength and significance of the war of 
manoeuvre. Similarly to the incident of ‘the virginity test’, the military continued 
to discredit the image of the protesters to avoid a situation where the war of 
manoeuvre could escalate and attract more and more protesters to join. In fact, 
state media framed the clashes with sectarian discourses, as well as 
emphasising the killing of security forces while failing to acknowledge the 
killing of protesters by the security forces, picturing the protesters as violent 
towards the institutions and calling ‘all honourable citizens’ to protect the 
military from the attack of an ‘unknown force’ (Chammah, 2012; Khalifa, 2014), 
whereas independent TV broadcasters like Alhurra and 25 January TV were 
raided by military police during the live coverage of the events (Amnesty 
International, 2012b, p. 14). The military crackdown continued after the events; 
in fact, 30 civilians – including Alaa Abdel Fattah – were detained and accused 
of inciting violence against the armed forces, assaulting security forces, 
stealing weapons and engaging in disorderly behaviour. No security personnel 
were investigated for the violence in Maspero (Amnesty International, 2011, 
2012b).  
Even more emblematic is the episode of Mohamed Mahmoud Street that 
occurred on 19th November 2011, which reflected the fear of the dominant 
forces towards the episodic unity of the subaltern forces. In November 2011, 
Ali Al Selmi – senior member of the Wafd party – in his role as deputy prime 
minister issued the ‘declaration of the fundamental principles of the new 
Egyptian state’, also known as the Selmi document. This 22-article document 
apparently inspired clashes with Islamist forces on the ‘secular’ character of 
the state (Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, p. 112). Most important, 
article 9 of the Selmi document guaranteed the military complete 
independence from civilian control (Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, p. 
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113). In fact, the document attempts to grant no restriction on military decisions 
on either strategic or financial matters, as well as elevating the SCAF to the 
rank of ‘protector of the constitutional legitimacy’, allowing the SCAF to freely 
intervene in the constitutional formation process (Selim, 2015).  
The MB, who so far had focused on pursuing its war of position to reach 
political institutions and rarely confronted the military, openly opposed the 
controversial Selmi document and threatened the SCAF with ‘unbearable 
consequences if they persisted in articulating these demands’ (Selim, 2015, p. 
186). The Islamists called for a demonstration against the Selmi document; the 
‘The Friday of One Demand’ saw the convergence of the war of position and 
the war of manoeuvre since the MB, Salafi, April 6, and Revolutionary 
Socialists stood against the military’s imposition of the Selmi document (Ahram 
Online, 2011). As a response, the security forces evicted the sit-in at Tahrir 
Square, which consequently triggered further protests against SCAF rule, 
pushing Tantawi to declare 30th June 2012 as the final date for the transition 
of power to civilian authority. Arguably, the withdrawal of the Selmi document 
represents the military fear of the episodic unity of the subaltern bloc.  
The protesters continued and echoed the demand of the Maspero protests, 
calling for the end of military rule and for an immediate transition of power to 
civilians, especially since the first round of elections was in three days. The 
MB, confident of its electoral victory, professed to abstain from the protest, 
distancing itself from the requests of the secular (International Crisis Group, 
2012, p. 6). Once the Selmi document was withdrawn, the senior MB withdrew 
from the clashes of Mohamed Mahmoud Street, letting the revolutionary youth 
as well as the young Brothers face the violence of the military and security 
forces – this generational split would be later exploited by the military post-
2013 as they attempted to gather the consent of youth via the Nation’s Future 
Party (see Chapter Seven) (Ryzova, 2011; Amnesty International, 2012a, pp. 
7–14; Selim, 2015). The General Security and Central Security Forces (CSF) 
attempted to crush protesters by using tear gas, batons, rubber bullets, 
shotgun pellets, and live ammunition targeting the eyes of protesters (Amnesty 
International, 2012a, pp. 7–8). Those arrested by the CSF were continually 
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beaten, sexually assaulted and spat on and insulted; while only one CSF 
officer was kept in preventive detention, 379 protesters were facing trial and 
charged with possession of weapons, damaging private and public property 
and assaulting public officials (Amnesty International, 2012a, p. 14). There 
were 51 deaths (Amnesty International, 2012a, p. 7).  
The Mohamed Mahmoud clashes addressed how the convergence of the 
war of position and the war of manoeuvre was successful in demanding a 
definitive date for the presidential elections, which the military had attempted 
to postpone indefinitely. When the MB used the war of manoeuvre with the 
support of the revolutionary social movements, the subaltern bloc succeeded 
in securing the transition via presidential elections. This was the only time the 
MB acted as a leading force of the subaltern: it was confrontational to the 
military in calling for protests; it had an achievable goal – the withdrawal of the 
Selmi document; and it brought together different social forces. However, 
when the MB achieved its goal, it abandoned the war of manoeuvre – 
regardless of its continuation by youth movements, including the MB’s own 
base. The withdrawal of the MB from the street marked its inability to retain 
any coercive competition vis-à-vis the military, thus keeping the MB unable to 
challenge the military alone. Another example of oscillation of the MB was 
during the presidential elections. Before the second round, the seculars met 
Morsi at the Fairmont Hotel and Morsi agreed to form a ‘national salvation’ 
government with them. However, once elected, Morsi disregarded the 
agreement (Khorshid, 2013; Shukrallah, 2013). By disowning the Fairmont 
agreement, the MB could infiltrate the institutions but it was slowly losing 
consent of the subaltern forces. Its lack of leadership would later be exploited 
by the military. 
To recap, during the early stage of the transition, the military failed to unite 
the dominant bloc, and the examples of convergence between the war of 
position and the war of manoeuvre weakened the hegemony of the military. To 
ensure its dominance it needed to divide the subaltern forces, not just to 
weaken the opposite bloc but also to ensure the support of an intermediary 
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force, to serve its dominance in order to expand its hegemony within civil 
society.  
 
5.3 Shaping the political structure – the MB as allied 
force  
As discussed earlier, the inability of the military to take the lead and reform 
the dominant bloc failed; this put the military in need an intermediary force to 
ally with it in order to reconnect with civil society, and in this regard the MB as 
the most advanced force was the top choice. However in order to do this, the 
military had to carefully lessen its strategy to restrict the war of position of the 
MB – giving it just enough space to access political society but not to become 
a significant threat – while at the same time it still prevented the revolutionary 
forces triggering a war of position alongside their successful war of 
manoeuvre. For this reason, since the MB did not have a war of manoeuvre of 
its own, the best strategy for the military was to separate the war of manoeuvre 
of the revolutionary forces and the war of position of the MB. In order to do so, 
the SCAF reshaped the state political superstructure in three main ways – the 
constitutional amendments (as discussed earlier), the new party formation and 
the new electoral law. In this way the restriction to the war of position of the 
revolutionary movements and the MB had different effects, as the development 
of the MB was given the most advantage as discussed in the previous chapter. 
In fact, the amendment of the political party’s law n. 40 of 1977 – approved by 
the interim government on 28th March 2011 – favoured the MB against other 
revolutionary movements. Small and unorganised parties faced structural 
barriers to be legalised; the increment of the number of founding members 
grew from 1,000 to 5,000 across ten different governorates. Moreover, each 
member’s signature needed to be witnessed by a notary. Eventually this 
notification process resulted in delaying the registrations of new parties (Auf, 
2014; Selim, 2015).  
Further restriction came in terms of finance and privacy. The average 
expenses for advertisement and publicity were estimated to be around 
$250,000: prohibitive for newly formed parties with limited access to electoral 
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competition (Wickham, 2013, p. 172). The law imposed on new parties to 
circulate the names of the 5,000 founding members to newspapers had 
financial costs that poorly financed youth movements could not afford, 
especially after the withdrawal of state funds; these did not affect established 
and well-funded movements like the MB (Selim, 2015). The SCAF amended 
the political party law and it allowed the formation of the Freedom and Justice 
Party by the MB in April 2011; the party was declared independent from the 
organisation (Wickham, 2013, p. 175). In the parliamentary elections the 
Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) won 216 seats out of 508, and Saad El-
Katatni, Secretary General of the Party, became Speaker of the People’s 
Assembly (Al-Awadi, 2013, p. 554). The fact that the major opposition force of 
the country had managed to get the majority in parliament marked a significant 
bottom-up transformation of the Egyptian state determined by the strength of 
the war of position of the MB, rather than a top-down transformation as a form 
of passive revolution, because for the first time Egyptian citizens had the 
opportunity to cast their vote in free and fair elections (Hill, 2011; Ozen, 2018, 
p. 454).  
The amendments of the law of party formation went hand in hand with the 
amendment of electoral law. Two-thirds of the parliamentary seats would be 
elected through a closed party list system, while the remaining third would be 
dedicated to the election of individual candidates as independent. On the one 
hand, the seats allocated to independent candidates could have allowed 
representation of revolutionary figures unaffiliated with a party – perhaps those 
unable to form a party. On the other, it failed to guarantee representation of 
revolutionary forces, because at the same time party-affiliated candidates were 
allowed to compete for independents’ seats (Selim, 2015). In this way the 
military attempted to prevent other revolutionary movements developing their 
war of position along their existing war of manoeuvre.  
Although the military needed to reach the MB to connect with social forces 
which supported the MB thanks to its charity work and improvement of the 
professional syndicate, it did not want the MB to become a significant 
challenge to military dominance. In this way, the military proposed the 
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nomination rather than the election of the members of the assembly: 20 
members according to political party weight, while the remaining 80 members 
would come from governing bodies of designated professional bodies (Selim, 
2015). This was a pool of remnants of Mubarak’s regime, 15 selected from the 
high council of universities; 15 from professional syndicates, among whom 
were five workers, five farmers, and one from institutions like the police, 
military, churches, student and sport unions, business unions and other 
corporate institutions (Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, p. 112). The 
SCAF refused to ban ex-NDP members – as demanded by the revolutionary 
movements. In fact, landowning military and police generals in retirement 
could run as peasants, while factory-owning businesses could run as 
labourers. In this way, the parliamentary quotas were meant to use the former 
members of the NDP as a strategic tactic to limit the war of position of the MB 
in reaching parliamentary elections (Hope, 2011; International Crisis Group, 
2012, p. 4). 
However, the intent of the SCAF to maintain a 50% quota for farmers and 
workers filled by ex-NDP candidates failed because the ex-NDP candidates 
managed to win only 5% of the seats; the SCAF then had to turn to the MB to 
maintain its privileges (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 17), particularly as 
the parliamentary elections resulted in 87% of the assembly being composed 
of forces like the FJP, Nour Party, Wafd and the Egyptian Bloc (Marshall and 
Stacher, 2012). This result was surprising also for the MB, which hoped to get 
a third of seats in parliament and did not expect to get over 50% (Wickham, 
2013, pp. 170, 175). However, after securing a parliamentary majority the 
Brotherhood attempted to exploit the success of its war of position to make 
direct demands on the military. In fact, when the MB demanded the SCAF 
replace Ganzouri – the interim prime minister close to Mubarak – with a 
government that could reflect the parliamentary majority, the SCAF refused 
(Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, p. 116). The victory of the MB in 
parliamentary elections, thanks to the meticulous war of position that the 
organisation had undertaken since the 1980s, allowed it to become the sole 
negotiator with the military in order to craft the amendments of Sadat’s 
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constitution of 1971. Nevertheless, the years of moderation that made the MB 
over-rely on the war of position undermined the ability of the MB to undertake 
a war of manoeuvre and an underground war – which put it in a vulnerable 
position when the military restricted the MB’s demands. In fact, the MB soon 
learned that accessing political institutions was not necessarily accessing 
political power, making them the intermediary force between political and civil 
society. 
 
5.4 Expanding the state economic structure  
Since Egypt is a semi-integral state the sole control of the political 
superstructure is not sufficient to guarantee the hegemony of the dominant 
force over civil society. Therefore the military had to expand its economic 
domain in order to be able to reintegrate the subaltern forces – like workers, 
urban poor and unemployed well-educated youth – within the state. At the 
same time, the expansion of the military’s control over the economic structure 
reduced the threat of the MB who under Mubarak used neoliberalism to 
develop the private sector to gain the popular consent of both profit and not-
for-profit business. Once the SCAF had managed to control the state political 
superstructure it started to reach the MB as a potential allied force within 
political institutions. The tension between the dis-integrating effect of 
neoliberalist reforms and the need of the dominant force to integrate the 
subaltern within the state is a distinctive feature that characterised the 
Egyptian Uprising as a form of morbid symptoms. The military was rather 
cautious to evaluate the potential of old and new allies. In fact, the SCAF 
expressed several times the intention of protecting its economic interests. For 
example, General Mahmoud Nasr – Assistant to the Minister of Defence for 
Financial Affairs – declared: ‘this money is not the state’s … but the result of 
our sweat from 30 years of labour … the armed forces would fight … in order 
not to allow any party whatever it might be to come near our projects’ 
(Abdelhadi, 2012; International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 23).  
In fact, soon the military started to keep a firm grip on both military and 
civilian economic production. The initiative of the military to maintain a 
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significant portion of the Egyptian economy served different aims. Firstly, the 
increase of the military economy served to increase the means of internal 
repression, institutional benefits and keep the consent of soldiers. Under the 
SCAF the Egyptian military expanded the production of weapons. In February 
2011, the navy managed to renegotiate with the US a contract for $13 million; 
the final contract was for $20 million. In this way, Egypt gained, in addition to 
the four vessels previously agreed, institutional benefits for the military, like 
technology transfer, new facilities, long-term contracts for repairs and spare 
parts and new personnel training (Marshall, 2015, pp. 6–7). In terms of the 
civilian economy, the SCAF invested in an industrial chemical complex in 
South Cairo, a cement factory in North Sinai and made a profit out of the 
construction of the new highway in Upper Egypt (Abul-Magd, 2016, p. 32). The 
expansion of the military economy was the attempt to control the economy to 
be able to integrate multiple subaltern forces – like workers, the middle class 
and lower classes – as the state development economic plan under Nasser 
did. 
The tension between the integration and dis-integration of various subaltern 
forces emerged when the military attempted to develop contradictory 
economic reforms. On the one hand, the intention of the military to control the 
civilian economy was not only for economic interests: civilian production was 
functional to build the consent of a section of the subaltern forces. In fact, the 
cheap primary goods provided by the military were mostly directed to the lower 
classes. In a context where the neoliberal polices and privatisation combined 
to increase the price of primary goods, the military production of civilian goods 
managed to provide cheap goods by cutting the cost of labour – in fact, often 
conscripts were employed in military factories. Despite the lower quality of the 
products, they fulfilled the need of the lower classes, which ensured this 
group’s consent to the military (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 22). On the 
other hand, the SCAF continued to deny public demands for food security, 
shelter and living wages to be national policies (Joya, 2017, p. 347). For this 
reason, the SCAF replaced Financial Minister Samir Radwan – an NDP in 
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favour of increasing spending on wages of social expenditure and budget – 
with the more neoliberal-friendly Hazim Beblawi (Marshall and Stacher, 2012). 
Furthermore, the SCAF used the same strategy that Mubarak promised to 
regain consent to remain in power. These economic manoeuvres were 
directed to ensure consent of the bureaucracy, such as an increase by 15% of 
salaries in the public sector, a boost for pensions and a conversion of 450,000 
public sector contracts from temporary to permanent employment, as well as 
the price rise by 75% of food and fuel subsidies (Springborg, 2011a, p. 94; El 
Dahshan, 2015, pp. 213–214). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) offered 
Egypt a loan of $3 billion, at a low interest rate of 1.5%; however, the SCAF 
rejected this offer, believing it would have damaged its nationalist image 
(Springborg, 2011a, p. 93). The SCAF proved to not have sufficient experience 
and skills to be able to handle such important economic policies (Springborg, 
2011a, p. 94). In fact, during the first year of SCAF rule, the economy grew 
below 2% while unemployment increased more than 10%. The populist 
economic reforms were not the economic reforms needed; rather, they 
contributed to increased inflation (Khan and Miller, 2016, p. 3). On the other 
hand, Islamists also profited from the infitah neoliberal policy. In the 1980s, 
eight of the top 18 business families – leaders in the private sector – were 
affiliated with the MB, whereas in the 1990s a new guard of business-minded 
and entrepreneurial Brothers started to replace the old theological guard 
(Dalacoura, 2016, p. 68). Arguably, the SCAF sought an ally with better 
organisational skills and economic knowledge, as the MB seemed to be 
serving this purpose as well. 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
As remarked in Chapter Three, the Egyptian Uprising cannot be defined as 
a form of passive revolution due to the exclusion of the subaltern forces. This 
would deny the participation of Egyptian citizens in casting their votes for the 
constitutional referendum and parliamentary and presidential elections in free 
and fair elections (Bassiouni, 2017, p. 80). Addressing the first year of 
transition as a revolution, counter-revolution and passive revolution (Tugal, 
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2012) depends on the actors affecting the transition and creates further 
theoretical limitations because it assumes that actors act based on the 
perceived characteristics without taking into account the changing context. In 
fact, according to Tugal, the revolution failed because the revolutionary forces 
remained far from the ‘institution-building processes’ due to their lack of 
expertise and organisation. On the other hand, the MB was considered as a 
force of the passive revolution because it seemed to represent a threat to the 
social justice demands of revolutionary forces, because of its attempt to 
embrace neoliberalism. This interpretation based on the distance of the 
revolutionary forces from the institutions can be substantiated by the 
perpetration of the war of manoeuvre that these social forces undertook – as 
the chapter has addressed.  
However, considering the MB as a force that is not compatible with the 
revolution is to reduce it only to the perpetration of neoliberalism which is 
equally problematic. This interpretation does not take into account – as the 
next chapter will – the possibility that a private-led development of the country 
could be considered a way for the MB to take control of the political structure 
of the state. In fact, as discussed in Chapter Four, the failure of the neoliberal 
policy under Mubarak was not related to poor economic performance in 
multiple sectors of the economy; it was due to the lack of redistribution of 
wealth and an increased gap between rich and poor. In the case of the 
Egyptian Uprising the old practice of the subaltern forces – the war of position 
and the war of manoeuvre – contrasted with each other while the new 
dominant force – the military – attempted to reshape the political and economic 
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As discussed previously in Chapters Three and Four, Gramsci addresses 
the development of the various subaltern forces to understand how they 
conquer political power. This means that within the subaltern bloc a social force 
needs to become the leader of the other forces before accessing political 
society; that is, unless a subaltern social force within civil society takes the 
lead of the subaltern bloc and undertakes a war of position, a war of 
manoeuvre and an underground war to form a counter-hegemony. This 
classification needs to reflect the development of the subaltern forces. In fact, 
the origin of the Egyptian counter-revolution lies in the paradox that the most 
advanced force might not necessarily be the leading force of the subaltern 
bloc. This diversion allowed the progression of forms of counter-revolution – 
not necessarily due to the exclusion of the subaltern bloc, as it is during 
passive revolution. Therefore the development of the counter-revolution in 
Egypt can be explained via two interlinked dynamics. Firstly, the oscillating 
behaviour of the MB, which acted sometimes as an allied force – supporting 
the military – and at other times acted as the leading force of the subaltern 
bloc, which it was able to do because it had become an intermediary force 
immediately post-2011. Secondly, although the MB was the most advanced 
force within the subaltern bloc, it openly challenged the military without 
becoming the leading force of the subaltern bloc, opposing the war of 
manoeuvre of the revolutionary social movements, while at the same time the 
revolutionary movements targeted the MB in its capacity of intermediary force 
instead of the military as dominant force.  
The previous chapter highlighted how the military opposed the war of 
manoeuvre of the revolutionary social movements and the war of position of 
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the MB in order to keep its dominance. The diversion between the war of 
manoeuvre and the war of position facilitated military dominance, especially 
when the MB continued the war of position to reach political institutions at the 
expense of the revolutionary movements’ war of manoeuvre. This resulted in 
the oscillating behaviour of the MB in supporting and opposing the military at 
different points in time. Nevertheless, the fact that the continuation of the MB’s 
war of position facilitated a sense of the dominance of the military does not 
necessarily mean that the first year of the Egyptian transition can be 
considered a form of passive revolution or counter-revolution. Thus the war of 
position was the strategy at the disposal of the subaltern forces to control key 
posts within civil society with the aim of developing counter-hegemony, 
especially as since the 1980s the MB had been engaging with a war of position 
to control part of the economy via profit and non-profit businesses, infiltrate 
professional syndicates and gain seats in parliament (Ranko, 2015; Kennedy, 
2017).  
This chapter turns the focus on how the clashes between the war of position 
and the war of manoeuvre sowed the seeds for the counter-revolution; in this 
way it puts the attention on the agency of the MB as the intermediary force, 
arguing that the MB’s behaviour continued to oscillate between protecting the 
military interests and attempting to challenge them by controlling political 
society. In fact, the MB attempted to control political society via the control of 
the state political institutions – like the presidency, parliament and government 
– while at the same time, due to its control within civil society, it aimed to 
change state economic relations. 
The weakness of its war of manoeuvre prevented the MB from directly 
confronting the military. Therefore, the MB attempted to expand its war of 
position, and the increasing control of economic structure, its attempt to 
challenge the dominant force by shaping economic relations with businessmen 
and by controlling the judiciary system, failed due to the lack of leadership of 
the MB among the subaltern forces. Although the MB was the most advanced 
subaltern force within Egyptian civil society, it was not the leading force behind 
the uprising. The cat-and-mouse game between the MB and the military is the 
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manifestation of the reactive act of defence that triggered strategic negative 
consequences for the subaltern forces. Finally, the chapter argues how the 
failure of the uprising was not due only to the successful dominance 
established by the military, but also to the competition among the subaltern 
forces to reach the allied position in the post-2011 balance of power. In fact, in 
contrast to 2011, in 2013 the subaltern protests targeted the MB as an 
intermediary force, not the military as a dominant force as had happened in 
2011 when Mubarak and the crony capitalists were the object of the protests.  
These assumption is further supported by the fact that the removal of Morsi 
via a military coup was quick, relatively peaceful and overwhelmingly 
supported by different groups of subalterns like Tamarrod and the National 
Salvation Front, as well as cheered by the protesters in the street. This chapter 
will keep the focus on the oscillation of the MB as an intermediary force. In 
fact, it will analyse in detail the relations that the MB had with the dominant 
force and the subaltern forces. The first part addresses how despite accessing 
political society the MB did not become dominant but only the intermediary 
force of the military. As discussed in the previous chapter, the MB moderated 
and shifted its strategy towards the war of position and abandoned other 
strategies like the war of manoeuvre and the underground war. This forced the 
MB to over-rely on the war of position to the point that the control of institutions 
was no longer reflecting consent within civil society, especially since the MB 
did not respect the Fairmont agreement made with the revolutionary forces 
during the second round of presidential elections. The second part of the 
chapter explains how the attempt of the MB to reshape the economic structure 
and the exacerbation of the war of position stimulated the response of the 
revolutionary forces. Finally, the third part analyses how the clashes between 
the war of position and the war of manoeuvre set the terrain for the counter-
revolution.  
 
6.1 The backfiring of the MB’s war of position  
As the war of position was the main strategy at the MB’s disposal, the 
Brotherhood used it to the extreme to increase its power within political society. 
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In order to do so, the MB utilised two main strategies: one was the so-called 
Brotherhoodisation of the state – the Brotherhood attempted to place Islamist 
supporters within state institutions (Brown, 2013b, p. 5) – and the second was 
the effort to reshape the economic structure to reintegrate the lower strata of 
society. Nevertheless, these strategies failed, firstly because the MB’s extreme 
war of position alienated the revolutionary movements, especially since the 
attempt of the MB to control coercion was reflected in the progressive reduction 
of the revolutionary movements’ war of manoeuvre.  
The revolutionary movements did not remain passive at the uncontrolled 
expansion of the war of position of the MB. Mirroring the MB, the war of 
manoeuvre was the most effective strategy available for the revolutionary 
movements to oppose the Brotherhood. Secondly, the MB’s attempt to reach 
out to the business people – instead of the revolutionary movements – in order 
to openly challenge the military, over a possibility of a private-led state 
development. The combination of these two trajectories ultimately resulted in 
the clash between the war of position and the war of manoeuvre within the 
subaltern bloc that allowed the military to depose Morsi and take full control of 
the state.  
 
6.1.1 The Brotherhoodisation of the state  
The war of position allowed the MB to access political society by accessing 
parliament and the presidency. However, the distance it had from the 
protesters’ war of manoeuvre and the lack of underground war did not make 
the MB a dominant force because its presence within political society was 
tolerated by the military only as long as the MB was cooperative. At the same 
time, the military wanted to constantly reaffirm its dominant position, fearing 
that the unity of the subaltern bloc could escalate and compromise its 
dominance, as happened in 2011 when the protesters in Tahrir Square 
destabilised the relations between the military and Mubarak; in late 2011 when 
the unity of the revolutionary movements and MB forced the military to 
withdraw the Selmi document; and in the second run of the presidential 
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elections when the Fairmont agreement seemed to establish the unity of the 
movements on the ground and the MB within institutions.  
Since 2011 the MB oscillated between allowing the military to consolidate 
its dominance and attempting to take the lead of the subaltern bloc to challenge 
the military’s predominant position. The election of Morsi as president changed 
the weight of the MB in political society; however, the access of the MB within 
core political institutions did not necessarily allow it to have full control of the 
state. In fact, fearing Morsi’s electoral victory, the Supreme Constitutional 
Court dissolved the Islamist-dominated parliament on 14th June 2012 (two 
days earlier than the second round of the presidential elections). In this way, 
even if Morsi had won the presidential election he would not have been able 
to rely on an Islamist majority parliament. The Supreme Constitutional Court 
declared the parliament unconstitutional because it allowed party members to 
run as independents for seats intended for non-partisans, like peasants and 
workers.  
To express their coercive control, the generals deployed troops to prevent 
MPs from entering the parliament (Amnesty International, 2012b, p. 5; 
Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, p. 120). Finally, the military expanded 
its control of the state political institutions; in fact, in line with the judiciary’s 
actions, during the final day of presidential election the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed legislative power through the constitutional 
declaration, replacing the dissolved parliament; in this way the SCAF gained 
the power to veto presidential decisions as well as reassuming the control of 
the Constituent Assembly (Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, p. 120). In 
fact, the SCAF wanted to send to the MB a clear message, that although it was 
formally in charge of the legislative and executive power, it was still subject to 
the conditions that the SCAF set for it. In fact, the formal handover of power 
from the SCAF to Morsi occurred at the Huckstep military base – the very same 
base that witnessed the military trial and imprisonment of many Muslim 
Brothers and other opposition figures during Mubarak’s regime (Stacher, 
2012b, p. 10; Bassiouni, 2017, p. 111).  
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Morsi’s accommodating behaviour with the military was indeed the reflection 
of the moderation of the MB dating from the 1980s (Stacher, 2012b, p. 10); in 
fact as soon as he became president, Morsi thanked the military for its support, 
declaring ‘only God knows how much love I have in my heart [for it]’ (Abul-
Magd, 2016, p. 32). He maintained the privileges of the military by hiring top 
administrators, governors and ministers from the military’s officers. In addition, 
Morsi stressed his intention to maintain the peace treaty with Israel, justifying 
such a position through religious obligations, maintaining the economic and 
security arrangement that Mubarak had with Israel and the US (Selim, 2015, 
p. 190). This was a strategic attempt to ensure the stability of political 
institutions in order to expand the war of position within political society.  
In fact, the president has the power to call the parliament to its normal 
session (Al Jazeera, 2012b). Restoring the parliament meant reclaiming the 
legislative power that the military took away from the elected Islamist majority. 
Morsi attempted to restore the dissolved parliament but his decision was 
rejected by the Supreme Constitutional Court (Brownlee, Masoud and 
Reynolds, 2015, p. 121; Bassiouni, 2017, p. 114). The fact that the Supreme 
Constitutional Court could take action in a situation that does not have clear 
jurisdiction flagged the subaltern position of the MB in political society, despite 
its electoral victory. The MB was reduced to an allied force that was allowed to 
share political power only if its actions favoured the dominant force. The MB’s 
limited institutional power emerged from the minor changes in the government. 
Although Morsi formed a new government replacing Prime Minister 
Ganzouri with Hisham Qandil, a civil servant and Minister of Irrigation from 
2011 to 2012, the bulk of the government did not undergo major changes. In 
fact, the majority of new ministers were technocrats and bureaucrats. The 
need for technocrats highlighted, on the one hand, the lack of competence that 
the MB had in engaging with political society; on the other hand, it showed the 
MB’s inability to impose its members within the government. In fact, Qandil 
reconfirmed seven key ministers already serving in Ganzouri government that 
belonged to the old regime and were close to the military: Defence (Tantawi), 
Foreign Affairs (Mohamed Kamel Amr), Insurance and Social Affairs (Nagwa 
                                                          Subalternity and Counter-Revolution 
  165 
Khalil), Scientific Research (Nadia Zakhary), Finance (Momtaz El-Saeed), 
Military Production (Ali Sabri) and Culture (Mohamed Saber Arab) 
(Aboulenein, 2012; Ahram Online, 2012c; Essam El-Din, 2012; Brownlee, 
Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, p. 121; Bassiouni, 2017, p. 115; Arafat, 2018, 
pp. 35–36).  
On the other hand, the MB attempted to control political society via key 
ministries that could have a role in controlling civil society in those areas in 
which the MB had already a stake. Only five members of the Freedom and 
Justice Party filled posts, as Ministers of Housing (Tareq Wafiq), 
Communication (Salah Abdel Maqsoud), Manpower (Khaled Al-Azhary), 
Youth (Osama Yassin) and Higher Education (Mostafa Mossad) (Aboulenein, 
2012; El-Hennawy, 2012; Arafat, 2018, p. 36); nevertheless, a few of these 
names were part of a strategy to maintain control over civil society. For 
example, Salah Abdel Maqsoud, a Brotherhood member of the journalists' 
syndicate’s board, replaced Ahmed Anis, a retired military general. This move 
aimed to have a more symbolic than pragmatic meaning; in fact, for the first 
time, the Television and Radio Union (TRU) – directly controlled by the 
government – was under the control of Islamists. The fact that this move was 
empty in substance emerged in the fact that Mohamed Badie – the Supreme 
Guide of the MB – accused the employees of the TRU of fabricating false news 
to discredit the MB (Essam El-Din, 2012).  
The expansion of the war of position of the MB was extended to other 
Islamist forces and beyond parliament and government. In fact, moderate 
Islamist Mohamed Mahsoud Abdel-Meguib from the Al Wasat Party became 
Minister of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, and Salafist Hatem Saleh from the 
Al Nahda Party was appointed Minister of Industry and Trade (Aboulenein, 
2012; Essam El-Din, 2012; Turner, 2014, p. 424). In addition, the MB 
attempted also to conquer political society by reaching other Islamist forces as 
potential supporters, for example within the religious institutions. Talaat Afifi, a 
Salafi close to the MB, was appointed Minister of Religious Endowment. Once 
in office, Afifi replaced ten civil servants of the ministry (two of whom were 
officers) with other Islamists (Haenni, 2016, pp. 29–30). Other figures close to 
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the MB and Salafis – like Sheikh Salama Abdel Qawi and Sheikh Mohamed 
Hussain Nawfal, Assyut mosque’s Imam elected through the Nour Party, who 
were appointed to be the ministry’s spokesperson and the Director-General of 
the Administration of Religious Endowment respectively – gained positions, 
whereas figures critical of the MB and Salafis – like Sheikh Ahmed Abdel 
Moneim, Sheikh Sabri Ibada and Sheikh Salim Abdel Jalil – either lost their 
posts or faced administrative sanctions (Haenni, 2016, p. 30). 
 
6.1.2 The limits of the war of position  
Because of the lack of a war of manoeuvre and underground war, Morsi did 
not have the ability to challenge the coercive apparatus directly; therefore the 
MB used the war of position to infiltrate the police forces via a bottom-up and 
top-down approach. Firstly, as a bottom-up strategy, policemen demanded to 
grow their beards, and this was considered as the growing presence of 
Islamists within the police (Saleh and Taylor, 2013; Arafat, 2018, p. 39). 
Secondly, as a top-down strategy, the MB appointed as Minister of Interior 
Ahmed Gamal al Din, a general close to Habib Al Adly, the last Minister of 
Interior of Mubarak. This was an attempt to oppose the dominance of the 
military in terms of coercion, especially since the security apparatus remained 
largely intact. In fact, the new Commander of the Republican Guard was 
General Mohamed Zaki, the former head of the paratroopers, who was 
responsible for crushing protesters in December 2011 during protests outside 
the government (Haenni, 2016, p. 30). Finally, Khaled Gharaba, Chief of Police 
in Alexandria in January 2011, at the time that Salafi activist Sayyid Biala was 
tortured to death, was appointed Deputy Minister of Interior (Haenni, 2016, p. 
30). Gharaba was deemed the ‘engineer of torture’, due to his responsibility 
for the torture in prison of the Mahalla workers arrested on 6th and 7th April 
2008 for striking to demand the national minimum wage (Assaf, 2008; Al 
Satuhy, 2012).  
Finally, after a terrorist attack that killed 16 police officers in Sinai on 12th 
August 2012, Morsi forced military Chief of State Sami Annan and Minister of 
Defence and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Hussain Tantawi to 
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resign (Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, p. 121; Bassiouni, 2017, p. 
115). Morsi also dismissed other generals like Nagiub Mohamed Abdel Salam, 
the Head of the Republican Guard; Murad Muwafi, Head of General 
Intelligence; and Hamdy Badin, Head of the Military Police (Chams El-Dine, 
2013, p. 1). With Tantawi another 200 officers, among them five members of 
the SCAF, were forced to retire. It is plausible that it was a move from junior 
officers to get rid of the older officers based on the fact that the SCAF should 
not have directly ruled the country, thus avoiding public scrutiny and 
accountability (Fahim, 2012; Stacher, 2012b, p. 11; Chams El-Dine, 2013, p. 
1; Sayed, 2013). The Chief of Military Intelligence, Sisi, was nominated 
Minister of Defence allegedly because he was considered a ‘pious Muslim’ and 
close to the MB (Chams El-Dine, 2013, p. 1; Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 
2015, p. 122; Abul-Magd, 2016, p. 32).  
Despite the fact that Morsi removed Tantawi and Annan after the incident in 
Sinai, he appointed both of them as presidential advisors; allegedly this action 
was considered a prearranged decision taken in collaboration (Brownlee, 
Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, p. 122). The Sinai incident was the pretext for 
the junior officers to reach higher positions within the military hierarchy rather 
than an exercise of power by the MB. In fact, the argument that the removal of 
Tantawi and Annan was also an attempt to remove the unpopular officers that 
were responsible for the crackdown on protests in order to gather protesters’ 
consent falls short, since Sisi defended the infamous ‘virginity test’ performed 
on female protesters in March 2011 (Hussein, 2012b; Chams El-Dine, 2013, 
p. 2).  
On several occasions, the political actions of Morsi were directed to gather 
the consent of revolutionary forces, nevertheless with limited concrete impact. 
For example, Morsi attempted to challenge military authority by attempting to 
investigate violence against protesters. In fact there was the formation of two 
committees – one with the mandate to identify who was responsible for killing 
and wounding protesters between 25th January 2011 and 30th June 2012, as 
well as investigating ‘crimes against protesters not previously investigated’, 
like torture and ill-treatment (Amnesty International, 2012b, p. 8). The other 
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committee was in charge of reviewing the cases of civilians in trials before 
military courts in addition to the cases of ‘revolutionaries’ imprisoned. As result 
of the committee’s investigation, 572 detainees were released after receiving 
amnesty by the president (Amnesty International, 2012b, p. 8), although Morsi 
granted a general amnesty for ‘crimes committed to support the revolution’ 
which excluded civilians to be tried by military courts.  
The military continued to randomly arrest and try civilians, like the case of 
Al-Qursay Island where the military police arrested 25 civilians (Al-Jaberi, 
2012). In 2010 civilians were granted the right to live and work on the island. 
Despite the lack of any military properties on the island, the inhabitants were 
tried for assaulting military properties according to art. 198 of the 2012 
constitution, which allowed the military to try civilians for crimes involving 
‘harming armed forces’ (Chams El-Dine, 2013, p. 3). On the other hand, the 
military remained away from civilian scrutiny for their responsibilities; in fact, 
the code of military justice remained in force. Despite the desire for the fair trial 
of officers involved in crimes against protesters, the code established that the 
military prosecutor had the exclusive authority to investigate military personnel 
(Chams El-Dine, 2013, pp. 4–5). This explains how the MB remained a 
subaltern force regardless of its access to the political society. In fact the MB 
was incapable of imposing its decisions on the military because its lack of war 
of manoeuvre did not allow the MB to oppose the coercion of the military.  
 
6.1.3 Pushing the war of position to its limits 
The perpetration of the war of position against coercive apparatuses without 
the support of the war of manoeuvre met the opposition of the judiciary system. 
The MB attempted to expand its control of political society outside the 
government and its affiliated institutions. In fact, Qandil appointed Ahmed 
Makki as Minister of Justice, someone who was extremely critical of the 
dissolution of the parliament that was ruled by the Supreme Constitutional 
Court, accusing the court of being politicised by loyalists of Mubarak’s regimes. 
This reaction was not unexpected since Makki was critical of Mubarak’s 
regime. Indeed during Mubarak’s rule, Makki demanded the independence of 
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the judiciary, becoming the leading voice of the judges’ protests against 
Mubarak (Essam El-Din, 2012). Nevertheless, Ahmed Makki was in favour of 
the emergency law and the empowering repressive power of the police 
(Haenni, 2016, pp. 30–31). Similarly, Morsi chose as his vice president 
Mahmoud Makki. Like his younger brother Ahmed Makki, Minister of Justice, 
Mahmoud was known for his activism in reforming the judiciary system. Makki, 
along with presidential candidate Hisham Al Bastawisi, denounced the 
involvement of the judiciary in committing electoral fraud and for that was tried 
for ‘defaming the judiciary’ in 2005. He also supported political protesters 
organised by Kefaya and the young guard of the MB (Afify, 2012; Pioppi, 2013, 
p. 2; Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, p. 122).  
The Brotherhood did not target the judiciary blindly; although the judiciary 
was considered the bastion of the authoritarian regime it contained seeds of 
dissent. In the aftermath of the uprising, the judiciary was not a unified bloc; in 
fact, on the one hand the judiciary was the executive of authoritarian rule and 
state corruption. On the other, there was an attempt from within the judiciary 
to criticise the regime and to act independently. This latter faction demanded 
the resignation of judges involved in supporting the previous regime, and the 
reinstatement of the judges’ arbitrary removal due to their critical political 
views. In the end, the Supreme Constitutional Court remained a cosy nest for 
the supporters of the previous regime, while the Judges’ Club – a social club 
that acts as an unofficial judges’ syndicate – shared a reformist position, posing 
the two institutions in contrast (Pioppi, 2013, p. 3).  
In October 2012, Morsi nominated Abdel El Magd Mahmoud as Vatican 
ambassador, with the intention of gaining the consent of the revolutionary 
movements who denounced Mahmoud’s inefficiency in persecuting the 
leaders of the old regime, responsible for violence against protesters (Pioppi, 
2013, p. 3; Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, p. 122). The Prosecutor 
General refused Morsi’s offer, claiming to protect the independence of the 
institution from presidential impositions (Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 
2015, p. 123). The strenuous war of position of the MB against the judiciary 
eventually backfired because Morsi exacerbated the situation by increasing 
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control of the state institutions with the aim of controlling the judiciary, to limit 
the war of manoeuvre of the revolutionary movements and to ensure the 
autonomy and economic privilege of the military. As a result, firstly the 
presidential decree also alienated the reformist Brotherhood judges; and 
secondly the decree and subsequently the new constitution triggered a new 
wave of protests, placing the war of manoeuvre of the revolutionary 
movements in direct conflict with the war of position of the MB.  
In November 2012, Morsi attempted to limit the power of the judges by 
issuing a new constitutional declaration in which he empowered himself with 
both executive and legislative powers (Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 
2015, p. 123; Bassiouni, 2017, p. 118). The decree attempted to also appeal 
to the revolutionary youth by attacking the old regime. In fact, it prescribed the 
retrial of Mubarak and all the security force members and officials responsible 
for the killing of protesters during the uprising (Beaumont, 2012). In this way, 
Morsi succeeded in replacing Mahmoud as Prosecutor General while 
becoming unaccountable and the self-proclaimed guardian of the Egyptian 
revolution (Selim, 2015, p. 190) (cf. next section for a detailed analysis on the 
revolutionary movements’ reaction). This constitutional decree prescribed that 
all decrees, laws, and constitutional declarations issued by the president since 
his official appointment were binding until the election of a new parliament and 
the approval of the new constitutions (Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, 
p. 123; Selim, 2015, p. 190). Finally, the constitutional decree allowed the 
military to make arrests until the end of the constitutional referendum (Hussein, 
2012a; Haenni, 2016, p. 31).  
The decree created tensions over the independence of the judiciary which 
was still a priority even for the reformist judges close to the Brotherhood. In 
fact, Islamist judge Tariq al Bashri – who was called by the SCAF to amend 
the 1971 constitution in 2011 – rejected the constitutional declaration of 21st 
November 2012 (Haenni, 2016, pp. 33–34). Tensions between the MB and the 
judiciary were exacerbated when the majority of judges refused to oversee the 
legality of the constitutional referendum of December 2012 (Haenni, 2016, p. 
33). In the meantime, despite the protests, the Constituent Assembly approved 
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the new constitutional draft, which protected military interests (BBC, 2012b; 
Hussein, 2012c). Ultimately, the new constitution was approved by 64% of 
votes in the referendums held on 15th and 22nd December 2012 with a 33% 
turnout (Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, p. 124; Selim, 2015, p. 192).  
The war of position of the MB and the war of manoeuvre of the revolutionary 
movements entered into collision due to the major restrictions that the new 
constitution imposed. Political and civil rights were not guaranteed by the new 
constitution which empowered the parliament and limited the term of the 
presidency; however, the president was still above the checks and balances. 
In fact, art. 202 prescribed that the independent body that monitored and 
charged the presidency was appointed by the president himself; art. 104 gave 
the president the power to veto parliamentary legislations; art. 176 granted the 
president the power to appoint the Chief of Justice and judges of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court (Selim, 2015, p. 192). Art. 219 allowed corporal 
punishment for cruel, degrading and inhuman crimes; more importantly, art. 
198 still allowed the military courts to prosecute civilians involved in the broad 
scale of offences ‘that harm the armed forces’ (Selim, 2015, p. 192). Art. 215 
restricted freedom of association for journalists (Selim, 2015, p. 192).  
The MB protected the military interests by ensuring through art. 197 that the 
military budget remained secret; art. 195 obliged the parliament to consult the 
National Defence Council (NDC) (a body formed by internally nominated 
military officers) before issuing any law related to military affairs (Abul-Magd, 
2016, p. 33). The NDC was instituted by Sadat via art. 182 of 1971 constitution. 
However, it had already been set up by Nasser. It remained inactive until 
Tantawi as head of the SCAF called a meeting on 14th June 2012, just before 
Morsi’s inauguration as president (Chams El-Dine, 2013, p. 6; Sayigh, 2013). 
Originally, the Council was formed by 11 out 16 military officers and headed 
by the president. Tantawi’s composition of the NDC allowed more civilians, six 
out of 14. According to art 19712 of the 2012 constitution the NDC is the only 
                                            
12 Article 197, which granted the military independence, was similar to article 53 of the Selmi 
Document: ‘Article 53: The incumbent SCAF members are responsible for deciding on all 
issues related to the armed forces including appointing its leaders and extending the terms in 
office of the aforesaid leaders. The current head of the SCAF is to act as commander-in-chief 
Subalternity and Counter-Revolution 
172   
institution able to discuss the military budget; in this way the parliament was 
excluded from scrutiny. In addition, the budget did not show a breakdown of 
the overall spending (Chams El-Dine, 2013, p. 6). Law 86 of 1986 granted the 
NDC the authority to define national defence policy in terms of troop number 
mobilisation and equipment during both war and peace (Chams El-Dine, 2013, 
pp. 6–7). Through the NDC, the new constitution formalised the role of the 
military in Egyptian politics; in fact, the NDC was responsible for the safety and 
security of the country and had to be consulted before parliament and 
president declared war (Sayigh, 2013). Finally, the new constitution 
guaranteed that the Minister of Defence had to be an officer since civilians 
cannot fill the post (Abul-Magd, 2016, p. 33). Specifically, art. 146 of the 2012 
constitution compelled the president to consult the NDC before declaring war 
or sending troops outside national territory; art. 197 also obliged the parliament 
to consult the NDC regarding drafting law related to the military.  
In addition, during discussions in the Constituent Assembly, Mamdouah 
Shahin, the representative of the SCAF in the Constituent Assembly, pushed 
for the formation of a new military institution, the National Security Council 
(NSC); art. 193 prescribed that the president headed 12 members of the NSC 
with a similar prerogative to the NDC but on civilian defence (Chams El-Dine, 
2013, p. 7). With the 2012 constitution, the MB aimed to secure for the military 
the domain of national security, hoping to lessen the military’s grip on the 
economic structure of the state. The election of Morsi as president and the 
majority in parliament for the Freedom and Justice Party marked the first major 
transformation of the Egyptian state. For the first time since 1952, Egypt 
allowed free and fair elections and Morsi became the first Islamist president. 
This was the result of the long-standing war of position of the MB. However, 
the lack of war of manoeuvre affected the MB’s consolidation of power. In fact, 
in the context of the semi-integral state, the limited ability that the MB had in 
influencing political institutions stressed how the war of position is necessary 
but not sufficient for a subaltern force to reach political power and control the 
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state. The lack of other strategies like a war of manoeuvre and underground 
war – as well as its distance from other subaltern forces that had developed a 
war of manoeuvre – reduced the chances of the MB to resist the imposition of 
the military. In this regard, the MB was found to be allied force.  
In fact, because of its allied position the MB attempted to gain control over 
the police as the alternative coercive force of the country. Indeed, the police 
supported the NDP in controlling the subaltern. Morsi thanked the security 
forces for their contribution, promising to restore security, better working 
conditions for the police (Amnesty International, 2012a, p. 5), and the trust 
between the people and the police. In August, Ahmed Makki – Minister of 
Justice – announced a draft of a new emergency law to restore security. Later 
Prime Minister Qandil announced that the draft was revoked to prove the 
government would not act above the law; nevertheless, the Minister of Interior 
then proposed a new draft to deal with crime which had similar features to the 
emergency law (Amnesty International, 2012a, p. 5). Police remained on strike 
for almost two years from Mubarak’s resignation, with the Minister of Interior 
against Morsi; at the same time the lack of police in the street contributed to 
the privatisation of security (Sayigh, 2013).  
In addition, the MB continued to target workers’ movements; in response to 
the request of labour movements to meet their basic rights the MB responded 
with coercive confrontation – as well as the perpetration of torture and torture 
to death for prisoners (Selim, 2015, p. 193). The strategy of controlling the 
subaltern via coercion rather than leading them further alienated the subaltern 
forces and planted the seeds for its division which allowed the military to 
capitalise on such division to oust Morsi. This does not necessarily mean that 
the MB had the power to force the military or the police to torture prisoners to 
death; rather it highlights its lack of power to stop them, because it had not 
infiltrated the coercive apparatuses. On 6th May 2012, art. 6 of the code of 
military justice was abolished by the assembly of people. This article allowed 
the president to refer civilians to military court. Even though the president no 
longer had the power to send civilians to military courts, the military still kept 
the authority to judge civilians in military courts (Chams El-Dine, 2013, p. 4). 
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This was a failure of the intermediary force in taking the lead and integrating 
the subaltern groups within the state by guaranteeing them the protection from 
coercion by the dominant force. The intermediary force was unable to confront 
the military and impose its authority. In this way the MB’s war of position 
partially succeeded in accessing political institutions but it failed in securing 
control of the coercive apparatuses.  
 
6.2 Reshaping the economic structure?  
The control of the MB within civil society was not limited to social 
mobilisation, control of civil society institutions and service provision to 
encourage ideological persuasion. Along with the attempt to control both 
political and civil society, the MB needed to control economic relations that 
were essential for the formation of the integral state. The engagement of the 
MB with the economic structure of the Egyptian semi-integral state reproduced 
the dilemma of the intermediary force. The MB had to face two major economic 
challenges during its year in power: on the one hand, it needed to be sure to 
solve the economic problems that triggered the popular uprising in 2011, 
reflecting the need of the allied force in reintegrating the subaltern within the 
state; and on the other hand, it needed to balance the economic interests of 
the military since the allied force did not have the capacity to challenge the 
dominant force, at least unless it became the leading force of the subaltern 
bloc.  
Contrary to the assumption that the MB and the military allied due to their 
mutual economic interests, the allied force needed to reach a balance with the 
dominant force to protect its dominance. In fact, the MB – as the military – 
profited by neoliberal policies, from Sadat infitah; therefore once in power they 
made sure to continue such policies. When the MB was released from jail it 
attempted to benefit from the infitiah policies; however, such profits were 
marginal due to the limits to investment that the regime imposed. In fact, its 
business remained limited to supermarket franchises and selling imported 
goods (Abul-Magd, 2012). In 2007 a group of businessmen from 72 
companies, members of the MB, were brought to a military court. The 
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companies were construction firms, clothing shops, Turkish luxury furniture 
shops and a fast food chain (Abul-Magd, 2012). This stresses how the MB was 
not able to challenge the economic empire of the military, since its economic 
expansion under Mubarak was crushed.  
On the other hand, the military’s economic empire specialised in high and 
heavy industries, chemicals and civil goods (Abul-Magd, 2012); this might 
have given a chance to the MB to find a balance with the military, since it was 
not competing within the same industries. Different economic sectors will 
integrate different social forces. In fact, confident of the financial support of 
Qatar and Turkey’s president, Morsi during his electoral campaign promised 
to launch the Nahada programme, a plan for national economic ‘renaissance’ 
based on heavy industrialisation (Abul-Magd, 2012). The MB attempted again 
to reintegrate different social forces within the state, since the programme 
aimed to attract the middle class who were advocating state intervention in the 
economy – like progressive income tax and distribution of national revenue – 
to fund education, healthcare and unemployment benefits especially for the 
youth, improving conditions for workers and farmers (Adly, 2016a, p. 68).  
Due to its ambivalent attitude towards integrating and dis-integrating the 
subaltern, the MB attempted a selective integration. In fact, on the one hand, 
in July 2012, before starting the negotiation with the IMF, to ensure the support 
of public sector employees Morsi raised state pensions by 15% and public 
sector employees’ salaries as well (Dalacoura, 2016, p. 71). In autumn 2012, 
the Egyptian pound fell, and to reassure the IMF the government proposed a 
10-year development plan; the deal with the IMF would have included the 
reduction of energy subsidies and tax increases (Dalacoura, 2016, p. 72). On 
the other hand, the MB aimed to lighten the state budget; in order to do this it 
advocated privatisation, especially regarding essential infrastructure, rather 
than increasing taxation (Adly, 2016a, pp. 62–63). Following the neoliberal 
policies that had characterised the Egyptian economy since the 1970s, the MB 
was reluctant to accept the IMF loan, not on an ideological basis but rather a 
strategic one, because economic austerity would have undermined the popular 
base of the MB. The cut in food and fuel subsidises that the IMF demanded 
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formed a quarter of the whole country’s budget (Dalacoura, 2016, p. 71); this 
would have alienated the lower- and middle-class supporters, therefore 
preventing the integration of these groups within the state (Adly, 2016a, p. 62; 
Dalacoura, 2016, p. 74).  
Similarly, although the tax increase meant to only target goods like alcohol, 
tobacco and luxury products, it eventually also hit essential goods like food, 
transportation, medical care and housing (Joya, 2017, p. 349). The fact the 
taxation was not voted on in parliament but was rather a presidential decree 
increased the unpopularity of the president since the population affected by 
the reform considered it the result of an authoritarian act. The dis-integration 
of the state was not merely due to the austerity measures to meet the IMF 
conditions. It resulted also from the inability to address structural problems like 
the creation of progressive taxation and policies against illicit financial flow, 
which generated $3 billion a year (Joya, 2017, p. 349).  
 
6.2.1 EBDA and the economic challenge for the military’s 
economic interests  
The MB tried to appeal to investors and businessmen close to Mubarak, 
undertaking individual and collective negotiation. In fact, over 2012-2013 
Hassan Malek – founder of the Egyptian Business Development 
Association (EBDA) – had a series of meetings with various businessmen; in 
one of these meetings, on 25th February 2013, Malek managed to reach out 
to 60 businessmen (both Brotherhood and NDP) with the intention of 
promoting local business in Alexandria (Awad, 2012; Marroushi, 2012a; 
2012b; Fouad, 2013; Haenni, 2016, p. 26;38). EBDA was founded with the 
intention of being: 
The pioneer business association in Egypt, to boost the economy 
for a better standard of living … [to] enable businessmen to 
contribute effectively in boosting the Egyptian economy, affecting 
positively the lives of the broad base of people … [by] attracting and 
encouraging investments, human development, providing projects 
and developmental solutions. (Adly, 2016a, pp. 73–74) 
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The association claimed that the massive corruption existing under Mubarak 
was the main reason for Egypt’s economic hardship, disregarding the toxic 
effect of neoliberal policies. Neoliberalism for the MB was a way to take control 
of strategic economic sectors as the starting point to take control of the state. 
Therefore it portrayed itself as made up of responsible businessmen able to 
affect ‘positively the lives of the broad base of people’ (Adly, 2016a, p. 74). In 
addition, EBDA encouraged support for small and medium-sized factories to 
foster growth, hoping to create new job opportunities (Adly, 2016a, p. 74). The 
membership of EBDA was varied, including Islamist businessmen (like Osama 
Farid), businessmen closely linked with the organisation (like Abdel Moneim 
Al Saudi and Samir al Nagger), and also respected businessmen involved with 
the previous regime (like Mohamed Farid Khamis, Safwat Thabet, and 
Mansour Amer, who were in charge of attracting other businessmen linked to 
Mubarak). There were other businessmen from important sectors like steel, as 
well as those in collaboration with Rashid Mohamed Rashid, former Minister 
of Trade and Industries under Mubarak. Finally, EBDA also accepted among 
its members companies from Turkey and Kuwait (Abul-Magd, 2012; Adly, 
2016a, p. 62; Haenni, 2016, pp. 26–27). In September 2012, when Morsi went 
to China, Hassan Malek, founder of EBDA, accompanied him and invited many 
tycoons close to Mubarak to join the trip and share the potential benefit (Abul-
Magd, 2012). Such plans might have been seen as threatening to the 
economic interests of the SCAF, as well as to their dominance. In fact, 
improving the economic conditions of the subaltern via the involvement of the 
businessmen meant for the MB the possibility of integrating the subaltern and 
reducing the crony capitalists of the NDP to an allied force.  
Through EBDA, the MB reached agreements with the Sawiris family, Yassin 
Mansour, Hamid al Shiti, and Hussein Salem. These businessmen were 
allowed to return from exile in return for repaying sums from their tax evasion 
over a period of five years (Haenni, 2016, p. 27). Naguib Sawiris was treated 
as a hero and the president’s office’s intention was ‘to send out a positive 
message that Egypt would welcome all honourable men ready to serve the 
nation, promptly rectify their situation with the state and open new investment 
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horizons for the rebirth of the national economy’ (Haenni, 2016, p. 38). Morsi 
continued negotiations with other businessmen, like Mounir Ghabbaour, 
Mohammed Mansour, Ahmed Al Maghrabi and Ahmed Ezz (Haenni, 2016, p. 
27). These negotiations did not reach any agreement due to the military coup 
that ousted Morsi in July 2013. Arguably this signals the growing relationship 
between the MB and the businessmen in order to challenge military 
dominance. Seeking an alliance with the previous dominant force led the MB 
to fail in becoming the leading force of the subaltern; in fact, this strategy 
further alienated the revolutionary social movement who were successful in 
using the war of manoeuvre to counteract Mubarak’s regime.  
To guarantee good relations with the military, in March 2013 the Shura 
Council,13 with an overwhelming Islamist majority, ensured the input to expand 
military business. In fact, the parliament transferred the property rights of state-
owned car factories from the Committee of Human Development to the 
Ministry of Military Production. The minister who visited the factory with the 
Islamist head of the committee expressed the intention to engage foreign 
partners and donors to relaunch the business (Abul-Magd, 2013, 2016, p. 33). 
In addition, the Ministry of Military Production was requested to assemble and 
sell tablets to government bodies like the Ministry of Religious Endowment and 
the Ministry of Education, without holding a fair and competitive public tender 
(Abul-Magd, 2013). The Military Engineers Authority was also granted 
contracts for public construction projects once again without winning a 
competitive public tender, similarly with the military’s right to turn the existing 
Cairo–Alexandria desert road into a toll highway and gain from the deriving 
profit (Abul-Magd, 2016, p. 33). Equally, the MB – through the Minister of 
Supply – granted to the Freedom and Justice Party the monopoly of distribution 
of subsidised goods like bread and butane gas cylinders (Abul-Magd, 2013). 
As in the past, the distributing of goods was covered by the donation of wealthy 
Brotherhood businessmen now the same strategies to gather consent were 
                                            
13 The Egyptian parliament was formed by the People’s Assembly, the lower house; and the 
Shura Council, the upper house. The constitution of 2014 abolished the bicameralism and 
established the unicameral parliament known as the House of Representatives (Völkel, 2017, 
p. 605).  
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financially covered by state resources (Abul-Magd, 2013). This was arguably 
another attempt by the MB to integrate the subaltern after the failure of the 
previous strategies.  
In fact, on the one hand, the MB failed to integrate the subaltern forces – 
middle and lower classes – within the state, a similar situation to the failure of 
the crony capitalists in the 2000s. Indeed – as argued in Chapter Four – the 
alienation of these social forces and their dis-integration from the state led to 
the manifestation of the crisis of authority. On the other hand, as discussed in 
the previous section, the MB aimed to protect the economic interests of the 
dominant force, erroneously believing that protecting the economic privileges 
of the military would allow the MB to change economic relations with different 
parts of the business community. In fact, the formation of the EBDA by the MB 
was an attempt to unite the business community to change the economic 
structure in order to create development programmes led by the private sector, 
posing considerable challenges to the military’s economic empire not only in 
terms of profits but also in terms of consent generated by different social forces 
that could be integrated in the state via the economic success of the EBDA.  
 
6.2.2 Sinai – where the war of position, the war of manoeuvre and 
economic structure met 
The war of position and the war of manoeuvre are two strategies at the 
disposal of subaltern forces to counter the hegemony of the dominant force. 
However, the control of the superstructure is linked with the control of the 
economic structure. As discussed earlier, the MB attempted to take control of 
the economic structure in order to launch an economic development led by the 
private sector via EBDA to compete with the military’s economic empire. 
However, when the MB attempted to engage with more significant projects in 
relation to state infrastructure – which implied more concrete political action – 
the contrast between the MB and the military manifested over Sinai. In fact, 
Sinai represents the fact that the conversion of the wars of position and 
manoeuvre and the economic structure are interlinked and the control of these 
three elements is necessary to reshape the state. Major clashes between the 
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MB and the military emerged over the control of the economic project and 
security issues in Sinai. On the one hand the MB attempted to take control of 
development projects, exploiting its position within state institutions. On the 
other hand, the military opposed the intention of the MB, reminding it of its 
allied position – in other words, if the MB wanted to remain within state 
institutions it needed to abandon its own economic initiative.  
Despite the concession that the MB granted to the military in terms of 
expanding civilian industry, favouring it with a non-competitive tender and 
excluding its activities from judiciary scrutiny, the precarious alliance between 
the MB and the military failed over the control of Sinai and related projects 
(Marshall, 2015, p. 11). In late 2012, the MB announced the Suez Canal 
Corridor development project: an ambitious project to turn the Suez Canal into 
a heavy manufacturing hub, based on a solar, wind and geothermal power 
station. The military would have been involved in the project by providing 
equipment and construction through the Ministry of Military Production and the 
Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI) (Marshall, 2015, pp. 11–12). 
A contrast between the military and the MB emerged when the MB 
nominated the deputy prime minister as the single chairman overseeing the 
project, relegating the military to a minor role. The Sinai project was a test for 
the MB to understand to what extent it was able to challenge the military while 
shifting the attention from the expansion of the civilian market to development 
projects. However, the military soon reminded the MB that despite being an 
allied force it remained subaltern. In fact, when Morsi announced the 
involvement of India in the expansion of the project, Sisi, in his capacity of 
Minister of Defence, promptly remarked that no title would have been given to 
land near the canal and any further plan needed the approval of the military to 
protect the area from foreign insolvency. The military reminded the MB that 
firms and supervisors involved in the project should not be decided by any 
particular party. The MB responded to this provocative statement by stressing 
that the canal expansion was under presidential authority (Marshall, 2015, p. 
13). After initial opposition from the Minister of Housing, Tarek Wafiq, who 
declared that the government would show the plan to the military but the 
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military would not have any voice in amending the project, three months later 
the ministry declared that the military was the only authority to able to grant 
licences to firms involved in the project (Marshall, 2015, p. 13). 
The tensions between the military and the MB did not remain confined to 
the economic realm; rather, they spilled over due to a dispute of coercion. In 
fact, the interest of the military in Sinai was not merely economic; it was also a 
matter of control of national security. In other words, the military did not want 
to risk losing its coercive leverage in Sinai. In this case, the increasing 
instability in Sinai constituted a threat. Apart from the underdeveloped social 
economic conditions, jihadist groups started to penetrate the peninsula 
(Chams El-Dine, 2013, p. 5). On 5th August 2012, 16 Egyptian soldiers were 
killed in an ambush in North Sinai, and two armed cars were stolen and used 
to cross the border into Israel, where seven jihadists were killed by the Israel 
Defense Forces (IDF) (Al Jazeera, 2012c). The military accused Hamas of 
being affiliated with the MB and responsible for the attacks (Haenni, 2016, p. 
32),14 since the Egyptian military is not allowed in Zone C,15 along the Israeli 
border, and only police are allowed (Chams El-Dine, 2013, p. 5). To solve the 
issue, in November 2012 Morsi attempted a dialogue with jihadist groups; the 
negotiations eventually failed, due to the refusal from Sinai jihadists to engage 
with the MB since they were considered heretics due to their alliance with the 
military (Chams El-Dine, 2013, p. 5) 
At the same time, while Morsi asked the military to suspend the operation 
to allow negotiation, the military continued the operation, asserting that no 
dialogue was possible with the jihadists. Eventually Sisi, in his capacity of 
Minister of Defence, attempted a dialogue with local tribes regarding land 
ownership. The division grew between the MB and the military over capitalising 
support of local subaltern forces to gain coercion of Sinai. Finally, Law 14 of 
2012 allowed the Minister of Defence to set the rules of land rights in Sinai, 
and in December Sisi banned private ownership and rent in areas strategically 
important for the military (Chams El-Dine, 2013, p. 6). Tensions between the 
                                            
14 This incident cost the resignation of Tantawi and Annan, cf. section 6.1.2.  
15 Zone C was established by the peace treaty with Israel. 
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MB and the military on security issues emerged on several fronts: the military 
questioned the legality of the ‘Suez Canal Corridor’ plan that Morsi presented 
as an industrial plan for technology development in Suez, Ismailia and Port 
Said, advocating a partnership between the public sector and foreign private 
investors. Tension was raised also by the intention of Morsi to negotiate with 
Sudan the contested cities of Halayeb and Shalatin (Haenni, 2016, p. 32).  
6.3 War of position vs war of manoeuvre – the seeds 
of the counter-revolution  
The fear of the ‘Brotherhoodisation’ of state institutions played a key role in 
alienating the revolutionary movement, especially since the MB did not respect 
the Fairmont agreement which facilitated the electoral victory of Morsi. Instead 
of building consent with the revolutionary forces, the peak of the war of position 
of the MB allowed it to use a form of coercion to oppose the war of manoeuvre 
of the revolutionary movements. From this perspective, the reaction of the 
revolutionary movement was the escalation of their prominent strategy. The 
clashes between the war of position of the MB and the reaction of the war of 
manoeuvre of the revolutionary movements created the condition for a stalled 
situation that was eventually resolved by the military intervention. The military 
coup put an end to the contrast between the war of position and the war of 
manoeuvre and set the basis for the transformation of the Egyptian state in a 
counter-revolutionary regime.  
The MB demonstrated its inability to be the leading force of the subaltern 
bloc – a force that is able to confront the dominant force, set achievable goals 
and gather the support of different social groups. In these terms, the MB 
attempted to confront the military without setting a specific goal, since often 
the MB, contrastingly, served the military’s interests. Finally, instead of 
developing the consent of social groups – like workers and revolutionary 
movements – that had been crucial during the uprising the MB attempted to 
unite the business community to steer the economic structure of the country. 
This emerged from the relations between the leadership of the MB and its 
youth component. Indeed, the MB failed to keep the leadership even of its one 
base. The results of such poor leadership led to the exclusion of the younger 
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generation and to the defection of the so-called wasat generation. These 
internal clashes weakened the stability of the organisation and allowed 
hardliners to take control of it. The youth section of the MB was largely based 
on a student division operating within the local universities, coordinated by 
graduates in their late 20s and early 30s. This network had relations with other 
youth movements with a different ideology; nonetheless, all of them shared the 
anti-regime sentiment that had pervaded Egypt since 2005. The MB youth 
observed the non-violent resistance and civil disobedience that characterised 
secular movements (Al-Awadi, 2013, pp. 541–542).  
The MB continued to alienate the revolutionary youth with the attempt to 
grab coercive control from the military, via institutional reforms and the 
exercise of power over the police. Both strategies failed to control civil society, 
and they produced the disengagement of the subaltern forces, creating 
mistrust that was easily filled by Tamarrod and subsequently steered by the 
military. In terms of institutional reforms, art. 6 of the constitutional declaration 
allowed that in case of danger for the safety and unity of the nation, the 
president had the freedom to take all necessary measures to stop this danger 
(Haenni, 2016, pp. 24–25). This article recalled the intentionally vague wording 
of law 162 (the emergency law) that was applied by Mubarak for 30 years 
(Haenni, 2016, p. 25). In addition to the constitutional declaration of 22nd 
November 2012, Morsi issued law 96 of 2012 – the so-called ‘law on the 
Protection of the Revolution’. 
Contrary to the SCAF security policy against protesters – that mostly 
involved a crackdown on the protests – after November 2012 the MB 
attempted to reduce the room for action by criminalising protests and 
controlling the trade unions (Haenni, 2016, p. 24). The intention of the law was 
to protect protesters from becoming the target of violence and police brutality, 
by criminalising a special court to try crimes against protesters. However, the 
law also allowed the protesters to be charged for ‘insulting and resisting the 
authorities’ which in itself contradicted the purpose of the law (Haenni, 2016, 
p. 24). In addition, the new constitution continued to limit the formation of new 
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independent unions, considering that between 2011 and 2012 the number of 
strikes and worker protests was over 4,000 while the new independent trade 
unions were more than 1,000. Although art. 52 of the constitution granted union 
independence, in reality such a right of association was exclusively granted to 
the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) which continued to maintain its 
monopoly over the trade unions (Haenni, 2016, p. 25).  
In May 2013, the MB expanded its repressive policies to other 
organisations; in fact, it proposed a draft law to restrict civil society 
organisations by monitoring their activities by security and administrative 
bodies, which had broad power in investigating foreign funding and restricting 
the collection of donors (Selim, 2015, p. 193). The repression against 
revolutionary movements and protesters did not stop; in fact, according to the 
Egyptian Centre for Social and Economic Rights, during Morsi’s year in power 
Egypt had 558 demonstrations, 514 strikes and 500 sit-ins (Al-Awadi, 2013, p. 
545; Achcar, 2016, pp. 80–81). In June 2013, the El Nadim Center for 
Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence announced that in the first year the MB 
was in power the torture documented was 359 cases, plus 217 cases of death 
due to torture (Selim, 2015, p. 193). In this climate the polarisation between 
MB supporters and the revolutionary movements emerged sharply. On the one 
hand, revolutionary movements protested at the presidential palace and 
stormed the MB offices; on the other hand, Islamist supporters besieged the 
Supreme Constitutional Court (Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, p. 124; 
Achcar, 2016, p. 76). In fact, in December 2012, Islamist supporters of Morsi 
surrounded the Supreme Constitutional Court with the aim of preventing it from 
taking legal action against the Shura Council and the Constituent Assembly, 
portraying it as an enclave of Mubarak loyalists (Selim, 2015, p. 191). 
At the same time, the MB leaders invited their supporters to use violence 
against the opposition, especially the National Salvation Front (NSF), claiming 
that they were simply a minority of insurgents (Selim, 2015, p. 191). A few days 
later, a sit-in at the presidential palace was attacked by MB supporters, causing 
seven deaths and hundreds of injuries. When the military declared that it would 
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not have tolerated any sort of violence, Morsi withdrew the constitutional 
decree but not the referendum (Selim, 2015, p. 191). Finally, the Minister of 
Defence, Abdel Fattah al Sisi, attempted to mediate between seculars and 
Islamists primarily to protect the interests that the military had gained during 
Morsi’s leadership (Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, p. 124). Sisi, 
without consulting the government or the president, invited Morsi, the 
government and the opposition to confront each other in a ‘social dialogue’, 
remarking on the ability of the military to interfere in politics (Sayigh, 2013). 
During a joint news conference on 23rd November 2012, Amr Moussa and 
Mohamed El-Baradei supported the declaration made by Sameh Ashour – 
head of the lawyers’ syndicate – who defined Morsi’s presidential decree as ‘a 
coup against legitimacy ... We are calling on all Egyptians to protest in all of 
Egypt's squares on Friday’ (Al Jazeera, 2012a; BBC, 2012a). In this way, the 
revolutionary forces focused their war of manoeuvre against the MB as the 
allied force rather than oppose the military’s dominance. In fact, the 
revolutionary forces attempted – as they did after the resignation of Mubarak 
– to develop a war of position next to their war of manoeuvre. As a result, the 
reaction of revolutionary forces – from social movements to political parties – 
united a varied and an anti-Morsi front to form the National Salvation Front 
(NSF), with three main opposition leaders: liberal Mohamed El-Baradei, 
Nasserist Hamdeen Sabahi and diplomat and Mubarak’s foreign minister – 
popular for his anti-Israeli positions – Amr Moussa (Brownlee, Masoud and 
Reynolds, 2015, p. 124; Selim, 2015, p. 191). The aim of the NSF was the 
cancellation of the constitutional declaration, the postponement of the 
constitutional referendum and the appointment of a new Constituent 
Assembly, asking for a new government of national unity by recalling the spirit 
of cooperation stipulated in the Fairmont agreement (BBC, 2012c; Brownlee, 
Masoud and Reynolds, 2013, p. 124; Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2013).  
The formation of the NSF as a tentative move by the political parties to take 
the lead of the revolutionary base – as Gramsci analysed in the case of the 
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Biennio Rosso – remained ineffective until a new social movement appeared 
on the political scene to pit the war of manoeuvre against the MB further. 
Dissatisfaction with the governance of the MB led a group of citizens in three 
governorates in March 2013 to call for military intervention (Brownlee, Masoud 
and Reynolds, 2015, p. 125). This call was echoed by Tamarrod, a new social 
movement. Tamarrod (Rebel) was founded in February 2013 by a group of 
young activists who started their political activity within Kefaya (Barbary and 
Adib Doss, 2014, pp. 156–157). Tamarrod was inspired by Nasserism, 
referencing the figure of Nasser, reviving the feeling of nostalgia in the 
Egyptian collective memory. The leaders criticised Kefaya’s other components 
– such as April 6 and the Revolutionary Socialists – because they did not 
maintain the unity within Kefaya. The leaders attempted to be part of these 
other movements but due to their apparently incompatible ideology they 
decided to come together and revive Nasserism under Tamarrod (Barbary and 
Adib Doss, 2014, pp. 157–158).  
The aim of Tamarrod was rather simple and effective: it had the intention of 
asking for the resignation of Morsi by showing him it was able to gather 12 
million signatures (the same number of votes Morsi received during the 
presidential election) (Barbary and Adib Doss, 2014, p. 163). The main 
accusation aimed at Morsi was that the MB had hijacked the revolution, by 
monopolising power, ikhawanising the state and suppressing the opposition 
(Selim, 2015, p. 194; Volpi and Stein, 2015, pp. 286–287). Tamarrod was 
affirmed as a movement for the Egyptian people claiming to regain power for 
the Egyptian people (Barbary and Adib Doss, 2014, p. 164). It justified the idea 
of the petition against Morsi by using Sa’d Zaghloul,16 a nostalgic figure, and 
                                            
16 Sa’d Zaghlul (1857–1927) was the founder and leader of the Wafd Party, and considered 
the ‘Father of the Egyptians’. Raised in a rural environment and educated in a European-style 
system, Zaghlul was the classic example that social mobility was possible due to the Tanzimat 
reforms in Egypt. The Wafd party started as a delegation of landlords and commercial 
bourgeoisie demanding Egyptian representation at the Paris Peace Conference – a peace 
conference organised by the allies to redefine geopolitical relations with the defeated countries 
of World War I. To overcome the denial of Egyptian representation, the Wafd sought popular 
support for their demand for independence, claiming to represent the will of the Egyptian 
people rather than the Egyptian rulers backed by the British. Using a similar rhetoric, the 
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reconnecting with the more recent El-Baradei campaign, the National 
Campaign for Change of late 2010 (Barbary and Adib Doss, 2014, pp. 164–
165).  
The novelty of Tamarrod compared with the other movements and 
campaigns was to achieve the shift from cyberspace to the street (Iskandar, 
2013), and to reach also those who remained passive, as Emad Mubarak, a 
member of Tamarrod, explained: ‘[Egyptians] are generally split between those 
who go down to the streets and those who do not. And it is important for us to 
know how much support we have from those who remain in their homes’ ( 
Emad Mubarak quote in Antoun, 2013). The movement interpreted unity as a 
core value and any form of dissent was a threat to unity, and as Mahmoud 
Badr – founding member of Tamarrod – indeed affirmed, ‘unity is the most 
important thing’ (Mahmoud Badr quote in Antoun, 2013). This highlights how it 
was the scattered action of various components of the subaltern bloc that 
prepared the terrain for the military coup, rather than their passive acceptance 
of the alliance between the military and the MB. Indeed, the growing division 
within the subaltern bloc was simply an advantage for the military, which did 
very little to co-opt Tamarrod. It rather allowed the clashes among the allied 
and the subaltern forces to escalate to the right moment when the military 
could lead the subaltern against the allied force via the military coup, portrayed 
populistically as the fulfilment of the will of the people. 
By mid-May 2013 Tamarrod claimed to have 2 million signatures, while in 
June they claimed 15 million (Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, p. 125). 
                                            
Tamarrod movement sought to represent the will of the people to force President Morsi to 
resign. 
As a charismatic and eloquent leader, Zaghlul channelled popular discontent with the Egyptian 
quest of independence; the British attempted to dismiss the Wafd demands by arresting and 
exiling Wafd leaders including Zaghlul. Such actions backfired causing a popular uprising in 
support of the Waft, with protesters chanting ‘Egypt to the Egyptians’; this uprising became 
known as the revolution of 1919. To put an end to the social unrest, Zaghlul was allowed to 
return to Egypt and the Wafd went to Paris hoping to make a case for Egyptian independence, 
in line with the self-determination right which remained unfulfilled (Vatikiotis, 1991, pp. 257–
260; Goldschmidt, 2002, pp. 243–245; Cleveland and Bunton, 2013, pp. 180–182). For a 
detailed discussion of Zaghlul’s involvement in Anglo-Egyptian relations between 1919 and 
1922 leading to the British unilateral withdrawal from Egypt and meaningless independence, 
cf. Vatikiotis, 1991, pp. 262–272. 
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On 23rd June the military was already preparing to act, especially when Sisi 
declared that the military would intervene to protect the will of the people and 
to avoid civil war (Kingsley, 2013; Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, p. 
125). However, the success of Tamarrod was due to the economic and 
strategic support that the movement received from the military and the Minister 
of Interior. On the one hand Tamarrod’s leaders had access to a bank account 
administrated by the military; on the other hand, the Minister of Interior allowed 
protests against Morsi and violence against MB offices (Ketchley, 2017b). 
The fact that the Minister of Interior and the military decided to financially 
and logistically support Tamarrod addresses that, firstly, the initiative was 
nevertheless coming from a subaltern group, not from the dominant force. 
Secondly, it highlighted the need for the dominant force to seek a more reliable 
allied force that would not challenge the military as the MB did. Protesters 
started to fill Tahrir Square after 26th June 2013 while Morsi placed the 
responsibility of the political situation on the heritage of the Mubarak era with 
a manipulative media and an uncooperative judiciary and opposition 
(Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, p. 125). Millions of people took to the 
streets and squares in Egypt to protest against Morsi; on the other hand, 
Morsi’s supporters mobilised as well to defend the president’s policies. They 
gathered around Rabaa al Adawya mosque in Nasser City, and elsewhere in 
the country. On 1st July, the military issued a 48-hour ultimatum to Morsi to 
meet protesters’ demands, threating Morsi with imposing an alternative road 
map if he did not fulfil them. The following day, Morsi denounced the danger 
of the return of the old regime and rejected the ultimatum, claiming he was 
legitimately elected (Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, p. 126; Selim, 
2015, p. 195). In response, Badr called for the military to intervene, addressing 
Minister of Defence Sisi: ‘I tell you, sir, you may be the general commander of 
the Egyptian military but the Egyptian people are your supreme commander, 
and they are immediately ordering you to side with their will and call an early 
presidential election’ (Saleh and Taylor, 2013).  
                                                          Subalternity and Counter-Revolution 
  189 
Finally, on 3rd July 2013, Sisi appeared on national TV, surrounded by new 
aspiring allied forces, stating that the military had had no intention of stepping 
into the political sphere but that they felt that the people were calling them to 
save the nation and to help them in their revolution. Sisi announced that Morsi 
‘failed to meet and conform to the demands of the people’; he was 
subsequently removed from office and arrested, and then ‘the army met all 
political powers, the youth movements and sections of the society to draw a 
roadmap’ (Al Arabiya, 2013; Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, p. 126). 
The 2012 constitution was suspended; Adly Mansour – the president of the 
Supreme Constitutional Court – was nominated president ad interim to lead 
the country to a new presidential election; and a new Constituent Assembly of 
50 members (with only two Islamists) was appointed to draft a new constitution 
(Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 2015, p. 126). Finally, the NSF issued an 
official statement declaring that:  
the NSF salutes the police and military forces, and bows its head in 
tribute and respect for the great people, imposing their will of 
complete victory and continuing to strive for a constitution befitting 
a civilized Egypt, rising to a bright future … Glory to the people, to 
the great army and to the courageous police. (Abdelrahman, 2015, 
p. 115) 
The military coup of 3rd July 2013 marked another important shift in 
Egyptian politics; the precarious alliance between the MB and the military 
failed due to the attempt of the MB to challenge the military’s fragile hegemony. 
The MB attempted to control political society and meanwhile lost control of civil 
society, mistaking the legitimacy derived from electoral support to mean 
hegemony over the state and civil society. The MB failed primarily to build any 
alternative alliance to oppose the power of the military. The military acted 
against the MB to protect its control over the political structure that it had 
recently regained in 2011. The persistence of a dominant force like the military, 
in a semi-integral state like Egypt, will be investigated in the next chapter.  
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6.4 Conclusion  
As discussed in Chapter Three, the hegemonic crisis can be resolved with 
a variety of outcomes depending on the type of state and the autonomy of the 
subaltern forces. As a reminder, a successful revolution is the resolution of the 
hegemonic crisis developed in a dis-integrated state with the use of a war of 
manoeuvre, whereas, at the other end of the spectrum, the passive revolution 
is the resolution of a hegemonic crisis characterised by the top-down approach 
of the dominant force and by the exclusion of the subaltern forces. In between 
these two extremes there are morbid symptoms that generate forms of 
counter-revolution, either as Caesarism or as spontaneous insurrection. When 
the most advanced force does not take the lead of the spontaneous 
insurrection the potential that it could turn into a successful revolution gets 
reduced.  
The case of the transformation of the Egyptian state and the inability of the 
MB to take the lead of the revolutionary forces prepared the ground for the 
counter-revolution. As discussed in Chapter Four, at the time of the 25th 
January revolution the MB was the most advanced force within the subaltern 
bloc. It progressively abandoned a confrontational strategy against Mubarak’s 
regime and maximised the war of position by infiltrating civil society institutions. 
The infiltration of civil society institutions was necessary to expand the consent 
of different social groups. The MB’s consent was built primarily over service 
provision which compensated for the dis-integration of the state. In this way – 
as Chapter Five explained – the uprising opened the opportunity for the MB to 
expand its war of position to political institutions. The perpetration of its war of 
position was, however, characterised by its oscillation between two extremes. 
In fact, since the MB became an intermediary force able to link the social forces 
within civil society with the dominant force in political society, it acted as both 
allied force of the dominant force and as a leading force of the subaltern bloc.  
Due to this oscillation the Egyptian case cannot be considered as a form of 
passive revolution – as De Smet argues, the revolution did not succeed 
because subaltern classes did not reach political power to transform economic 
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relations (De Smet, 2016, p. 202), and the attempt of the MB to reach political 
power after 25th January 2011 was considered a ‘counter-revolution in 
democratic form’ (De Smet, 2016, p. 214). First of all, De Smet considers as 
subaltern classes only the workers and peasants; this overlooks the fact that 
although the new generation of the MB were businessmen, this did not make 
them dominant because they did not build sufficient counter-hegemonic 
consent and coercion to oppose the military.  
Secondly, the assumption that Morsi was a civil Caesar, able to shape the 
‘counter-revolution in democratic form’, stresses the narrow view that the 
control of the economic structure was, for the benefit of the MB businessmen, 
in order to reproduce a class conflict between bourgeoisie forces and the 
proletariat. In this regard the clashes between the MB and the revolutionary 
forces relied on the authoritarian action that Morsi had to impose constitutional 
reforms (De Smet, 2016, p. 215). This interpretation overlooks the attempt of 
the MB to control the economic structure to promote the development of the 
country via its economic organisation (EBDA) which would have posed 
significant challenges to the dominance of the military as the sole actor in 
control of the development of Egypt.  
Thirdly, the mobilisation of revolutionary forces via the war of manoeuvre 
contradicts the interpretation of the Egyptian Uprising as a form of passive 
revolution because the revolutionary youth, workers and peasants did not 
reach political society as the MB did thanks to its prolonged war of position. 
The failure of the MB was due to the fact that it was in between the military and 
the revolutionary forces, and it was unable to develop a coherent strategy that 
could have turned it into a reliable allied force of the military, or the leading 
force of the revolutionary forces. The MB exacerbated its war of position 
without developing any war of manoeuvre, and in turn opposed the war of 
manoeuvre of the revolutionary forces, hoping to control the economy of the 
country via EBDA. On the other hand, the war of manoeuvre of the 
revolutionary movements allowed the targeting of the MB as an intermediary 
force, regardless of the dominance of the military. The escalation of these 
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conflicts prepared the ground for the military coup, which removed the first 
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Chapter 7 The post-coup and the 




Events post-coup unfolded a further twist in the relation between the 
dominant force and subaltern forces. The military had to prevent the possibility 
that a new subaltern force could develop and take the lead of the subaltern 
bloc. In order to avoid such a scenario, the dominant force had two options: 1) 
to seek another and more reliable allied force within the context of semi-
integral state; or 2) attempt to start a passive revolution to transform the 
Egyptian state into an integral state. Contrary to the interpretation that the 
military coup was not the end of a passive revolution that started in 2011, it is 
actually post-2013 – the consolidation of the post-coup regime – that can be 
analysed through the lens of passive revolution. 
As addressed in Chapters Two and Three, passive revolution and counter-
revolution are often used interchangeably to address the unfolding of the 
Egyptian Uprising. In this view, the starting point of the counter-revolution was 
right after the resignation of Mubarak and the transition period controlled by 
the military and the MB (De Smet, 2016, p. 209). As discussed in Chapters 
Five and Six, this interpretation undermines the role the social forces like the 
MB and the revolutionary movements had in preparing the ground for the 
counter-revolution. In fact, Chapter Five highlighted how the separation 
between the war of manoeuvre and the war of position advanced the 
dominance of the military; and Chapter Six analysed how the counter-
revolution was the result of the clash between the war of position of the MB 
and the war of manoeuvre of the revolutionary movements, while the military 
stood in the background waiting for the right moment to start a new 
transformation of the Egyptian state. In other words, Chapter Six addressed 
how the counter-revolution was not a form of passive revolution with a 
Caesarist tendency. This chapter now reflects on the transformation of the 
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Egyptian state after the coup. In this regard, I argue that the post-2013 situation 
was not the restoration of the status quo, as in 2011; in fact, contrary to pre-
2011, the military was attempting to recreate an integral state to prevent the 
formation and potential challenge from social forces that could exploit pockets 
of autonomy within civil society to take the lead of the subaltern bloc.  
In this last empirical chapter, I investigate the attempt of the military to 
transform the semi-integral state with the aim of integrating the subaltern 
forces. Nevertheless, the dominant force still needs the support of an allied 
force, due to the partial integration of the subaltern with the state. In other 
words, the dominant force can only hegemonise the entire society without the 
need of any allied force within an integral state. Unless the military manages 
to fully integrate the subaltern, the dominant force will always need the support 
of an allied force to keep its hegemony. In the previous chapter, I argued that 
the dominant group – the military – survived the challenge of its allied group – 
the Muslim Brotherhood – exploiting the consent of the faction of subaltern 
forces that attacked the allied force. In this chapter, however, I will address 
why, instead of building an alliance with the subaltern forces like the secular 
opposition, and technocrats, the new military regime preferred to rely on 
coercion to establish its hegemony while establishing ad hoc alliances with 
various groups; these weak alliances were challenged by the foreign support 
that the military regime received. In fact, the aftermath of the military coup 
witnessed not only the reshaping of new alliances but also the increase of 
coercion in the country. Indeed, despite an initial phase of cooperation with 
leftists and Nasserists that the regime used strategically to appeal to workers, 
considered the most threatening social group, as well as to appeal to the ultra-
nationalist rhetoric.  
In fact, the new regime has not yet formed a suitable alliance with other 
intermediary forces able to ensure its hegemony; the lack of such consent 
emerged from the urgency of the military in controlling the means of production 
by expanding its economic empire, and to protect its dominant position it relies 
heavily on increasing coercion. The expansion of the military economy 
marginalises and divides the business community, and the regime is spreading 
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its consensus in fragmented sectors of the subaltern forces. Contrary to the 
Mubarak era, when the interests of the cronies were channelled into the 
political arena via the NDP, in the post-coup era the relations between the 
economic and political elites have been reshaped directly by Sisi’s personality. 
The secular opposition which supported the coup suffered from 
marginalisation as well, and parties like the Salafi Nour Party were 
marginalised during the parliamentary election of 2015, although they had 
taken part in writing the new constitution of 2014; with the initial co-opting of 
the Nour Party, Sisi’s regime tried to appeal to Islamist supporters since other 
Islamist parties like Wasat and Watan opposed the coup (Messieh and 
Mohamed, 2015).  
The secular opposition acted similarly to the Nour Party. Tamarrod first 
suffered from internal division and then was transformed in a short-lived 
political party supporting Sisi’s candidacy. The National Salvation Front 
collapsed after the coup, due to its inability to become a unifying force that 
could lead the subaltern bloc. Nevertheless, Amr Moussa headed the 
Constituent Assembly and attempted to form a coalition list for the 
parliamentary elections, while Hamedeen Sabahi participated both in the 
presidential elections in 2014 and the parliamentary elections in 2015. The 
Dostour Party suffered from internal divisions which affected its popular 
support, after its cooperation with the dominant force further alienated the 
subaltern forces who protested against Morsi but did not wish to see the 
consolidation of the military as a dominant force. On the other hand, the 
business community was fragmented and not supported by any other 
opposition parties (especially after the co-optation of the Free Egyptians 
Party); this allowed the military to relegate business to a subordinate position, 
allowing just a few companies to be involved in projects only as subcontractors, 
while the rest of the non-aligned companies remained excluded.  
The aftermath of the coup illustrated how the military did not strategically 
use the support of the opposition which played a role in undermining the MB’s 
authority and supporting the military intervention to form a new alliance; rather 
it preferred to rely on coercion, divide and rule strategies for both political and 
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economic opponents, and to reinforce alienating forms of consent derived from 
the network of patronage. Whether or not the developing hegemony of the 
dominant group has the ability to rely primarily on coercion and fragmented 
consent to prove durable goes beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
7.1 The military’s transformation of the political 
superstructure 
The priority of the dominant force was to reintegrate various subaltern forces 
– youth, and middle and lower classes – within the state. In order to do so, the 
military had to firstly seek a new allied force since it was still operating within 
a semi-integral state; in this context the pool of forces that targeted Morsi were 
the first option to be considered as potential allies. In this way, the military 
transformed the state political institutions to ensure the inclusion of an allied 
force that could connect with various social forces within civil society – as the 
MB was the intermediary force between political and civil society in the 
aftermath of the 25th January uprising.  
The road map set up by the military consisted of the drafting of the new 
constitution and the consolidation of a pro-regime coalition within parliament 
(Alsharif and Saleh, 2013). These two developments were essential for the 
formation of the new allied groups that would eventually support the new 
regime. During the first year of the transitional government, the new regime 
tested Morsi’s opposition, while the parliamentary elections represented the 
formation of weak and variegated allied groups.  
 
7.1.1 Interim government – the start of the counter-revolution  
The formation of the interim government highlights two main features of the 
new state that the military intended to benefit from: first, the military, like the 
MB, did not have much experience in running state business; therefore, it 
needed to rely on technocrats. Second, the military needed an allied force that 
could connect and represent subaltern forces – especially youth, workers and 
leftists – who concurred with the manifestation of the hegemonic crisis in 2011.  
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In the first phase, the newly formed regime failed to maintain the consent of 
leftist co-opted forces like the Social Democrats, Karama and Dostour. This 
government represented the inability of Morsi’s opposition, most notably the 
National Salvation Front, to negotiate and to take part in the transition. 
However, once the interim government served the purpose of securing the 
military’s privileges by drafting the new constitution, and by increasing the use 
of coercion, the new regime shifted alliance and sought the support of the 
business community. But the businessmen split over opposing or accepting 
their new subordinate role. Despite such division among the subaltern, the 
post-coup was led by co-opted opposition and technocrats.  
In fact, the technocrats in Beblawi’s government had worked with the MB; 
for example, Ahmed Galal – Beblawi’s new Minister of Finance – took part in 
‘societal dialogues’ that Qandil launched to address economic issues. 
Similarly, the Minister of Investment, Osama Saleh, served in the same post 
from August 2012 to May 2013 (Ahram Online, 2013b). This highlights how 
both the Muslim Brotherhood and the military were in need of skilled 
technocrats in order to face the country’s economic difficulties. In fact, many 
of the ministers in the new government had connections with Mubarak’s 
regime: Dorreya Sharaf El Din, Minister of Information, was a member of the 
NDP and relevant figure of the state-run Egyptian Radio and Television Union; 
Ibrahim Mahleb, Minister of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development, under 
Mubarak was appointed head of the public Arab contractors’ company (Ahram 
Online, 2013b). The presence of figures close to Mubarak showed the need 
for the new regime to seek cooperation beyond the allied forces to avoid giving 
concessions to the social forces which were the protagonists during the post-
uprising.  
At the same time, the military needed to test the support of the co-opted 
forces – both the secular opposition and the remnants of Mubarak’s regime. 
The co-optation of these technocrats was not only due to their expertise but 
also the fact that they represented different forces that were crucial to target 
the MB in 2013. In this regard, in addition to Beblawi – founder of the Social 
Democratic Party in 2011 – as Prime Minister, the Nasserist and unionist 
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leader and member of the Karama Party, Kamal Abu Eita, was appointed 
Minister of Labour; and Ahmed Burai – supporter of the independent labour 
union – became Minister of Social Solidarity; Hossam Eissa, co-founder of the 
Dostour Party and former member of the Nasserist Party, was nominated 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Higher Education (Ahram Online, 
2013b; Abul-Magd, 2016, p. 35).  
However, this placebo co-optation of labour’s leaders was not followed by 
concrete action to placate the strikes. It actually provoked the opposite results, 
in fact: the co-optation of the leadership of such groups compromised their 
credibility and alienated the base. The intention to integrate the workers 
resulting in the split between the base and the leadership is a similar pattern 
to the one Gramsci analysed in the Biennio Rosso – as discussed in Chapter 
Three. Workers occupied the factories, a manifestation of their war of 
manoeuvre, while the leadership of the socialist party did not take the lead of 
the movement to transform the war of manoeuvre into a more significant threat 
to the state.  
As a result, the split nurtured the opportunity of the leadership of the 
revolutionary forces in 2011 to become a leading force of the subaltern bloc 
and to pose challenges to the dominant force. Indeed, the temporarily allied 
forces in the Beblawi government did not hesitate to target revolutionary 
forces; for example, the Minister of Higher Education, Hossam Eissa – co-
founder of the Dostour Party – suppressed students’ demonstrations and 
involved private security providers in controlling students’ and universities’ 
activities (Ahram Online, 2013a). Finally, Abu Eita remained silent when the 
military was cracking down on the workers’ strike of the Suez Steel Company 
(Beinin, 2013a; Charbel, 2016). From this perspective, the political leader of 
the subaltern forces concurred with the formation of the counter-revolution and 
the transformation of the post-coup state. In fact, the military attempted to 
reach out for the consent of the revolutionary movements by co-opting political 
leaders active against Mubarak like El-Baradei and Abu Eita. 
Finally, the major achievement of the interim government was to ensure 
temporary political stability and allow the consolidation of the military as a 
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dominant force. The constitutional committee – formed via the constitutional 
declaration on 7th July 2013, but starting its work on 8th September – 
appointed to draft the new constitution was composed of remnants of 
Mubarak’s regime, as well as representatives of professional syndicates; 
official representatives of Al-Azhar University and the Coptic Church; with the 
representation of youth by Tamarrod, Youth Coalition and Student Union. The 
allocation according to political ideology did not reflect the popular support of 
the parties; in fact, Islamists were represented by Bassem Al Zaka from the 
Nour Party, and Kamal Al Halabawy, former MB; liberals were represented by 
Sayed al Badawy from the New Wafd, and Amr Moussa; and leftists were 
Mohamed Abul Ghar from the Social Democratic Party, and Mohamed Samy 
from the Karama Party (Auf, 2013; Mansour, 2013).  
However, the abrupt resignation of the Beblawi government also marked 
the failure of the anti-Morsi coalition. The failure in calming the waves of strikes 
due to the lack of guarantee of minimum wages and the inability to solve the 
storage of cooking gas and the insecurity due to clashes with the MB’s 
supporters led to the resignation of Beblawi (Ahram Online, 2014a; BBC, 2014; 
Abul-Magd, 2016, p. 35). In his speech, Beblawi gave conflicting reasons for 
the resignation, claiming that his government ‘restored basic security and 
helped bring forth a new constitution’ (Sabry, 2014). If, on the one hand, 
Beblawi’s resignation opened officially the door for Sisi’s candidacy, on the 
other it seems that the post-revolution forces, who aimed to be pro-revolution 
and at the same time non-Islamist and anti-Morsi, failed to reach an agreement 
with the new regime (Sabry, 2014).  
The dominant force continued to transform the state political superstructure 
via constitutional reforms and parliamentary elections. The military was moving 
away from its previous strategy of relying on only one main allied force. In fact, 
the opposition protagonists of the coup, like Karama, the Social Democratic 
Party and the Dostour Party, soon became excluded from the power sharing 
and were no longer able to be considered allied forces of the military. A 
significant example is the Social Democratic Party which supported the coup, 
many of whose members were part of the interim government led by Beblawi; 
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despite helping draft the new constitution of 2014, contrasting bids for the 
leadership compromised the credibility and stability of the party and in fact their 
winning only four seats in parliament reflects the distance of the Social 
Democrats from the regime (Ahram Online, 2013b; Dunne and Hamzawy, 
2017, pp. 10, 23).  
 
7.1.2 Establishing the new rules of the game – the new 
constitution  
In January 2014 the new constitution was approved in a referendum which 
attained 94% of popular consent; this new constitution maintained the same 
military privileges as the MB constitution of 2012 despite the concession of a 
few rights (Abul-Magd, 2016, p. 35). In fact, art. 203 (similarly to art. 197 of the 
MB constitution) ratified the secrecy of the military budget, granting to the 
National Defence Council the authority to discuss it (Abul-Magd, 2016, p. 35). 
Art. 201 specifies that the Minister of Defence must be an officer; art. 204 
prescribes that civilians should face military courts for attacks on military 
businesses (Chams El-Dine, 2014, p. 1; Abul-Magd, 2016, p. 35). Art. 204 
extended military trials to civilians; according to art. 234 the Minister of Defence 
must be approved by the SCAF for two presidential terms (Chams El-Dine, 
2014, p. 2). In addition, the new institutional set-up was created to weaken the 
parliament and strengthen the personal relations that individual MPs had with 
the president rather than channel their grievances through a political party. In 
fact, the constitution approved in January 2014 abolished bicameralism in 
Egypt, creating only one chamber for a total of 568 MPs directly elected 
(Sanyal, 2016, pp. 446–447). A single chamber limited the access to political 
society. 
In addition, electoral law – law 46 of 2014 – established that only 120 seats 
out of 568 should be elected through a closed list; the rest are elected on 
individual representation, plus 27 MPs are appointed by the president, 
therefore not elected. As a result, the new electoral law increased the 
fragmentation of the opposition, and offered an advantage to the individual 
who could rely on their network of patronage by exploiting the mixed system 
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of 420 seats for independent candidates, and 120 seats for closed-list 
coalitions (Chams El-Dine, 2014, p. 5). According to art. 5 of law 46 of 2014, 
each list must present a number of candidates equal to the seats available 
(Sanyal, 2016, p. 447). Therefore, voters have different numbers of votes to 
cast according to the district; for example if the district prescribes three seats, 
the voters have three votes to cast, one for each seat (Gur, 2016, p. 461). 
Despite the fact that votes have unequal weight according to the geographic 
area, this system allows the increase of the patronage network in which voters 
are interconnected with more than one candidate, and voters can spread their 
votes among all lists, regardless of the party affiliation or ideology. Therefore, 
for the individual seats, this system endorses the existing network of 
patronage, where only well-connected and well-funded individuals can run for 
elections. At the same time, this increases instability within the already 
fragmented opposition because many small parties have to negotiate an 
alliance often too fragile to survive, only for the sake of securing the majority 
(Chams El-Dine, 2014, p. 5).  
 
7.1.3 Parliamentary elections – testing the allied forces  
The failure of the interim government as a coherent coalition restrained the 
chances of the military to connect with social forces like workers, youth and 
leftists. In this regard the military implemented different strategies to connect 
with the social forces that triggered the uprising. The parliamentary election 
offers a good understanding of the effort to transform the Egyptian state and 
the ability of the dominant force in steering the semi-integral state towards 
forms of integration. In fact, only seven electoral lists ran for political election 
in 2015. In summer 2014, Sisi won the presidential election against Nasserist 
candidate Hamdeen Sabahi, with the wide consent of different social classes 
from the business community to workers, public employees and middle-class 
urbanites (Abul-Magd, 2015, 2016).  
The parliamentary elections of 2015 witnessed seven electoral lists: the 
main parties in the For the Love of Egypt coalition were the Free Egyptians 
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Party (65 seats) and Nation’s Future (53 seats); New Wafd got 36 seats 
(Sanyal, 2016, p. 447; Dunne and Hamzawy, 2017, p. 6). For the Love of Egypt 
was a list in support of Sisi, although it was never officially affiliated, and it was 
the only list able to run in all four constituencies (Afify and Magid, 2015; Magid, 
2015), which meant it was the only one which won all 120 seats. Other parties 
boycotted the elections, including Egypt Freedom, Strong Egypt, Bread and 
Freedom and the Dostour Party (Dunne and Hamzawy, 2017, pp. 6–8). In 
conjunction with the political crackdown, this meant that the number of political 
parties participating in the 2015 parliamentary elections was only 44 (Sanyal, 
2016, p. 449). Only 13 parties formed electoral coalitions for closed lists while 
the rest of the 31 parties let their candidates run as independents (Sanyal, 
2016, p. 449).  
As already discussed with regard to electoral law – such a system that 
encouraged independent candidates reflects the increase of the patronage 
network and the direct linkage that single candidates had with the new regime, 
to promote alienation, ineffective opposition and greater control over groups 
that do not play according to the rules. On the other hand, the longevity of such 
a precarious system depends on the consent that the regime can gain around 
the figure of the president. The parliamentary elections of 2015 provide details 
of Sisi’s support especially where the lack of a ruling party supporting the 
president is so noticeable. In a way, similar to the Nasserite state, Sisi 
attempted to consolidate power around his persona rather than creating 
institutions as a way to mediate interests as Sadat did.  
First of all, the parliamentary elections were constantly postponed due to 
the lack of consensus over several lists. In fact, the reasons behind the 
declaration of unconstitutionality of the electoral law – the unfair weight of 
voters across the constituencies – was only superficially addressed, since the 
closed-list system remained untouched (El-Fekki, 2015a; Farid, 2015). The 
formation of a pro-Sisi coalition was preceded by two failed attempts, the first 
by Amr Moussa and the second by Kamal Ganzouri. In July 2014, Amr Moussa 
attempted to create a list with members of Shafiq’s party, Egyptian National 
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Movement, with the aim of creating an allied force ‘that would not oppose the 
government, but at the same time would not act on its orders’ (Bahgat, 2016). 
Amr Moussa was head of the 50-member committee which drafted the 2014 
constitution. In June 2014, he called for the ‘civil and patriotic’ element of 
political society to build a coalition which only excluded candidates sentenced 
to corruption, giving an opportunity to former NDP members to join the list 
(AbdAllah, 2014a). Moussa negotiated with other parties to form a coalition; 
this negotiation never led to an agreement over a list, due to parties’ self-
interest and unwillingness to cooperate with members of the NDP (Chams El-
Dine, 2014, p. 5).  
The second attempt to create a pro-state list with the aim to win all 120 seats 
in parliament came from Ganzouri who became presidential advisor in July 
2013. This attempt also failed, due to the interference of Ganzouri (as 
representative of the executive power) in the formation of the parliament. The 
failed attempt to create a strong pro-state list left the opposition deeply divided 
to the point that general intelligence had to intervene to create a pro-state list 
(Bahgat, 2016).  
These two attempts highlight, on the one hand, how leaders of subaltern 
forces that supported the military coup – like Karama, Doustour and the Social 
Democrats – realised that such actions had alienated the base who still 
opposed the military. Therefore these parties were no longer keen to be 
reduced to an intermediary force for the advantage of the military. On the other 
hand they highlight how the military had to use its internal resources, like 
military intelligence, to attract allied forces. Eventually, the For the Love of 
Egypt list was formed and its first meeting was in the general intelligence 
headquarters, and the composition of the group of founding members brought 
together the intelligence and co-opted part of the opposition. The coordinator 
of the list was Sameh Said al Yazal, a former intelligence officer; the founding 
members included Mahmoud Badr – founder of Tamarrod; Tarek al Kholy, 
former leader of April 6; Gabaly al Meraghy, chair of the Egyptian Trade Union 
Federation; Sayed Mahmoud al Sheriff, the head of the descendants of the 
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Prophet’s syndicate, who eventually became the Deputy Speaker of the 
parliament; and Emad Gad, former leader of the Egyptian Socialist Democrat 
Party who later passed to the co-opted Free Egyptians Party. All these 
personalities were included in the list and all secured their seats (Bahgat, 
2016). The composition of the founding members of this list reflects how the 
dominant force was penetrating civil society. In fact, Tamarrod and the April 6 
leaders were the direct connection with the youth that triggered the uprising, 
along with the control of media, workers and business.  
The aim of the list was to target specific social forces that were the main 
forces during the uprising and its aftermath, like youth and business. Pro-
regime parties were formed after the coup, like Nation’s Future and My 
Homeland Egypt Party (Dunne and Hamzawy, 2017, pp. 7, 22). Firstly, while 
the Free Egyptians Party initially attempted to run independently, refusing to 
participate in other coalitions, it meant to join the alliance to support Egypt 
coalition led by Ahmed Shafiq (AbdAllah, 2014b; Chams El-Dine, 2014, p. 5). 
Eventually the Free Egyptians Party ended up supporting the new regime and 
Sisi’s candidacy (Dunne and Hamzawy, 2017, p. 23). Naguib Sawiris – founder 
and financial supporter of the Free Egyptians Party – admitted that the party 
reluctantly agreed to join the list to avoid the accusation of dividing the country 
and not helping at such a difficult time (Bahgat, 2016).  
Founded and financed in 2011 by Christian businessman Naguib Sawaris, 
the Free Egyptians Party channelled the Christian identity of its leader to attract 
the Christian community as well as to gather the interest of the businessmen 
that had clashed with the MB (Dunne and Hamzawy, 2017, p. 10). In the 2011 
parliamentary election, the party won 17 seats thanks to the financial support 
of Sawaris and the use of its television, ONTV. In 2015 Free Egyptians became 
the first party in the country with 65 seats in parliament; however, corruption 
scandals and leadership conflicts affected the strength of the party. Sawiris 
was forced to sell ONTV and was later expelled from the party, as well as 
expelling other members and losing support (Dunne and Hamzawy, 2017, pp. 
7, 11).  
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Secondly, the Nation’s Future Party claimed to present Egyptian youth, 
while its candidates were former NDP members who also supported the party 
financially; more important is the fact that although those parties used their 
network of patronage to reach the presidency, they were still limited in 
enlarging the base of the network of patronage that the NDP used to have 
(Dunne and Hamzawy, 2017, pp. 22–23). 
A big component of social unrest was unemployed youth, and for the 
survival of the new regime this faction of society needed to be selectively 
integrated within the state, especially when the youth seemed to be divided. In 
2011 the MB youth joined the April 6 Movement and workers’ protests while in 
2013 Tamarrod claimed to represent the youth but eventually divided the 
secular from the MB forces. In December 2015 the Nation’s Future campaign 
was founded by 1,500 young people to ‘support the nation at this historical 
juncture’, chaired by Mohamed Badran, president of the Egyptian Student 
Union, already appointed in July 2013 as a member of the Constituent 
Assembly (as a representative of university students) (Mansour, 2013; Bahgat, 
2016).  
This campaign was necessary to attract the consent of youth movements 
that were protagonists in the 2011 uprising; since the division within Tamarrod, 
especially, the campaign acted in support of the regime by mobilising voters in 
favour of the constitution during the referendum in January 2014, receiving 
financial and legislative support from officers from military intelligence to 
incentivise youth activism with the pro-state campaign. The campaigners were 
also promised exemption from compulsory military service (Bahgat, 2016). The 
necessity of the Nation’s Future campaign and party materialised when the 
new regime perceived Tamarrod as not as reliable as expected. In fact, 
Tamarrod started to suffer from internal divisions; the leadership split over the 
presidential election campaign: Badr expressed unconditional support for Sisi, 
while Abdel Aziz was member of the Popular Current led by Sabbahi (Ahram 
Online, 2014b; El-Fekki, 2015b; Hussein, 2015). During the Rabaa Al-Adawiya 
Mosque and Nahda Square sit-ins in support of the deposed Morsi, Tamarrod 
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demanded to be armed and to have arrest powers against the protesters. Badr 
on that occasion said, ‘we cannot accept having weapons in the squares. Not 
only does this harm the nation, but harms the very concept of a peaceful 
protest’ (Mada Masr, 2013b).  
The demands of Tamarrod of gaining coercive power were refused by the 
military which would not allow an unpredictable force like Tamarrod to have 
access to resources which could be used for an underground war – as a 
strategy to destabilise the state. Nevertheless, populist rhetoric remained 
convenient for the military, to use ultra-nationalist rhetoric to reintegrate the 
population as Nasser did. Contrary to all other social movements, Tamarrod 
entered political society formally by becoming a political party – the Arab 
Popular Movement Political Party – ‘to avoid the “corruption” of the elections 
in 2012, in which the Muslim Brotherhood’s political party won the most seats’, 
and to support a ‘new parliament to represent the revolution’, highlighting its 
support for only ‘patriotic’ forces (Mada Masr, 2013c). 
 Badr remarked that the participation of Tamarrod in the coming 
parliamentary elections was in order to ‘block the forces of darkness from 
entering the parliament’ (Ashraf, 2013b). Tamarrod continued to build up its 
populist rhetoric during the controversial Protest Law, asserting that it ‘won’t 
allow for terrorist forces to continue their campaign against the Egyptian 
people and their consistent acts of violence and sabotage against the Egyptian 
state’ (Mada Masr, 2013a). Tamarrod – like Kefaya – did not survive after the 
achievement of its goal. In fact, before Sisi announced his presidential 
candidacy, Tamarrod issued conflicting statements. First, it expressed 
concerns over the potential candidacy of a member of the military, stating that:  
Lieutenant General Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi should not run for 
presidency, to preserve his image as a national hero who did his 
duty for this nation. The movement affirms that Egypt, after the 
revolution, must be ruled by a civilian president who is elected 
through a democratic process (in Ashraf, 2013a).  
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A few days later a new statement expressed not only support for the military, 
but also the populist sentiment and the aspiration of unity that seems to 
characterise the movement; in fact, it read that ‘the Tamarod movement cannot 
disagree with the people’s aspirations; therefore, it announces that if Al-Sisi 
runs for presidency, the movement will support him’ (in Ashraf, 2013c).  
Despite the ideological achievement of spreading ultra-nationalistic rhetoric 
to recall Nasserist nostalgia, the demand for coercive control and internal 
division showed that Tamarrod was not a reliable allied force able to 
reintegrate the youth. And in fact, due to such internal divisions and the 
rejection by the Supreme Electoral Commission of the establishment of 
Tamarrod’s party, Mahmoud Badr abandoned the idea to turn Tamarrod into a 
political party; Tamarrod members would run as independent (Nader, 2014; 
Aswat Masriya, 2015; Messieh and Mohamed, 2015). The rhetoric of 
Tamarrod highlights how the group was willing to become an allied force 
similar to the MB, and this can be interpreted in the mobilisation of Tamarrod 
as the intention of replacing the allied force rather than the dominant.  
To fill the void left by Tamarrod, in July 2014 Mohamed Badran – already a 
member of the Constituent Assembly in 2013 as the university students’ 
representative – filed the official request to transform the National Future 
campaign into a political party with the aim of representing the youth (Bahgat, 
2016). The party remained in the shadows until August 2015 when Badran 
took his place in the inauguration of the new Suez Canal next to Sisi. Due to 
such proximity to the president, the party started to receive financial support 
from businessmen like Ahmed Abu Hashima, Masnour Amer, Kamel Abu Ali 
and Hani Abu Reda, as well as big families like Al Ghoneimi, Al Maghrabi, Al 
Qurashi and Al Ashraf (Bahgat, 2016). The network of patronage and financial 
support were essential to help the party win 53 seats (becoming the second 
party of the country) at its first election. Beside the financial support of 
businessmen and the logistics support of military intelligence, the party 
exploited the existing network of patronage, selecting candidates with specific 
advantages in their constituency like leaders linked with the NDP or those able 
to finance their own campaign (Bahgat, 2016). Finally, the For the Love of 
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Egypt list included wealthy business people like Farag Amer; Akmal Kurtam, 
also leader of the Conservative Party; Mohamed Moustafa Salleb; and Sahar 
Talaat Moustafa, daughter of Talaat Moustafa17 (El-Sayed, 2015; Bahgat, 
2016; Essam El-Din, 2016). The formation of the electoral coalition and the 
result of the parliamentary elections show the weak alliance that the new 
regime managed to achieve with only fragmented parts of society.  
The new forces represented in parliament reflected the result of the state 
transformation derived from the 2011 uprising. In fact, the attempt to 
reintegrate the youth was a necessity dictated by the fact that the youth 
movements were a strong component behind the 2011 uprising – and along 
with other revolutionary movements they were in control of the war of 
manoeuvre. In addition, the fact that some business people and former NDP 
members returned in parliament does not necessarily mean that the status quo 
before the uprising had been restored. In fact, co-opted business people and 
NDP members were no longer leading the dominant bloc as before in 2011; 
rather, they were now following the lead of the military. The regime attempted 
to attract and neuter the youth since they were the primary force behind the 
2011 uprising. The regime co-opted business people and former NDP 
members willing to maintain an inferior role. This precarious balance revolves 
around the figure of the president, and his ability to directly mediate conflicts 
and interests within the allied groups. The effort to reshape the political 
superstructure to guarantee the support of the youth and to secure its 
hegemonic power is a necessary but not sufficient condition to ensure the 
transformation of the state into an integral form. The dominant force also needs 
to transform the economic structure.  
  
                                            
17 Talaat Moustafa – patriarch of the powerful Talaat Moustafa family – founded his 
construction business with his children in the 1970s. In the 1980s, thanks to the government-
sponsored development programme, the Talaat Moustafa Group started an unstoppable 
expansion. Talaat Moustafa, along with his two sons, Tarek and Hisham, was a constructor 
and MP, and member of the NDP party. Tarek presided over the housing committee in 
parliament; and Hisham, close to Gamal Mubarak, was stripped of his parliamentary immunity 
before the trial for the murder of Lebanese singer Suzanne Tamim (Sturcke, 2009; El Gundy, 
2011; Eibl, 2016; Essam El-Din, 2016; Talaat Moustafa Group, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c).  
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7.2 Egypt integral state? The integration of economic 
structure  
The military – as the dominant force with no significant challenges – 
attempted to reinforce the integrated part of the state like the expansion of the 
military economy and the bureaucracy, and to integrate the subaltern via the 
implementation of infrastructure. The development of infrastructure allowed 
the dominant force to exercise the presence of the state within the various local 
communities, implementing a top-down strategy of integration targeting the 
small subcontractors and construction workers rather than big business. After 
the coup, the military economic empire expanded in all sorts of sectors, with 
the major support of foreign donors and companies, which partially met the 
resistance of the local business community. In fact, the new regime relied on 
the military economy to bolster growth through the military-owned companies. 
Firstly, military involvement in the economy would ensure the support of the 
military for the new regime; secondly, the military intervention in infrastructure, 
transportation, energy and housing projects aimed to maintain the consent of 
the population (Adly, 2016b, p. 14).  
 
7.2.1 Military-led economic development  
Sisi faced the dilemma of how to reconcile the nationalistic rhetoric of a 
socialist state à la Nasser, controlled by the military – essential to frame its 
discourses to appeal to the population – with how to create the condition for a 
liberal market to attract local and foreign investors – vital to provide the 
necessary resources to relaunch the economy (Abul-Magd, 2016, p. 34). The 
solution to this decline would reveal how to integrate different social forces 
within the counter-revolutionary state to guarantee the formation of the integral 
state. This was an attempt to revive the economy by using a state-led model, 
primarily with the involvement of the military in the economy attempting to 
benefit public employees (Adly, 2016b, pp. 9–10).  
In order to do so, the ad interim president Adly Mansour appointed 15 new 
governors of province who were military officers in retirement, as well as retired 
officers to be in charge of ports and government authorities for industrial and 
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agricultural development, and heads of state-owned companies in chemical, 
transportation and land reclamation. Sisi continued appointing retired generals 
to positions like heads of the maritime navigation safety authority and the 
tunnel and subway authority (Abul-Magd, 2015, 2016). He constantly ensured 
the support of the military, by increasing military pensions by 25% in addition 
to the 15% increase in 2011 by the SCAF and 15% in 2012 by Morsi (Abul-
Magd, 2015). The military budget increased from 31 billion to 39 billion EGP in 
2014–2015 and to 43 billion in 2015–2016 (Abul-Magd, 2015, 2016).  
Despite the precarious economic situation, the regime strategically 
attempted to guarantee the support not just of military officers but also of other 
public sector groups like public sector employees, including the police and 
judges, as well as granting benefits for investments by companies linked with 
the Minister of Interior, and the possibility of blending coercion and business 
by establishing for-profit private security companies (Tarek, 2014; Adly, 2016b, 
p. 9). In addition, the regime aimed to gain consensus from public sector 
employees in local government public authorities and state-owned companies 
because they were skilled labour forces with legal contracts, which allowed 
them to have a better position in bargaining with the regime (Adly, 2016b, pp. 
9–10). The marginal minimum wages guaranteed were only for public sector 
employees, not for the rest of the workers and employees of private and state-
run companies (Abul-Magd, 2015). However, such spending on public salaries 
was unsustainable due to the low revenue of the state (Adly, 2016b, p. 10).  
In order to get the resources to maintain the high satisfaction of the military, 
Sisi implemented austerity policies – especially the reduction of food and gas 
subsidies and the increase of electricity bills regardless of the continuous 
power cuts – to attract foreign and domestic investors (Abul-Magd, 2015, pp. 
64–65, 2016, pp. 23, 37). Sisi relied on austerity policies which were 
characterised by the introduction of new taxes as well as the increasing of the 
existing cuts in public spending, and investment reforms as well as a new 
programme of privatisation (Joya, 2017, p. 351).  
The introduction of new taxation like VAT affected mostly low salaried and 
unemployed people, whereas corporations and high salaries did not face 
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taxation on wealth. Companies paid a fixed tax regardless of discretional 
factors like size, profit, capital and workforce, and profit on the financial market 
remained untaxed. All of the different taxation resulted in increasing the 
already existing gap between poor and rich (Joya, 2017, p. 352). This social 
inequality was exacerbated by the rise of goods prices, especially for primary 
goods like food and energy that had already become affected by cuts to 
subsidies. Farmers and peasants would be particularly affected by such cuts, 
due to the increase of high costs of agriculture production that did not reflect 
income, in addition to cuts in healthcare, education and housing (Joya, 2017, 
p. 353). The increase in fuel prices had an effect not only on the lower classes 
but also energy-intense industries like cement, fertilisers, iron and steel which 
competed with the military in these sectors (Chams El-Dine, 2014, p. 3). The 
introduction of the VAT affected the lower classes as well the public sector who 
were more likely to increase consumption. At the same time, taxes on real 
estate and progressive taxation to ensure social equality had not been 
implemented; neither was the suspension of the capital gains tax (Adly, 2016b, 
pp. 11–12).  
The cut in subsidies had a limited popular discontent due to the programme 
of the World Bank to supply food subsidies for the poorest families; at the same 
time the Central Bank offered loans to small and medium enterprises. 
However, those programmes would not necessarily help the category they 
aimed to help because of the lack of formal assessment of wealth due to the 
informal economy (El Dahshan, 2015, p. 214).  
The development of the military economy was not only a measure to ensure 
the consent of retired officers, but it also it aimed to compensate the austerity 
measures with the provision of welfare and infrastructure to secure the consent 
of the population, via service provision and employment opportunities (Roll, 
2014, p. 2). The full control of the military over the economy had already started 
under the Adly Mansour presidency which amended the legislation on public 
tender. Decree 48 of 2014 allows the government to direct the allotting of 
construction projects of less than 10 million EGP; this allowed the government 
to directly hire military companies for all sorts of projects like hospitals, bridges, 
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roads, tunnels and social housing, as well as the Suez Canal area 
development project, without undertaking transparent and competitive public 
tenders in case of emergency (Chams El-Dine, 2014; Abul-Magd, 2015, 2016; 
El Dahshan, 2015). Subsequently, military companies signed contracts for 
construction projects for $1 billion despite the lack of any emergency status for 
such intervention (El Dahshan, 2015, p. 212). Since 2012, the armed forces 
engineering corps was also involved in 1,350 development projects, in several 
sectors, especially in the enlargement of the Suez Canal and land reclamation 
(El Dahshan, 2015, p. 213).  
Between September and November 2013, the military companies were 
granted contracts for 7 billion EGP; in August 2014, the head of the military 
engineers’ authority declared that it was involved in 850 projects on 
construction in different sectors like land reclamation, housing, health, 
education, transportation etc., also acquiring 10,000 acres of land in the 
Western Desert and 40,000 in Upper Egypt (Roll, 2014; Abul-Magd, 2015, 
2016). The military started to select the companies that seemed more reliable, 
although not competitive; for example, in January 2014, the National Bank of 
Egypt approved a loan of $20 million to a subsidiary, Tharwa Petroleum, which 
had links with the military, since the National Authority of Military Production 
owned 5% of the shares (Tharwa, 2017), despite the fact the company had 
lacked business with the state between 2011 and 2013. In addition, the state-
owned shares of Vodafone Egyptian were transferred to the military (Marshall, 
2015, p. 14).  
Also, the military expanded by governing 10,000 acres from land 
reclamation and commercial farming in the Western Desert, and 40,000 
square metres for the construction of four gas stations in Upper Egypt (Abul-
Magd, 2016, p. 36). This allowed the government to hire military contractors to 
build all sorts of infrastructures like hospitals, social houses, roads, tunnels 
and bridges, as well as the Cairo–Alexandria toll highway (Abul-Magd, 2016, 
p. 36). The Ministry of Defence was involved in the construction of new roads 
in 2015–2016, including major connections between cities in the Nile Delta, 
the Cairo–Ain Sokhan road and the amelioration of the Cairo–Ismailia road 
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(Adly, 2017, p. 20). The engineering agency of the armed forces was involved 
in the construction of the social housing projects, cooperating with the Ministry 
of Housing to deliver 145,000 units in May 2016, and the contract was renewed 
for another 145,000 units to be delivered in 2017 (Adly, 2017, p. 20). In this 
case, the dominant force was seeking the support of external forces to avoid 
seeking an alliance with the Egyptian intermediary forces.  
 
7.2.2 The international help for the formation of the counter-
revolutionary state 
The military-led development of the state – intended to reintegrate social 
forces like workers and youth which were at the front of the uprising – needed 
considerable financial support. In order to attract foreign capital, the 
government protected investors from nationalisation, guaranteeing tax breaks 
for the creation of jobs, and created a new system of dispute resolution 
between the investors and the state, avoiding judiciary scrutiny and protecting 
the executive bodies of companies from criminal charges (Joya, 2017, p. 352). 
Sisi attempted to revive the Egyptian economy by stimulating the private sector 
as well as launching development projects for the Suez Canal with the intention 
of using the revenue for infrastructural projects, transportation, health, 
agriculture and energy (Joya, 2017, p. 352).  
In this regard, during the Egyptian Economic Development Conference 
(EEDC) held in Sharm el Sheikh in March 2015, the government remarked on 
its position in leading the development of the country, expressing openness to 
private business in helping the state’s economy. It was also an occasion for 
funding ambitious projects, and in fact Egypt received $12.5 billion from Gulf 
countries, plus secure deals with Gulf companies worth $38.2 billion, and 
memoranda of understanding for future deals of $92 billion. The government 
also signed a deal with Siemens for $9 billion (El Dahshan, 2015, p. 211). 
During the conference, the government also revealed its five-year programme: 
2014/15–2018/19. This plan involved tax and spending reforms mostly through 
cuts of energy subsidies, adjustment of wages and managing of public finance, 
plus reduction of the public debt from 95.5% to 80–85% GDP; reducing 
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inflation from 11.5% to 6–8%; and promoting export (El Dahshan, 2015, pp. 
211–212). In addition to an increase in fuel prices, this policy was already 
suspended in 2015–2016, gaining from the lower global oil price and so 
reducing the discounting of such an unpopular measure (Adly, 2016b, p. 12). 
The financial support of international actors is not simply to guarantee the 
military the development of megaprojects, but also to limit the opportunities for 
local business to take a stake in the Egyptian economy. In fact, the involvement 
of the military in such projects would not have been possible without the 
financial contribution of foreign companies and countries. To the initial $12 
billion offered to Egypt by the Gulf states in July 2013, in May 2014 the offer 
became $20 billion; the conditions for this loan were relaxed, especially since 
both Saudi Arabia and UAE hoped to reinforce the military regime to firmly 
crack down on the MB opposition. The investment in Egypt from the GCC (Gulf 
Cooperation Council) was $50 billion by 2013; it was more than the 
investments of Western states which reached $46 billion (Roll, 2014, p. 2). 
Thanks to the generous help from the Gulf state of $12 billion, Sisi could 
suspend the negotiation with the IMF; in July 2013, Ashraf Al Araby, the 
Minister of Planning, declared that in such an unstable political situation it was 
inappropriate to continue with the negotiation (El Dahshan, 2015, p. 208).  
Other considerable support came from Russia, China and the US. In fact, 
Russia kept its word given to Morsi on financing Nasco, and also included 
support for the development of the Helwan District of iron and steel factories, 
and Egyptalum, the largest state producer of aluminium and aid to the 
electricity generator plants of the Aswan Dam; China also financed projects 
like the Suez Canal, power stations and high-speed rails (Marshall, 2015, p. 
17). The US maintained military production at a high level; in fact, despite the 
massacre of Rabaa al Adawya the US Department of Defence signed a 
contract to deliver and manufacture military equipment for $300 million. In June 
2014, the US released $575 million of military aid and another $1.3 billion in 
December 2014. France and UAE helped the growth of the coercion 
apparatus; France agreed on $7 billion for fighter jets and battleships; while 
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UAE proved training and intelligence during military operations against ISIS in 
Libya between March and October 2014 (Marshall, 2015, p. 17). 
In October 2013, UAE signed agreements with Egypt. These ensured the 
armed forces engineering authority had the exclusive role of implementing 
these projects. In addition, two companies based in UAE – Emaar Properties 
and Arabtec Holding – became involved in retail development and low-income 
housing projects (Chams El-Dine, 2014, p. 2). The UAE financed $4.9 billion 
for infrastructural projects contracted to military companies and their partners, 
and long-term concessions for the management of highways. In return the 
military partner Arabtec, based in Dubai, managed a $40 billion project for 
affordable housing (Marshall, 2015, pp. 16–17). The contract of Arabtec was 
decided without any public tender, justified by the urgency of the project 
(Marshall, 2015, p. 17). In March 2015, during the EEDC, Arabtec was going 
to receive land for the construction of one million affordable houses. In his 
capacity as Minister of Defence, Sisi signed an agreement with Arabtec for the 
construction of one million houses on 160 million square metres of land; the 
land would be provided by the military free of charge (Roll, 2014, p. 2; El 
Dahshan, 2015, p. 213).  
The fact that the military allowed foreign companies to set the development 
of important projects like social housing reflects its strategy to prevent Egyptian 
business from controlling projects that are strategic to capitalise on the consent 
of lower classes. In this way, the military attempted to integrate the lower 
classes by utilising foreign support to avoid giving concession to the local 
business community.  
The military focused the majority of the financial support on three 
megaprojects: Toshka, the Suez Canal and the new capital. The Toshka 
project was particularly valuable for the military, since the military had several 
companies contracted with the project. The project saw Al Waleed Bin Talaal, 
a Saudi prince, as the major investor in the project; this raised issues related 
to the use of land, taxation, agricultural exports and labour requirements by 
foreign companies since 2010, and the MB openly opposed the project; 
however, in September 2013, soon after the removal of Morsi, the interim 
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movement welcomed financial support from UAE and Saudi Arabia (Marshall, 
2015, pp. 15–16).  
The military as dominant force had the interest in avoiding an alliance with 
threatening forces like the MB – which was able to control civil society via 
consent and had attempted to change the economic structure of the state. In 
fact, by relying on foreign actors the military had less need to seek the alliance 
of local businesses that could be a threat. This allowed Sisi to expand the 
Toshka plan to $140 billion including 48 new cities, eight airports and 
highways. This project had been financed by businessmen like Talaal and 
Sawiris – as well as a call for citizens to donate to Sisi’s Long Live Egypt fund 
(Marshall, 2015, p. 16). 
During the EEDC, the economic plan revealed by Sisi proposed vague 
investment policies for the development of 26 cities and tourist sites, and 
especially the Suez Canal development project. This project claimed to 
increase the revenue from canal transit from $5.4 billion in 2014 to $13.5 billion 
in 2023, as well as developing an industrial hub in the area near the canal 
which was expected to contribute up to 30–35% of the national economy (El 
Dahshan, 2015, pp. 208–209). The existing Suez Canal Corridor development 
project saw the expansion of six ports plus the construction of an industrial 
zone, tunnels and a parallel canal to increase the traffic in both directions. The 
enlargement of the canal involved the partnership of Dar al Handash, a Gulf-
based construction and consultancy company (Marshall, 2015, p. 14). The 
construction of the new waterway took only one year and the new Suez Canal 
was inaugurated with majestic celebration all over the country on 6th August 
2015 (El Dahshan, 2015, p. 209; MadaMasr, 2015). The control of such 
revenues seems problematic since the canal project saw the cooperation of 
the Egyptian military with Saudi Arabia and UAE and the establishment of a 
separated jurisdiction that was not subject to Egyptian authorities and 
legislations (Joya, 2017, p. 352). 
Finally, the new capital project was launched in 2016. The military, 
especially the Armed Forces Land Project Organization, received 8,000 
hectares to create the new administrative capital as announced by Sisi in 
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March 2015 during the EEDC in Sharm el Sheikh (Adly, 2016b, p. 15). With 
the launch of the new administrative capital, competition over land intensified; 
in addition, in 2016 Sisi allocated 15,400 acres for the capital project to the 
Armed Forces Land Project Organization, allowing also the formation of for-
profit companies in partnership with the military (Adly, 2017, p. 20). However, 
when the military companies were not skilled enough to implement specialised 
work, the regime allowed big companies, like Orascom Construction, to be 
involved in the project, with two contracts, one for the construction of the 
building of the Ministry of Interior in the new capital, and a second contract for 
the construction of six tunnels under the Suez Canal (Adly, 2017, pp. 20–21).  
The fact that the military had to rely on a few big companies to implement 
these projects stressed their inability to form an integral state where social 
forces were integrated and unable to be a threat to the dominant force. Finally 
the value of these megaprojects is also ideological. In fact, the dominant force 
utilised ultra-nationalist rhetoric to frame these projects as a tool to fill the 
ideological gap left by the crackdown on the Islamists. Despite the stability 
claimed by the regime after the coup, the economic situation improved 
marginally: domestic and foreign investments have not recovered since 2010. 
The low growth contributed to the reduction of tax revenue; another lack of 
revenue was determined by the stagnation of the maritime traffic in the Suez 
Canal, due to the slowdown of the Chinese economy which affected the trade 
between Europe and China, as well as the tourism revenue decline since 2011, 
even more marked after incidents involving a Russian airline in Sinai in 2015 
and Egyptair in May 2016 (Adly, 2016b, pp. 6–7). 
 
7.2.3 Subcontractors as allied forces  
The post-Morsi era has been characterised by the formation of the various 
new allied groups that support the reshaping of the state; the military focused 
its effort on the expansion of controlling the economic structure, portraying 
such expansion as the model of economic development of the country. 
However, rather than relying on business to support the economy, the military 
regime relies on the considerable financial aid of foreign countries, primarily 
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from the Gulf. This results, on the one hand, in the unstable and precarious 
support of only a part of the business community – and in fact business only 
cooperates with the military at a subordinate level: some business people are 
excluded from the market due to the unfair competition set by the military, while 
other companies aim to work in partnership with the military to avoid being 
subjected to civilian administration (Adly, 2016b, p. 15). On the other hand, the 
military has to rely on growing coercion to maintain power, given the limited 
consensus received from business and the political opposition.  
As discussed earlier, similarly to the SCAF and the MB Sisi also encouraged 
investment to generate jobs in 2015. The government tried to incentivise 
domestic and foreign companies with a reduction of taxes and exemptions 
and, most importantly, the protection of private companies involved in public 
projects from administrative scrutiny (Adly, 2017, pp. 18–19). The expansion 
of the military economic empire marginalised and divided the business 
community. Some business actors, especially the ones owning media, seemed 
to engage with the new regime, while others remained distant (Abul-Magd, 
2015, p. 67, 2016, p. 36). In April 2015, the Federation of Egyptian Industries 
denounced the illicit allocation of contracts that the military had for construction 
projects (Abul-Magd, 2016, p. 36).  
Sisi does not have connection with business, contrary to Mubarak who had 
close enough connections with businessmen to allow them to be part of the 
NDP and gain seats in parliament, as well as be part of the cabinet. Sisi has 
more distant relations with business, commenting, for example, that 
businessmen did not contribute to the Long Live Egypt (Tahiya Misr) fund he 
created to seek economic help for infrastructure projects (Chams El-Dine, 
2014, p. 3; Adly, 2016b, p. 13). In mid-July 2014, Sisi attempted to reconcile 
with businessmen, inviting them for a Ramadan iftar at the Ittadeya Palace, 
asking them to invest in the development of the country in return for a revision 
of investment law (Abul-Magd, 2015, p. 67). From the 50 businessmen invited 
by Sisi, he managed to gather 5 billion EGP. This was donated by a limited 
number of businessmen while others preferred to abstain (Chams El-Dine, 
2014, p. 3). 
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To the meeting Sisi invited all sorts of businessmen regardless of their 
ideological affiliation, including Naguib Sawiris; Mohamed Farid Khamis, 
former member of the NDP; and Safwan Thabet, former member of EBDA; 
though figures like Ahmed Ezz, considered too close to Mubarak cronyism, 
were excluded (Chams El-Dine, 2014, p. 3). However, such friendly promises 
to business clashed with a 10% tax on capital gains in the stock market with 
the intention to get state reserves, which at the same time discouraged 
investors. This tax was eventually cancelled due to the pressure from business 
(Abul-Magd, 2015, p. 67, 2016, p. 36). The relations with businessmen 
remained distant, to the point that during the inauguration of the Suez Canal, 
Sisi intimated to them that they were ‘going to pay’ for the Long Live Egypt 
fund (Rabie, 2014). 
In addition, Sawiris, who was previously welcomed as a hero when Morsi 
allowed businessmen in exile to repay their tax evasion over five years, was 
now forced to pay 7 billion EGP. Salah Diab, owner of Al-Masry Al-Youm 
newspaper, was released after three years in jail for corruption, and arrested 
in November 2015 for owning unlicensed weapons, together with his son. His 
lawyer declared that the arrest was due to the fact that his newspaper became 
critical of the regime, and both were acquitted in 2017 (Ahram Online, 2017; 
Dawoud, 2017).  
Although the regime co-opted Sawiris’s Free Egyptians Party, after his 
expulsion Sawiris attempted to buy and merge two banks while the Central 
Bank of Egypt vetoed the deal, arguing Sawiris’s companies did not meet the 
required criteria (Adly, 2016b, p. 14). Ahmed Ezz, tycoon of steel industry in 
Egypt and the closest businessman to Gamal Mubarak, was acquitted of most 
corruption charges and allowed to resume his economic activities, but he was 
forbidden twice to run for the 2015 parliamentary election (Adly, 2016b, pp. 
13–14, 2017, p. 17).  
The lack of a ruling party similar to the NDP made it harder for businessmen 
formerly affiliated with the NDP to revive their old patronage relations in the 
new regime, especially since the attempt to run for election by the Shafiq party 
failed (Adly, 2017, p. 17). The network of patronage was established but the 
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lack of a ruling party and the increase of individual candidates helped Sisi to 
pick and choose the businessmen he needed. Sawiris attempted to remain in 
an oppositional party representing the interests of business, but after the co-
optation of the party Sawiris and its supporters were expelled, according to the 
new party leadership because Sawiris refused to reconcile with the authorities 
(Adly, 2017, p. 18).  
The main interest of the new regime was to reduce business to an allied 
force, unable to operate without the agreement of the military. The military 
aimed to use the economic activity of the business community to contribute to 
the state integration, creating jobs to ensure popular consent. Mostly 
redirecting the business money for state projects, Sisi expected businessmen 
to contribute 100 billion EGP to the Long Live Egypt fund; however, at the end 
of 2016 the fund had reached only 6 billion EGP. This is a signal that the 
business community was divided and part of it resisted being to the allied force 
of the military (Adly, 2017, p. 18). Despite the generous financial help that the 
new military regime received from foreign powers, the economic situation in 
the country needs the implementation of structural reforms. So far, Sisi has 
had to keep big business at a distance while ensuring the support of small 
subcontractors.  
 
7.3 Conclusion  
This chapter investigated the post-coup scenario to analyse how the military 
has learned from the experience of the oscillations of the MB between ally of 
the dominant force and the advanced subalterns at different points in time. In 
this chapter I highlighted how the military avoided having a single organised 
force that could be an allied force, creating a hyper-fragmented and transversal 
composition of allied forces, like subcontractors in the economy rather than big 
business dependent, and co-opting specific elements from, for example, the 
youth, Salafi and worker movements. 
The transformation of the Egyptian state in this sense is the result of the 
failure of the new interim government which sought the co-opting of unionist 
leaders like Kamal Abu Eita and Ahmed Burai, an initial attempt to integrate 
                                                          Subalternity and Counter-Revolution 
  221 
the workers within the state. This strategy backfired since it alienated the base 
of the subaltern forces from their leaders. The main strategy of the military was 
to limit the subalterns’ autonomy via coercion and attempting to fragment them 
and integrate them within the state. I argue that, contrary to the previous two 
phases of the uprising which were characterised by a lack of ideology from the 
dominant force, in this third phase the military started to develop a more 
defined ideology, firstly addressing any dissent as terrorist as it targeted 
unarmed Brotherhood supporters (as discussed in Chapter Six), and secondly 
reconstructing ideas of unity and integration via ultra-nationalist rhetoric, 
concretising it with the construction of megaprojects.  
I argue that the post-2013 state transformation, contrary to the 2011–2013 
transition, could be considered as a new passive revolution, where the military 
as the dominant force attempts to fragment the subaltern groups and integrate 
it within the state. However, contrary to the previous regime which undertook 
a strategy of divide and rule along lines of ideological difference within the 
opposition, the new dominant force divided the subaltern forces at the 
individual level, as proven by the split of Tamarrod and April 6. This highlights 
the weak alliance that the new dominant force managed to achieve with only 
fragmented parts of society. 
However, to fully integrate the subaltern groups within the state, the military 
has to implement structural reforms; this requires the cooperation of business 
which is reluctant to subordinate to the military. Because the contradiction that 
led to the 2011 uprising remains unsolved, in order to survive Sisi’s regime 
needs to include the subaltern groups in economic, social and political 
relations, reducing the autonomy of the subaltern groups within civil society.  
To do so, the new regime needs, on the one hand, to restrict the informal 
sector, on the other to provide welfare services to avoid the competition of 
subaltern groups. The main goal of the military is to reduce business to an 
allied force – where they do not have any access to the political society – with 
limited control of the economy, contributing to regime stability by creating jobs 
to ensure popular consent. By attempting to control business, the military aims 
to create an integral state where political society can penetrate the social–
Subalternity and Counter-Revolution 
222   
economic relations of civil society. Whether or not Sisi’s regime will manage to 
turn Egypt into an integral state via a passive revolution to neuter the subaltern 
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This project has aimed to provide a new theoretical tool to navigate the 
development of a revolutionary situation and to understand counter-revolution 
not as the default outcome of a failed revolution, but in its own right. The study 
of revolution often tends to focus only on successful revolutions while the 
unsuccessful are deemed merely as the residual category of what revolution 
is not. In this regard the Arab Uprising in general and the Egyptian counter-
revolution in particular highlighted how existing theories of revolution were 
unable to identify factors that made revolution fragile or the dynamic that 
underpins the development of counter-revolution. In order to fill this theoretical 
gap, the project revisits Gramsci’s theory of hegemonic crisis and subalternity. 
This thesis is based on assumptions similar to Gramsci’s: the understanding 
of how social forces develop and how to counter the hegemony of the dominant 
force. In this way, the thesis has proposed a theoretical model to address how 
the interaction between structure and agency determined the formation of 
counter-revolution. In addition, the model aims to go beyond the dichotomy 
between the study of the elite and the study of society as two separate levels 
of analysis. Indeed, as the example of the MB highlights, some social forces 
develop from civil society to political society and the linkage between these 
two realms is key to understanding state–society relations. In other words, the 
understanding of the oscillation of the intermediary forces and the conflicting 
strategies used by the social forces allowed us to explain the formation of the 
counter-revolution not as a top-down approach imposed by the will of the 
dominant force – as argued by scholars who consider the Egyptian Uprising a 
case of passive revolution – but rather as bottom-up dynamics that unfold with 
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the clashes within the subaltern bloc and the use of the strategies at their 
disposal to conquer the state. 
As a final remark, this thesis made three important contributions and linked 
three different fields of investigation. First of all, the thesis, by providing a 
model to understand the revolutionary situation as an open-ended process, 
contributed to the study of revolutions by accounting for the relations between 
structure and agency which was an unfulfilled aim of the fourth generation of 
revolution study. Secondly, but following the new insight offered by scholars 
on the study of Gramsci and subalternity, this thesis operationalised and 
empirically applied the concept of subalternity in terms of development and 
leadership that so far have been only theorised, based on the study of 
Gramsci’s prison notebook and pre-prison writing, but not yet applied. It also 
highlights how the intermediary force can be investigated in order to 
understand how in the context of a semi-integral state the hegemonic function 
of the dominant force is exercised within civil society through the intermediary 
forces that ally with the dominant. Thirdly, the thesis offered a reinterpretation 
of the conceptualisation of the state based on the empirical questions posed 
about the transformation of the Egyptian state due to the Uprising. The 
conceptualisation offered in this thesis should not be restricted to its 
application in authoritarian or developing countries. As addressed in Chapter 
Four, the integration and dis-integration of the state are complex mechanisms 
that underpin the simultaneous transformation of structural and superstructural 
relations.  
This final chapter underlines the main insights offered by the model that 
describes the Egyptian case throughout the thesis, and it remarks how it fills 
the gaps of the existing literature in understanding counter-revolution. Finally, 
the chapter reflects on the limitations of the thesis and proposes a future 
research agenda to fill these gaps.  
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8.1 Summary of thesis 
The introductory chapter (Chapter One) presented the research puzzle that 
underlined the theoretical gap. This thesis aimed to develop a new model to 
theorise revolution, passive revolution and grey areas of phenomena 
contained between these two extremes – like counter-revolution. By re-
engaging with the concept of subalternity and the integral state, this thesis 
explained how the Egyptian counter-revolution was the result of the oscillation 
of the intermediary force – the MB. In fact, the MB acted alternately as the 
allied and leading force. On the one hand, the MB accommodated the military 
in order to keep its place within the institutions. On the other hand, the MB took 
the lead of the subaltern bloc by setting specific achievable goals that could 
unify the subaltern forces in order to oppose the dominance of the military. 
In this regard, this thesis highlighted the relevance of the intermediary force 
in affecting the outcome of the Egyptian Uprising. The analysis, based on the 
intermediary force, reflects the necessity of investigating the dis-integration of 
the Egyptian state. In fact, the lack of an integral state allowed the emergence 
of a triangle of power during the revolutionary situation that started in 2011, 
because the dominant force does not control civil society in order to resolve 
the hegemonic crisis via a passive revolution. Instead of looking at a bipolar 
dynamic between dominant and subaltern blocs, this project investigated a ‘tri-
polar’ dynamic. Pre-2011 the military was pushed to the margin of the 
dominant bloc; when massive protests pushed for the removal of the crony 
capitalists, it allowed the military to emerge as the new dominant force after 
the uprising. This ‘democratic’ transition led to the election of the first Islamist 
president of Egypt.  
As discussed extensively in Chapter Two, this poses the basis for the 
scholarly debate on how to conceptualise the uprising. On the one hand, 
scholars who remained anchored to the old debate between authoritarianism 
and democratisation recognised the limits of both approaches but only 
addressed the uprising as a failed revolution, looking at the contingency of the 
empirical cases. On the other hand, scholars who attempted to move beyond 
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these old approaches interpreted the uprising as a form of revolution. 
However, the attempt to explain the revolution was soon replaced with the 
effort to explain the counter-revolution without adequate theoretical tools. In 
order to fill this gap of the fourth generation of revolutionary theory, this thesis 
revisited the concept of subalternity and the integral state to provide a 
theoretical framework to explain the Egyptian counter-revolution.  
Chapter Two looks at the existing literature on subalternity and the 
application of Gramsci’s theory in the pre- and post-Egyptian Uprising 
contexts. The literature on the Egyptian Uprising does not problematise the 
relations between the subaltern and the state in a counter-revolutionary 
context. This thesis contributed to the work of these scholars like Green (2002; 
2011); Liguori (2016); Modonesi (2014); Thomas (2015; 2018); and Galastri 
(2018) who highlight how subalternity is relational and intersectional, and can 
be identified at different levels of the organisation and penetration of civil 
society and political society, specifically in the context of the integral state.  
The pre-uprising literature applies Gramsci’s theory to explain the Egyptian 
state formation (Ayubi, 1995), the lack of democracy (Pratt, 2007), or the 
trajectory to the MB under Mubarak (Ranko, 2015), and the neoliberal 
economic reforms (Roccu, 2012), whereas the post-uprising literature focuses 
on hegemonic contraction as an enabling condition of the uprising (Chalcraft, 
2016), or a passive revolution driven by Caesarism (De Smet, 2016). While 
the uprising offers a new context to revise the application of Gramsci in Egypt, 
some of the scholars who applied Gramsci in the context of the uprising 
overlook the active role of subalterns in the counter-revolution, and their 
relations with the state. For example, De Smet (2016) stressed the exclusion 
of revolutionary forces in the revolutionary process, due to their failure to 
emancipate. De Smet assumed that because the working class failed to lead 
the revolution, then automatically the process is a passive revolution because 
it was led by neoliberal forces.  
This theory has two main limitations. On the one hand it overstretches the 
concept of passive revolution and Caesarism since both concepts are 
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continuously applied in every single phase of the Egyptian regime 
transformation. This argument minimises the disruptive effect of the uprising, 
reducing the relation between subaltern and dominant to only controlling the 
means of production, overlooking the complex relations among subaltern, 
intermediary and dominant forces.  
On the other hand, De Smet’s application of Caesarism to the relations 
between the military and the MB is also problematic. This theory does not fully 
explain, for example, why the MB challenged the hegemony of the military, 
especially since they are both considered dominant while sharing economic 
interests. More specifically, De Smet’s application of Caesarism is in 
contradiction with the argument which considers Morsi as both a civil Caesar 
– which by definition has hegemony – and a counter-hegemonic force – 
characterised by a lack of hegemony – that attempted to challenge the military. 
I do agree with the argument that the MB aimed to challenge the military; 
however, as discussed in Chapter Six, in order to conceptualise this power 
dynamic I argue that the concept of subalternity is more explanatory, and, 
additionally, the concept of intermediary force is a peculiar case of subalternity 
that can steer the transition in one direction rather than another.  
Chapter Three discusses the concept of the state in Gramsci and its 
relations with hegemony crisis, subalternity and state. The passive revolution 
– which implies the exclusion of the subaltern forces in the resolution of 
hegemonic crisis – is linked with the concept of integral state. In fact, only when 
the political and civil society are integrated with each other can they form the 
integral state. Thus, the changes in political society can shape the civil society 
and win the consent of subalterns, as fully integrated within the state, and they 
passively accept the change. The integration of subalterns within the state is 
necessary to restrict the autonomy of the subaltern because autonomy is a key 
condition for developing counter-hegemony. The chapter conceptualises the 
crisis of hegemony as the starting point of a revolutionary change; however, it 
states that the resolution of the hegemonic crisis is not predefined as revolution 
and passive revolution, rather it encompasses all sorts of ‘morbid symptoms’. 
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The chapter outlines how the concept of subalternity develops within 
Gramsci’s work. In the pre-prison writing Gramsci analysed non-hegemonic 
groups as the main connection between the dominant and oppressed masses, 
addressing it as the bureaucracy and the petty bourgeoisie. Then in the initial 
prison notebook, Gramsci analysed other non-hegemonic groups as both 
marginalised groups and fundamental social groups in different historical 
contexts, like slaves in ancient Rome, medieval Ciompi, and the industrial 
proletariat. In this way, the enlargement of the term should not be interpreted 
as a contradiction within Gramsci’s intellectual work, in fact the 
dominant/subaltern relation encompasses a broader category than 
bourgeoisie/proletariat, engaging with the cultural and ideological aspect of 
hegemony (Liguori, 2016, pp. 123–124). Thus the chapter connects Middle 
Eastern studies, revolution studies and Gramscian studies to elaborate an 
explanatory model that interlinks the autonomy of subalterns, state integration 
and the resolution of hegemonic crisis.  
Chapter Four analyses the hegemonic crisis in Gramsci’s terms, addressing 
specifically how the dis-integration of the state allowed different social forces 
to exploit pockets of autonomy within civil society. It highlights not only the 
economic roots of the uprising but also defines how autonomy is a prerequisite 
of subalternity organisation. The pre-uprising has been analysed by other 
scholars like Alexander and Bassiouny (2014), Abdelrahman (2015) and De 
Smet (2016); however, none of them conceptualised the crisis of hegemony 
as the failure of the integral state, they rather focus their attention on neoliberal 
contradictions. The manifestation of the hegemonic crisis cannot be fully 
understood without taking into account the Egyptian state. Chapter Four 
argues that the attempt at passive revolution by the crony capitalists failed 
because it did not develop any ideology to win the consent of the subaltern 
forces, nor for integrating the subaltern groups within the state. The relations 
between the dominant – the NDP and business – and marginalised force within 
the dominant bloc – the military – progressively deteriorated since the 1980s, 
as the Minister of Defence Abu Ghazala stressed how the tenure of officers 
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was lowering compared to the living standards of the upper middle class 
(Kandil, 2012a, p. 182).  
This tension remained latent due to the military economic interests in 
society, since the military relied on the manufacture of products for the civilian 
market, and the export of military products (Abdelrahman, 2015, pp. 21–22). 
The military enjoyed the benefit of state bureaucracy, since after their 
retirement generals accessed top positions in local governments (Bou Nassif, 
2012). In addition, the marginalisation of the military within the dominant bloc 
emerged in their competition with the police. The military had their resentment 
against Mubarak, because they had been put aside in favour of the police. The 
role of the military reduced after the peace treaty with Israel, which determined 
a parallel increase of the police and Mukhabarat (Frisch, 2013, p. 138). The 
number of MPs who were business people increased under Prime Minister 
Ahmed Nazif (2004–2011), becoming the symbol of the bond between the 
NDP and the crony capitalists. This penetration of political society by business 
has led scholars like De Smet (2016) and Roccu (2012) to suggest the 
formation of a passive revolution. However, I argue the passive revolution 
failed due to the lack of integration of subaltern forces. In fact, the exclusion of 
the subaltern groups from the redistribution of wealth confirmed the limited 
integration of the subaltern forces within state economic relations, as well as 
the lack of ideology behind business figures’ persuasion of civil society to 
accept their neoliberal economic relations.  
At the subaltern level, I argue that the subaltern forces exploited the 
autonomy offered by cyberspace, which allowed them to form a loose network 
that enabled them to develop contentious politics, witnessing the cooperation 
of various movements like workers, youth, Islamists, etc. In this context, the 
MB exploited pockets of autonomy to launch its war of position against the 
state; however, the war of position was necessary to weaken the state but not 
sufficient to allow the MB to become dominant. The convergence of the war of 
position by the most advanced force and the war of manoeuvre by the leading 
force – Kefaya and April 6 – allowed the strengthening of the subaltern bloc 
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which contributed to the manifestation of the hegemonic crisis. The most 
advanced groups, like the MB, had more sophisticated networks, organisation, 
resources and alternative ideologies. Nevertheless, I argue, the MB failed to 
take the lead of the post-uprising, being paralysed in its position of intermediary 
force, situating itself between the subaltern and the military. Finally, the military 
could become dominant because it was at the margins of the dominant bloc 
rather than an external force intervening due to the contrast between 
bourgeoisie and proletariat (De Smet, 2016).  
Chapter Five explains the first phase of the power dynamic between the 
three main actors starting from 25th January 2011. On the one hand, the gap 
formed by the resignation of Mubarak and his cronies was immediately filled 
by the military who became the dominant force with limited links with social 
forces except for their state within the civilian production and provision of 
primary goods for low-income groups. On the other hand, the transition opened 
the possibility for the MB to benefit from its war of position. However, because 
the war of position and manoeuvre were developed by different groups this 
resulted in a three-polar dynamic that characterised the transformation of the 
Egyptian state. In fact, as the dominant force of a semi-integral state, the 
military needed to secure more consent within civil society. In this regard the 
MB, as the most advanced force within civil society, was the preferred actor to 
become the connector between political and civil society.  
Contrary to the interpretation that the alliance between the military and the 
MB was a form of counter-revolution because it opposed the demand of the 
revolutionary movements (Achcar, 2016, p. 105), Chapter Five highlights the 
relations between the role of intermediary force as the connector between civil 
and political society and the semi-integral state. Due to its intermediary 
position the MB oscillated between becoming the potential allied force of the 
military and attempting to lead the subaltern forces. The necessity for the MB 
to consider the alliance with the military was due to the alienation between the 
base and the leadership of the MB which undermined the ability of the MB to 
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perform as the leading subaltern force, despite being the most advanced force 
within civil society. 
This marked the diversion of strategies of the base (war of manoeuvre) and 
the leadership (war of position), since the leadership maintained its moderate 
strategy, preferring cooperation over confrontation, and aiming to infiltrate 
political society; the base continued to engage actively with other social 
movements on the ground. This argument differs from the interpretation that 
the MB became a dominant force in Egypt because it won parliamentary 
elections and was bourgeoisie (De Smet, 2016, pp. 210–211). In fact, the 
moments of unity among the subalterns’ forces, such as the cooperation 
between the various social movements and the MB, highlight an oscillation on 
the part of the MB that stressed the inability of the military to control civil society 
without the support of the intermediary force, as the unity of the subaltern 
forces against the Selmi document, which forced the military to withdraw it, 
emphasised. However, once the Selmi document was withdrawn the MB 
abandoned the lead of the subaltern forces. The inability of the MB to perform 
a war of manoeuvre ultimately resulted in its ability to challenge the military.  
In Chapter Six, I look at the failed attempt of the MB as the allied force to 
control political society. I argue that the MB’s perpetration of its war of position 
was an attempt to challenge the military and control political society. The MB 
attempted to undertake the same strategy that allowed business figures to gain 
power under Mubarak – controlling civil society and then reaching political 
society. However, contrary to the crony capitalists, the MB had ideological 
leverage. In other words, since the MB was supporting different social forces 
via profit and non-profit activities, it had the potential to create a development 
model led by the private sectors. The MB did not have any control over 
coercion, due to its moderation since the 1980s, and it did not infiltrate the 
coercive apparatus; this resulted in its inability to challenge the military directly. 
Therefore, I argue that the MB attempted to expand its control of economic 
relations within civil society and, secondly, that the MB attempted to infiltrate 
the judiciary as an alternative coercive apparatus which resisted confrontation 
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with the MB. Finally, in the attempt to pre-empt the military reaction, before 
expanding its economic control over civil society, the MB had to protect the 
economic interest of the military. However, similar to the mistake made by 
crony capitalists under Mubarak, the MB did not integrate the subaltern forces 
within the state.  
The oscillation of the MB from being the allied force of the military to 
attempting to become the leading force of the subaltern bloc reduced the 
consent from the civil movements. In this context, Tamarrod emerged as a 
leading force to channel the discontent which resulted from the exacerbation 
of the MB’s war of position and the economic dis-integration. In this way, 
Tamarrod was able to lead the subaltern forces – similarly to the way Kefaya 
and April 6 did – by using a confrontational strategy to reach a specific aim – 
Morsi’s resignation – that could gather a broad base.  
However, due to the lack of organisation and therefore the lack of 
leadership, the military was able to capitalise on the wave of protests 
generated by the Tamarrod movement, and win the consent of the subaltern 
groups in deposing Morsi. To conclude, I argue that the easy removal of Morsi 
by the military was due to the fact that, in contrast to 2011, in 2013 the 
subaltern forces targeted the intermediary force which acted as an allied force 
of the dominant force, rather than targeting their alliance. This reinforced the 
dominant position of the military, which at that point had to recruit another allied 
force or expand its hegemony to form an integral state.  
Finally, Chapter Seven interrogates whether or not the transformation of the 
Egyptian state after the military coup can be addressed as a form of passive 
revolution. Most of the studies on the Egyptian Uprising – especially 
authoritarian resilience approaches – interpret the military coup as the 
complete restoration of the status quo that existed during Mubarak, denying 
the participation that popular forces had in shaping the Egyptian 
transformation. In this regard, some scholars put revolution and counter-
revolution as the two opposite outcomes of the same revolutionary situation 
(De Smet, 2016; Allinson, 2019a, 2019b). This approach stresses the 
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importance of addressing revolution not as an outcome but as a process, 
because it captures the dynamism of a change that occurs over an extended 
period of time and involves a plurality of actors at different levels. However, 
this dichotomic approach does not allow the study of what might fall in between 
revolution and counter-revolution.  
Others have conceptualised the Egyptian Uprising as form of morbid 
symptoms as the alternation of waves of revolution and counter-revolution. For 
example, the first wave or revolution is considered to be between the 
occupation of Tahrir Square and the resignation of Mubarak; the conservative 
coup follows as the first moment of counter-revolution based on the 
cooperation of the military and the MB as conservative forces to stop the 
revolution; the second wave of revolution was considered the strike and protest 
during the presidency of Morsi, to be followed again by the final counter-
revolutionary way of the post-military coup (Achcar, 2016, pp. 105–106). 
Although this interpretation aims to be rooted within Gramsci’s theory, it is 
close to Huntington’s theory of waves of democratisation (Arafat, 2018) – 
where the end goal of protest is to establish a revolution which will be 
achievable only via the support of the troops – similar to the case of 1952 
(Achcar, 2016, p. 146).  
This interpretation does not acknowledge the achievement that the unity of 
subaltern forces displayed against the military. In fact every time that Islamist 
and secular forces united they managed to push back the military’s demands. 
Furthermore, despite the need of the military to form an integral state, there 
were not suitable forces able to connect the political society with the civil 
society. As a matter of necessity to maintain its dominance, the military had to 
develop a way to integrate different forms of social forces. This intensified the 
use of consent and coercion with the use of ultra-nationalist rhetoric and brutal 
repression respectively. In order to reintegrate the social forces within the 
state, consent and coercion have to be accompanied by structural 
transformation. 
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 In this case, in order to avoid the possibility that an allied force could 
challenge its dominance, the military over-relied on foreign aid to sustain and 
trigger the development of the country. Whether or not the military will succeed 
in the reintegration of the state is too early to assess; however, protests 
triggered in September 2019 by Mohamed Ali – a former contractor of the 
military – and the formation of an anti-Sisi protest highlighted two main points 
(Al Jazeera, 2019; Michaelson, 2019a, 2019b). Firstly, Sisi’s state reintegration 
based on the lack of intermediary forces able to connect with different social 
forces might be a short-term strategy if the military-led development does not 
ensure the integration of subaltern forces. Secondly, these protests stress the 
relevance of the intermediary forces as a pivotal force that can tip the balance 
between political and civil society within the context of a semi-integral state.  
 
8.2 Limitations and further research agenda  
The thesis has discussed the reinterpretation of Gramsci’s concept of 
subalternity and his theory of revolution to propose a model to explain counter-
revolution and the fragility of the revolutionary process that the Egyptian case 
exposed. It is also important to reflect on the limitations of the thesis project 
and bear these in mind in order to prepare for further research. Thus, the main 
limitation of this project has been the inability to conduct fieldwork and primary 
data collection via interviews. In fact, although secondary data has been useful 
to highlight the development of the war of position and war of manoeuvre of 
the social forces involved in the uprising and its transition, the lack of interviews 
with those in the revolutionary movements, youth – both seculars and Islamists 
– workers, the MB, limited an analysis of the relations within the subaltern 
forces – not in terms of strategies used, since the thesis has investigated the 
wars of position and manoeuvre – but in relation to their internal organisation 
and ideology. Firstly, an accurate investigation of the organisation and 
mobilisation of these different groups will allow a better understanding of how 
the social forces developed between 2011 and 2013, and a mapping out of 
how their impact changed over time.  
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Secondly, the investigation of ideology – defined by Gramsci as a world view 
– is intertwined with other forms of consent and integration, like the provision 
of welfare and the development of economy. In this regard, we can better 
understand the limits of the war of position and the war of manoeuvre by 
investigating the relations in the ideological division between Islamists and 
seculars within the subaltern bloc. However, the investigation of ideology can 
illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of each movement, and its 
development. As explained in Chapter Three and discussed throughout the 
thesis, with the case of the MB the development of a social force is crucial to 
understand how the most advanced force can take the lead of the subaltern 
bloc and keep it united to turn the revolutionary situation into a consolidated 
revolution. Overall, access to interviews would have helped ‘why’ questions, 
like why movements like April 6 over-relied on the war of manoeuvre, or why 
some secular groups supported the military coup while others did not.  
To overcome these limitations the thesis focused on the ‘how’ questions 
which were essential to develop the model proposed to explain the counter-
revolution as the result of an open-ended process. Furthermore, the data 
collected from previous research is linked with the research objective of the 
primary researcher. I have always been aware of this and in fact in order to 
overcome this limitation this research triangulated data by seeking multiple 
sources reporting the same events in a similar manner. Similar to the previous 
limitations, in this case interviews are a way to further attest the validity of the 
sources used. 
These limitations can be met by conducting interviews, and as discussed 
earlier, can provide insight on the ideology of the subaltern forces. However, 
ideology is not exclusively a world view of the subaltern forces only. In fact, in 
order to maintain its dominance the military had also to develop ideology, and 
it did it through the use of ultra-nationalistic discourse to recall Nasser’s state. 
As discussed earlier, the new Egyptian state under Sisi is attempting to 
integrate the subaltern forces who triggered the uprising. In this regard an 
investigation of how Sisi’s regime deployed ideological discourses will help to 
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build on the current understanding of the basis of Sisi’s regime offered in this 
thesis – for example, military-led development and pretentious representations 
of the revolutionary forces like youth and workers. However, as stated in 
Chapter One and re-affirmed in Chapter Seven, whether or not the Sisi regime 
is successful in the integration of the subaltern forces remains beyond the 
scope of this project. Thus, this seems the first and foremost aim for further 
research. 
More broadly, since the aim of this research has been to develop a model 
of understanding of counter-revolution, it would be valuable to apply the model 
to similar cases that have experienced the wave of uprising as well but 
experienced very different outcomes, like Yemen, Syria and Libya, to assess 
the explanatory power of the model. This would also be valuable to understand 
the part of the model that has been conceptualised based on Gramsci but is 
not applicable in Egypt, like the use of the underground war. In fact, on this 
basis it is useful to reflect and investigate how underground war has played a 
role in the transformation of these cases and if there might be a correlation 
between underground war and civil war. Other components of the model can 
be investigated, for example the concept of Caesarism in the case of Yemen. 
In fact, Yemen in particular is a striking case for the application of the model in 
order to test the application of its Caesarism aspect because before turning 
into a civil war, the contrast within the military allowed the Houthi to gain control 
of the territory in the north and west of the country.  
The model can be applied in ongoing cases like Sudan and Algeria. This 
does not mean to suggest that Sudan and Algeria will turn into a counter-
revolution, rather it stresses that this model can be useful in two ways. Firstly, 
it can capture the difference within revolutionary situations. Secondly, it offers 
a theoretical tool to investigate state–society relations in a changing region that 
is still experiencing the effects of the Arab Uprisings.  
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